欧盟银行“自救”机制中债权保障的失衡与应对

发布时间：2018-03-31 03:13

  本文选题：银行风险处置　切入点：自救　出处：《上海财经大学学报》2017年05期

【摘要】：欧盟《银行与风险处置条例》赋予成员国强制减记银行债务或债转股的"自救"权力,债权成为自救机制发挥作用的基础。风险处置目标的公共利益属性赋予了"自救"机制处分债权的正当性,但各目标存在冲突且优先次序不明,埋下了债权保障失衡的隐患。"自救"机制虽然"改良"破产清算程序要素,规定了"自救"机制的触发条件、合格债务及其最低标准、债务处置顺序、"不低于破产待遇"及其例外,但存在较大的裁量性。欧盟"自救"机制难以适用于"第三国文件"项下的合格债务,削弱了风险处置的效果,为"第三国"应对"自救"措施提供了空间。我国目前不宜承认和执行欧盟的自救措施,可在全球金融治理层面主张约束"自救"权力的行使,并在今后立法中有限采纳自救机制。
[Abstract]:The EU Regulation on Banking and risk disposal gives member States the power to "save themselves" by forcing writedowns on bank debts or debt-for-equity swaps. Creditor's rights have become the basis of self-saving mechanism. The public interest attribute of the target of risk disposal gives the legitimacy of self-saving mechanism to dispose of creditor's rights, but each target has conflict and the order of priority is not clear. Although the "self-help" mechanism "improved" the elements of the bankruptcy liquidation procedure, it stipulated the trigger conditions for the "self-rescue" mechanism, eligible debts and their minimum standards. The order of debt disposal, "no less than the treatment of bankruptcy" and its exceptions, but there is greater discretion. The EU "self-rescue" mechanism is difficult to apply to eligible debts under the "third country document", which weakens the effect of risk disposal. This has provided space for "third countries" to respond to "self-help" measures. At present, China is not in a position to recognize and implement the EU's self-rescue measures, and can advocate restricting the exercise of the "self-help" power in the global financial governance. And in the future legislation of limited adoption of self-rescue mechanism.
【作者单位】： 华东政法大学国际法学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金年度一般项目[15BFX203]
【分类号】：D95;DD912.28
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本文编号：1688887