论提名股东对提名董事利益输送的补充责任

发布时间：2018-01-23 21:44

本文关键词： 公司治理提名董事提名股东　出处：《广西民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：董事的出身决定了其所代表的特定利益,并成为特定利益群体的代言人。现行公司法无视董事这一自然属性,强制赋予董事一些不切实际的义务,导致董事无所适从,从而影响了公司治理的效率。应当明确规定董事在其履行职务时违反法律规定给公司及其他利益相关者造成损害时,应由董事承担赔偿责任,并由其提名人承担补充赔偿责任。应明确落实每位董事候选人的提名人,从而将每位董事与其提名人的利益和责任绑定。这一方面在董事会内各位董事将各为其主有助于形成一种利益制衡机制,形成透明决策,保障决策质量,提高决策效率;另一方面追究提名人的补充责任将对大股东利用董事会损害小股东利益的行为形成有力的威慑,从而遏制利益输送。
[Abstract]:The birth of directors determines the specific interests they represent and becomes the spokesman of specific interest groups. The current company law disregards the natural attribute of directors and imposes some impractical obligations on directors. Therefore, the efficiency of corporate governance is affected. It should be clearly stipulated that when the director violates the law and causes damage to the company and other stakeholders in the performance of their duties. The directors shall be held liable for compensation and their nominees shall bear the supplementary liability... the nominees for each director candidate shall be clearly identified. Therefore, the interests and responsibilities of each director and their nominees are bound. On the one hand, each director in the board of directors will contribute to the formation of a mechanism of interest checks and balances, the formation of transparent decision-making, and the assurance of decision-making quality. Improving the efficiency of decision-making; On the other hand, the supplementary liability of the nominees will be a powerful deterrent to the large shareholders using the board of directors to harm the interests of the minority shareholders, thereby curbing the transfer of benefits.
【作者单位】：中南民族大学法学院;
【分类号】：D922.291.91
【正文快照】： 07一、问题的提出从现代各国公司法的规定来看,公司法一般只强调董事共同的一般抽象意义上的董事对公司及全体股东的义务以及为了公司整体利益最大化行事的责任,但一般都忽视或者无视不同类型董事对特定公司利益主体的特定诉求的关怀。如果是这样的话,那么公司法区分不同类型

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