国有控股上市公司高管薪酬与公司财务绩效关系的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-20 15:43

本文关键词： 国有控股高管薪酬财务绩效　出处：《西南财经大学》2011年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2008年的金融危机已经即将淡出我们的视线,但是金融危机的影响和警戒却犹在心间。2008金融海啸引发了国外金融业高管的降薪潮,也引出了国内金融业的“限薪令”。以此为导火索,引发了国内民众对国企高管薪酬的热议。国内高管的薪酬问题是整个社会普遍存在的问题,不仅理论界关注,企业家们也是头痛不已。委托代理理论的核心问题之一就是设计激励方案来避免委托代理问题,而激励方案的重中之重就是薪酬制度的设计。国内外都有很多的学者在进行高管薪酬与公司绩效关系的研究。高管薪酬可以激励经理和其他高管勤勉尽职,达到企业各项资源的最优配置,从而最大化公司价值,最终实现股东财富最大化的目标。次贷危机暴露出美国企业公司治理方面的问题。首先,董事会及其下属薪酬委员会没有花费必要时间精力来监督高管的薪酬方案的执行情况,表现为责任感的缺失；其次,非执行董事缺乏对复杂的公司业务的了解,缺乏专业知识以提出问题,缺乏风险防范意识,不能有效地实施监督和制衡。这些都是我们的前车之鉴。知识经济时代的到来,伴随着全球经济一体化进程,企业的竞争已经成为人力资源的竞争。公司高管人员的能力与企业的盈利能力和发展前景密切联系。高管薪酬是否与企业绩效挂钩,对于公司业绩的影响和人才的保有至关重要。薪酬制度是现代公司治理的一个重要的研究方向,一套好的薪酬制度有助企业的成长发展。有效的激励方案可以激励高管最优化配置资源,最大限度提升公司价值,使得股东财富最大化。国有企业作为我国经济的主要命脉,是中国经济发展的关键所在。而要使这类公司发挥其重要作用,继续稳步推动我国经济发展,提高经济效益,国企高管作为其核心决策层,对公司和国家的前途起着关键作用。因此,国企薪酬制度的完善性非常重要。研究国有控股上市公司高管薪酬与公司财务绩效的关系,对构建现代企业制度和规范薪酬管理具有重要意义,而专门针对我国国有企业高管薪酬与企业绩效关系的研究还很少。加之目前公众对国企高管的薪酬充满质疑,国企高管自己又觉得很委屈。与其说公众是对国企高管薪酬不满,更不如说是对这一薪酬背后的形成机制的科学、合理、公开、透明性的质疑。无论从理论还是实际的角度出发,国企高管薪酬制度都值得进一步研究。笔者希望通过本文的研究,能够得到更清晰、合理的关于国企高管薪酬与公司财务绩效关系的结论,为我国的国企薪酬激励实施提供部分的理论支持。本文分为六章,各章主要内容如下：第一章：导论。主要介绍论文的研究背景及目的、研究思路和框架结构以及研究方法为后文进一步研究打好伏笔。第二章：文献综述。依据本文的研究对象和对高管薪酬内容的划分,将本章划分为高管年薪与公司财务绩效关系的研究、管理者持股与公司财务绩效关系的研究和国有控股上市高管薪酬与公司财务绩效关系的研究三部分,分别对每部分的国内外研究成果进行了回顾和梳理。通过对已有文献的分析梳理,笔者发现,国外的文献对高管薪酬的激励作用普遍认可且认为运行有效。而国内的研究由于市场发展程度有限,研究的较晚,样本数据有限,得出的结论也不尽一致。大多数研究都集中于全部的上市公司,国有控股仅作为一个控制变量,专门针对国有控股上市公司的研究较少。而且国内目前关于薪酬激励研究的样本数据严重过时,大部分都是基于2004年以前的数据,对现在的市场已经不具有实践指导意义。而市场经济发展日新月异,国企作为国民经济的支柱,对其高管的薪酬激励进行新的验证分析已经迫在眉睫。第三章：理论分析。首先对本文的重要概念(国有控股上市公司、高管、高管薪酬、公司财务绩效和因子分析法)进行界定。其中国有控股上市公司是指的沪、深上市公司中实际控制人为国有股、国家股、国有法人股的公司。高管的定义与公司法的一致。公司财务绩效是通过因子分析法获得的包括了公司获利能力、成长能力、营运能力和偿债能力的7个指标的综合因子得分。其次对本文依据的四大理论(委托代理理论、激励理论、人力资本理论和利益汇聚假说)进行阐述,笔者总结出：现代公司两权分离的情况下,委托代理理论提出可以通过激励管理者的方式来降低代理成本；而激励理论则为委托代理理论需要的激励方式提供理论和行为上的指导；人力资本理论则提出对高管人员这一特殊群体进行激励的必要性和重要性；利益汇聚假说则具体指明对管理者的激励可能达到的目的。上述四个理论从不同方面对本文的研究给予了理论上的支持,为假设的提出奠定了理论基础。第四章：国有控股上市公司高管薪酬与公司财务绩效之间关系的分析。对我国国有控股上市公司的背景进行介绍,从理论上分析我国国有控股上市公司高管薪酬与公司财务绩效的关系,分析说明我国国有控股上市公司高管薪酬目前存在的问题。通过上述分析发现,我国国有控股上市公司高管薪酬与公司财务绩效的关系如下：首先：制度规定方面,国有控股上市公司已经建立了相应的激励机制,包括董事会下设专门的薪酬委员会和高管薪酬与绩效挂钩的规定。但薪酬委员会的独立性和进行激励的“值”的确定还存在不足。其次,国有控股上市公司的高管薪酬目前存在三方面问题：一是薪酬结构不合理、形式单一；二是行业差距大、难兼顾公平和效率；三是薪酬委员会的独立性的缺失。第五章：我国国有控股上市公司高管薪酬与公司财务绩效关系的实证研究。主要从实证的角度来研究国有控股上市公司高管薪酬与公司财务绩效的关系。根据我国沪深股市2007——2009年样本数据,用因子分析法得出的公司财务绩效变量F做被解释变量,用高管年薪、高管持股比例、公司规模和行业虚拟变量做解释变量建立回归模型,通过excel和统计软件进行了描述性统计分析和回归分析,得出以下四个结论： 1.国有控股上市公司高管薪酬与公司财务绩效呈正相关关系。 2.国有控股上市公司高管年薪与高管在职消费存在正相关关系。 3.国有控股上市公司高管持股比例与公司财务绩效关系不显著。 4.公司财务绩效与公司规模和行业存在显著相关关系。第六章：结论与政策建议。通过实证分析,本文得出国有控股上市公司高管年薪对公司财务绩效的影响不及在职消费对绩效的影响,而高管持股比例对公司财务绩效基本不产生影响的结论。为了提高国有控股上市公司高管薪酬激励的作用,降低代理成本,实现股东价值：,即国民财富最大化的目标,根据实证研究结论提出以下几点政策建议： 1促进薪酬机制健全完善 2加快股权激励机制建立 3加强监督和法制化,提高高管薪酬的透明度 4奖惩结合,引入信誉风险考核本文的主要贡献是： 1.以国有控股上市公司作为研究的切入点,研究结果对国有企业薪酬激励机制具有参考价值。国内对高管薪酬与财务绩效关系的实证研究基本上都是以上市公司整体或者分行业来进行,而对国有企业进行单独研究的很少。但是国有控股公司由于其性质和制度的特殊性,不同于一般公司,因此这些结论可能并不能完全反映国有控股上市公司的薪酬激励情况。本文针对国有控股上市公司高管薪酬与财务绩效关系进行实证研究,对国有企业高管薪酬激励机制具有参考价值。 2.在数据的选择方面,采用了最新数据。先有文献大多集中于对2004年以前的数据的研究,样本严重过时。本文选取我国沪深股市全部国有控股上市公司20072009年的数据作为样本分年进行回归分析,一方面可以发现所研究问题的最新动向,另一方面也保持了研究的连贯性。并且本文分年对样本数据进行回归分析,可以比较不同年份的结论,看清发展趋势。而选取2007年作为样本选取的开端是因为这样可以检验2006年股权分置改革是否推动了国有控股上市公司激励机制的实施。当然,本文也存在一些不足,包括： 1.样本区间选择的特殊性。本文选择20072009年作为样本区间,在这一段时间内,我国股市接受了全球金融危机的洗礼,经历了从大牛市到大熊市的巨大变化,公司业绩受到很大影响,对本文的研究结果会有一定的影响。 2.财务绩效指标和高管薪酬变量有待完善。由于指标选择的局限性,难免存在不足。在以后的研究中,在因子分析法基础变量的选择上做到更全面,尽量覆盖全部因子信息；而高管薪酬的替代变量尽量涵盖全部的薪酬内容,尽量避免上述不足。
[Abstract]:The financial crisis in 2008 is about to fade out of our line of sight , but the impact and vigilance of the financial crisis is still in the heart . The 2008 financial tsunami triggered a rise in the financial sector in the foreign financial sector . It also led to the domestic financial industry ' s " limited salary order " . The problem of domestic executives ' remuneration is a widespread problem throughout the society . Not only is the theoretical circle concerned , but entrepreneurs are headache . One of the core issues of principal agent theory is to design incentive scheme to avoid the problem of delegation agent , and the core of incentive scheme is the design of compensation system . Many scholars at home and abroad have studied the relationship between executive pay and company performance . High executive pay can motivate managers and other executives to work hard due diligence to maximize the value of the company and ultimately achieve the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth . The subprime crisis has exposed the problems of American corporate governance . First , the Board of Directors and its remuneration committees do not spend the necessary time to monitor the implementation of executive pay programmes , as a sense of responsibility ; secondly , non - executive directors lack knowledge of complex company operations , lack of expertise to raise issues , lack of awareness of risk prevention , and do not effectively implement supervision and balances . These are all of our headlights . The coming of the era of knowledge economy is accompanied by the process of global economic integration , the competition of enterprises has become the competition of human resources . The ability of the senior managers of the company is closely related to the profitability and the development prospect of the enterprise . The compensation system is an important research direction of modern corporate governance . The compensation system is an important research direction of modern corporate governance , and a good salary system can help the growth of the enterprise . The effective incentive scheme can inspire executives to optimize the allocation resources , maximize the value of the company , and maximize the shareholder ' s wealth . State - owned enterprises , as the main lifeline of our economy , are the key to the development of China ' s economy . The author hopes that through the research in this paper , we can get a clearer and reasonable conclusion about the relationship between the executive pay of state - owned enterprise and the company ' s financial performance , and provide some theoretical support for the implementation of state - owned enterprise salary incentive . This article is divided into six chapters , the main contents of each chapter are as follows : Chapter One : Introduction . It mainly introduces the research background and purpose of the thesis , the research thought and frame structure and the research method . Chapter 2 : Literature review . According to the research object and the division of the content of executive compensation , this chapter is divided into three parts : the study of the relationship between executive stock annual salary and the company ' s financial performance , the research on the relationship between manager ' s holding and the company ' s financial performance , and the research on the relationship between the executive compensation and the company ' s financial performance . Chapter Three : Theoretical analysis . Firstly , it defines the important concept of the thesis ( state - controlled listed company , executive , executive pay , company ' s financial performance and factor analysis method ) . Chapter Four : The analysis of the relationship between executive compensation and financial performance of state - controlled listed companies . The relationship between executive compensation and financial performance of state - controlled listed companies in our country is analyzed theoretically . First of all , the state - controlled listed company has set up the corresponding incentive mechanism , including the special compensation committee under the board of directors and executive pay and performance linked provisions , but the determination of the independence of the remuneration committee and the " value " of the incentive is insufficient . Secondly , there are three problems in the executive pay of state - controlled listed companies : firstly , the salary structure is unreasonable and the form is unitary ; secondly , the industry gap is big , it is difficult to balance the fairness and efficiency ; and the third is the lack of the independence of the remuneration committee . Chapter 5 : The empirical research on the relationship between executive compensation and corporate financial performance of state - controlled listed companies in our country . Based on the sample data of Shanghai - Shenzhen stock market in 2007 _ 2009 , the company ' s financial performance variable F obtained by factor analysis is interpreted as the variable , and the regression model is established by using high - tube annual salary , high - tube shareholding ratio , company size and industry virtual variable as explanatory variables , and the following four conclusions are obtained through descriptive statistics analysis and regression analysis by excel and statistical software : 1 . The executive pay of state - controlled listed company is positively related to the company ' s financial performance . 2 . There is positive correlation between the annual salary of state - controlled listed company and the in - service consumption of senior executives . 3 . There is no significant relationship between the proportion of executives held by state - controlled listed companies and the company ' s financial performance . 4 . The company ' s financial performance is related to the company ' s size and industry . Chapter 6 : The conclusion and policy suggestion . Through the empirical analysis , this paper concludes that the effect of the executive salary of the state - controlled listed company on the company ' s financial performance is less than that of the in - service consumption . 1 Promotion of sound and perfect compensation mechanism 2 Speed up the establishment of the equity incentive mechanism 3 Strengthen supervision and legalization , improve the transparency of executive pay 4 reward and punishment combination , introduction of reputation risk assessment The main contributions of this paper are as follows : 1 . Taking the state - controlled listed company as the entry point of the research , the research results are of reference value to the compensation incentive mechanism of state - owned enterprises . 2 . In the aspect of data selection , the latest data is adopted . First , most of the literatures are focused on the study of data before 2004 , and the samples are seriously outdated . In this paper , we can find out the latest trend of the research problems and the consistency of the research on the other hand . There are , of course , some drawbacks , including : 1 . The particularity of sample interval selection . In this paper , the author selects 2007 as the sample interval , and in this period , China ' s stock market accepted the global financial crisis , experienced the great changes from the bull market to the big bear market , the company ' s performance has been greatly affected , the research results of this article have some influence . 2 . The financial performance indicator and the executive pay variable need to be improved . Due to the limitation of the indicator selection , there is no shortage . In the future research , the factor analysis method is more comprehensive and can cover all the factor information as much as possible ; and the substitute variable of the executive compensation should cover all the compensation contents as far as possible , so that the shortage is avoided as much as possible .

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：F275;F272.92;F276.1

【引证文献】