哈特规则理论中的立法思想探究

发布时间：2018-11-13 07:27

【摘要】：哈特将语言哲学与法哲学完美结合,运用日常语言分析方法,通过对奥斯丁的法律命令理论的批判建立起规则自治的描述性法理学,揭示了美国现实主义“规则怀疑论”者关于规则预测理论的谬误,指出奥斯丁“法律是主权者的命令”这一理论无法解释立法合法性、立法权威的连续性以及法律的持续性等问题。哈特认为“法律科学之关键”在于科以义务的初级规则和授予权力的次级规则的结合。初级规则主要是规范人们具体的行为和变动,在某些领域内,该群体或者官方的代表作为立法的主体来设立刑法意义上的设定义务的规则,对暴力、偷窃等行为加以限制,此外,在私人之间同样存在着设定民法义务的狭义立法行为。然而仅由初级规则构成的简单社会的法律控制具有不确定性、静止性和无效率性的缺陷,据此,哈特引入了次级规则加以补救。其中承认规则是规则的效力标准,是立法的正当性来源,法律的有效性取决于其是否符合承认规则所提供的标准。改变规则授予了立法权,并界定了立法所必须遵循的程序。裁判规则授权给某些人,对规则是否被违反作出权威性的决定,即授予法官司法裁判的权力,是对立法的补充。由于组成规则的语言文字具有开放结构的特征以及立法目标的不确定性,规则在适用过程中存在着“意思中心”和“边缘地带”。在规则的意思中心,法律规则所要表达的概念、命题和规范范围是确定的、无可置疑的,法官要遵循立法至上的原则,严格依照规则办事。而在规则的边缘地带,法官享有有限的立法权,通过司法造法来填补立法的空隙,在立法者立法目的的指导下进行自由裁量。哈特规则理论中所隐含的这一立法思想有着重要的意义,法律的有效性在于承认规则的识别,而承认规则本身是一种社会实践,以人们对其持有内在观点的接受而存在,这样分析实证主义由立法的“意志论”转向了立法的社会维度。同时,哈特指出在规则适用过程中法官享有一定意义上的自由裁量权,恰当地平衡了立法的稳定性和变化性,并重新理清了立法权和司法权二者之间的关系。
[Abstract]:Hart perfectly combines philosophy of language with philosophy of law, and sets up descriptive jurisprudence of rule autonomy by criticizing Austen's theory of legal command by using the method of daily language analysis. This paper reveals the fallacy of the American realistic "rule sceptics" about the theory of rule prediction, and points out that Austin's theory that "law is the command of the sovereign" cannot explain the legality of legislation. The continuity of legislative authority and the continuity of law and so on. Hart believes that the key to the science of law lies in the combination of the primary rules of obligation and the secondary rules of delegation of power. The primary rules are mainly to regulate the specific behavior and changes of people. In some areas, the representatives of the group or the official, as the subject of the legislation, establish rules of establishing obligations in the sense of criminal law, and restrict the acts of violence, theft, etc. In addition, there is also a narrow legislative act of creating civil law obligations between private individuals. However, the legal control of a simple society composed only of primary rules has the defects of uncertainty, stillness and inefficiency. According to this, Hart introduces secondary rules to remedy them. The rule of recognition is the criterion of validity of rules and the source of legitimacy of legislation. The validity of law depends on whether it meets the standard provided by rules of recognition. Changing the rules gives legislative power and defines the procedures that must be followed. The rules of adjudication authorize some people to make an authoritative decision as to whether the rules are violated, that is, the power to confer on the judge the judicial decision, which is a supplement to the legislation. Due to the open structure of the language and the uncertainty of the legislative goal, the rules have "meaning center" and "marginal zone" in the process of application. In the meaning center of the rules, the concepts, propositions and normative scope of the legal rules are certain and beyond doubt, the judges should abide by the principle of legislation supremacy and act strictly according to the rules. On the edge of the rules, the judges have limited legislative power to fill the gap of legislation through judicial legislation, and exercise discretion under the guidance of the legislative purpose of the legislator. The legislative thought implied in Hart's rule theory is of great significance. The validity of law lies in the recognition of rules, and the recognition of rules itself is a kind of social practice, which exists on the basis of people's acceptance of their internal views. In this way, positivism has changed from the "will theory" of legislation to the social dimension of legislation. At the same time, Hart points out that in the process of the application of the rules, the judge enjoys the discretion in a certain sense, which properly balances the stability and variability of the legislation, and clarifies the relationship between the legislative power and the judicial power.
【学位授予单位】：南京师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D90

【参考文献】