德国卡特尔法对水价的规制

发布时间：2018-02-20 01:09

本文关键词： 卡特尔法水价调控价格滥用地区自治　出处：《南京大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在德国,供水作为地区自治的一部分,是受德国《基本法》第28条第2款保护的。供水的组织形式是多种多样的,供水者可以选择私法的组织方式,比如以有限责任公司的形式,通过与用水方签订供水合同进行供水。当然,供水者也可以选择公法的组织方式进行供水,比如以市政企业的形式,而在这种情况下,供水者则向用水者收取水费,这是种行政性的费用。然而高昂的水价以及各地区间巨大的价格差异体现出,在德国长久以来缺乏对水价有效的卡特尔法调控。这也直接导致了这样的情形：德国的水价几乎是西方工业国家最高的,而且各个地区间水价的差异甚至达到了三倍。虽然在德国《反限制竞争法》中一直都存在着关于对价格滥用进行调控的条文。这主要是为了避免以下情况的产生：市场支配地位的占有者通过利用其优势地位而任意制定价格,他们在获得高额利益的同时使其交易的对方遭受经济上的损失。但是,数十年以来这些条文在供水价控制方面都没有发挥实际的作用一一特别是在以公法形式收取的水费领域。人们一直都基于这种观点：行政费用是依据行政法等公法征收的,只受地区行政法的调控,不受卡特尔法的调控,因为卡特尔法在本质上是私法。但在最近的"Niederbamimer Wasserverband"判决中,最高法院提出了这么一个问题：公法性质的费用是否也受卡特尔法的调控?这一案件判决的法律意见中,联邦最高法院表示出了这样的倾向,即使是有行政性质的水费对卡特尔法也没有天然的免疫力。这一判决在整个德国引起了强烈的反响,也引起了各方激烈的争论,争论的核心就是卡特尔法能否调控这种以公法性质征收的行政费用。依照传统的理念,公法性质的费用只受地区行政的调控。卡特尔法所能调控的价格仅限于私法性的,也即是那种通过平等的民事合同关系协商建立而来的价格。地区行政固然是必不可少的,实际中水价产生的弊端却说明,地区行政调控却是无效率、不足够的。面对德国如此高昂的水价,对水费有权进行监管的地区行政却常常是不作为。这样就使得水费在实际上处在了不受任何监管的境地。相应的,在地区行政监管无效率、不足够的情况下,水费就应该受卡特尔法的调控,所有联邦州和联邦的卡特尔部门都应该对其负责。尤其是用水的消费者需要卡特尔法提供的保护。用水者一直处于在弱势的地位,供水者的垄断地位使得他们毫无能力去影响价格的形成。出于这种保护弱势消费者的目的,也需要卡特尔法的调控。所以,在地区行政调控之外由卡特尔法进行平行的调控是有必要的。在宪法层面上,综合考虑联邦的经济权力和地区自治,我们也能得出这样的结果：通过卡特尔法对水价进行调控,是完全合宪的,这种辅助性的、第二性的调控并没有损害各个联邦州的自主权。
[Abstract]:In Germany, water supply, as part of regional autonomy, is protected by article 28, paragraph 2, of the German basic Law. For example, in the form of a limited liability company, the water supply is provided by signing a water supply contract with the water user. Of course, the water supplier may also choose the public law organization for the water supply, for example, in the form of a municipal enterprise, and in this case, Water users charge water users, which is an administrative charge. However, the high water prices and the huge price differences between regions show that, In Germany, where there has been a long lack of effective cartel regulation on water prices, this has led directly to the fact that water prices in Germany are almost the highest in industrialized countries in the West. And the price difference between different regions has even reached three times. Although there has always been a regulation of price abuse in the German Anti-restrictive Competition Law. This is mainly to avoid the occurrence of the following situations. The occupants of a dominant position of the market set prices at their discretion by exploiting their dominant position, They gain high profits while making the other side of their trade suffer financial losses. However, For decades, these articles have not played a practical role in controlling the price of water, especially in the area of water charges in the form of public law. People have been based on the view that administrative expenses are levied on the basis of public law, such as administrative law. Is governed only by regional administrative law and not by cartel law, which is essentially private law. But in the recent "Niederbamimer Wasserverband" judgment, The Supreme Court has raised the question of whether costs of a public law nature are also regulated by cartel law. In its legal opinion on the case decision, the Federal Supreme Court expressed such a tendency that even water charges of an administrative nature have no natural immunity to the cartel law. This decision has aroused strong repercussions throughout Germany. There has also been a heated debate among the parties. The core of the argument is whether cartel law can regulate this kind of administrative fee imposed by the nature of public law. According to the traditional idea, Costs of public law are regulated only by regional administration. The price that cartel law can regulate is limited to private law, that is, the price established through equal civil contractual relations. However, the drawbacks of water prices in practice show that regional administrative regulation and control is inefficient and insufficient. Faced with such high water prices in Germany, The district administration that has the right to supervise water charges is often not an act of action. As a result, water charges are in fact not subject to any supervision. Accordingly, in the case of inefficient and inadequate regional administrative supervision, Water charges should be regulated by the cartel law, and all federal state and federal cartel departments should be held accountable. Especially consumers of water need the protection provided by the cartel law. Water users have always been in a weak position. The monopolistic position of water suppliers leaves them powerless to influence the formation of prices. For this purpose of protecting vulnerable consumers, cartel laws are also required. It is necessary to have parallel regulation and control by cartel law in addition to regional administrative regulation. At the constitutional level, considering the economic power of the Federation and regional autonomy, we can also get the following result: we can regulate water prices through the cartel law. Fully constitutional, this complementary, secondary regulation does not undermine the autonomy of federal states.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D951.6;DD912.29

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