自由主义中立性原则的虚弱——对基础规范理论政治功能的批评

发布时间：2018-03-01 16:14

本文关键词： 基础规范制宪权实践反思性认同政治价值　出处：《清华法学》2012年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：凯尔森基础规范的认识论背后潜藏着重要的政治功能:通过法治保存民主自由国家的多元社会价值。然而,以一种自由主义的中立性原则来处理价值问题并不适合法律秩序。原因即在于法的规范性陈述只有认识—语义学意义,但作为陈述对象的"法规范",则必然具有实践—语用学功能,而在一个多元社会,法规范实践功能之有效发挥必然要涉及"理由追问",这种理由在证成一个具体规范的时候就已经涉及政治价值的权衡和运用。凯尔森基础规范在认识论上是成立的,但当它是法律体系的基础规范时,就无法回避法律体系的本质在于实践这一根本特征。
[Abstract]:There is an important political function behind Kelsen's basic normative epistemology: preserving the pluralistic social values of a democratic and free country through the rule of law. It is not suitable for the legal order to deal with the value problem with a kind of liberalism neutral principle. The reason is that the normative statement of law has only cognitive-semantic meaning. However, the "legal norms", which are the objects of statement, must have the function of practice-pragmatics, and in a pluralistic society, The effective exertion of the practical function of law and norm must involve "reason questioning", which has already involved the weighing and applying of political value when it is proved to be a concrete norm. The Kelsen basic norm is established in epistemology. However, when it is the basic norm of legal system, the essence of legal system lies in practice.
【作者单位】：中国人民大学法学院;
【基金】：2010年度中国人民大学“中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金项目”(10XNF044)成果
【分类号】：D909.1

【共引文献】