我国国企高管薪酬的法律规制

发布时间：2018-02-02 18:12

本文关键词： 国企高管薪酬规制法律分配制度公平　出处：《西南政法大学》2011年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近年来,国有企业高管收入的增长速度超乎常人的想象,国企高管的收入与普通职工差距过大,已经引起了社会民众的巨大不满。国有企业的良好效益大多受益于国有企业的垄断地位、政府的优惠政策,因此,国企高管的高收入不完全是其管理能力高的结果,其高收入与其绩效的联系也不得而知。这也是社会公众对国企高管收入过高不满意的原因之一,总的来说国企高管的高薪与其付出不成正比。本文通过比较法的研究方法,对其他国家国企高管的薪酬的制度做了说明,并阐述了对我国的启示。我国现有的法律法规较为混乱,对国企高管薪酬的规定也过于抽象,在实践中不易操作。笔者呼吁加速国企的市场化改革,通过市场及法律的双重规制来完善对国企高管的薪酬制度。即可以通过规范薪酬构成,完善国有企业的信息披露制度等措施使国企高管的收入走向合法化,合理化。这对于维护公平,保障正当的分配秩序,缩小贫富差距,维护社会稳定具有重要的意义。本文除引言与结语部外,共分五部分。引言通过实例引出我国国企高管收入的背景及其现状,分析了对国企高管收入限制的意义,引出下文。第一部分对国企高管收入过高的情况进行了实证分析。本部分首先简要介绍了国有企业与国企高管的概念,然后通过数据和实例论证了我国国企高管收入过高,并对国企高管收入过高的原因进行了深入分析。第二部分对我国国企高管薪酬的法律规制进行了必要性分析。本部分分别从维护社会公平,保障正当的分配秩序和缩小贫富差距,维护社会稳定等方面分析了对国企高管薪酬进行法律规制的必要性。第三部分是对我国国企高管薪酬规制的比较法考察及借鉴的论述。本部分首先对法国、意大利、美国、英国四个国家的相关法律加以综述,然后总结了各国值得学习的经验,最后从我国的国情出发阐述了对我国的启示。第四部分考察了我国国企高管薪酬规制的立法状况。本部分先对《公司法》、《企业国有资产法》、《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法》等规范性文件的相关规定进行了评述。然后,结合我国实践从三个方面论述了我国现行法律法规存在的问题。第五部分从立法的角度提出了对我国国企高管薪酬规制的完善措施。本部分先说明了立法完善的总体思路,包括完善的形式及其基本的理念,又从四方面论述了对国企高管薪酬规制的具体制度的完善。结语部分总结了全文的观点,重申了对国企高管薪酬规制的重要意义,并对国企高管薪酬规制的未来发展提出展望。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the income of senior executives in state-owned enterprises has increased at a faster rate than most people imagine, and the gap between the income of executives in state-owned enterprises and that of ordinary workers is too large. The good benefits of state-owned enterprises mostly benefit from the monopoly position of state-owned enterprises and the preferential policies of the government. Therefore, the high income of senior executives of state-owned enterprises is not entirely the result of their high management ability. The link between their high incomes and their performance is also unknown. This is one of the reasons why the public is dissatisfied with the high income of executives at state-owned enterprises, whose salaries are generally not proportional to their pay. Through the comparative method, this paper explains the system of executive compensation of state-owned enterprises in other countries, and expounds the enlightenment to our country. The existing laws and regulations of our country are more confused, and the regulations of executive compensation of state-owned enterprises are too abstract. It is not easy to operate in practice. The author calls for speeding up the market-oriented reform of state-owned enterprises and perfecting the compensation system for state-owned enterprise executives through the dual regulation of the market and the law. Perfecting the information disclosure system of state-owned enterprises and other measures to legalize and rationalize the income of state-owned enterprise executives is of great significance for safeguarding fairness, ensuring proper distribution order, narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, and maintaining social stability. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, this article is divided into five parts. The introduction leads to the background and present situation of the executive income of state-owned enterprises in China through examples, analyzes the significance of restricting the income of executives in state-owned enterprises, and leads to the following. In the first part, the author makes an empirical analysis of the excessive income of the senior executives in the state-owned enterprises. Firstly, this part introduces the concepts of the state-owned enterprises and the executives of the state-owned enterprises, and then proves that the income of the executives in the state-owned enterprises is too high through the data and examples. And the reasons for the high income of state-owned executives are analyzed in depth. In the second part, the author analyzes the necessity of the legal regulation of the executive compensation of the state-owned enterprises in China. This part is to safeguard the social equity, guarantee the proper distribution order and narrow the gap between the rich and the poor. This paper analyzes the necessity of legal regulation of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises in terms of maintaining social stability. The third part is a comparative study and reference to the executive compensation regulation of state-owned enterprises in China. This part first summarizes the relevant laws of France, Italy, the United States and Britain, and then summarizes the experience of various countries that deserve to learn. At last, it expounds the enlightenment to our country from the point of view of our national conditions. Part 4th examines the legislative status of executive compensation regulation in state-owned enterprises in china. This part first deals with the relevant regulations of the normative documents, such as company law, the law of state-owned assets of enterprises, and the interim measures for assessing the management performance of central enterprises. And then, Combined with the practice of our country, this paper discusses the existing problems of our country's current laws and regulations from three aspects. In the 5th part, the author puts forward the measures to perfect the executive compensation regulation of the state-owned enterprises in China from the angle of legislation. This part first explains the general idea of the legislative perfection, including the form of perfection and its basic idea. It also discusses how to perfect the specific system of executive compensation regulation in four aspects. The conclusion part summarizes the views of the full text, reiterates the importance of the executive compensation regulation of state-owned enterprises, and puts forward the prospect of the future development of the executive compensation regulation of state-owned enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：西南政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.291;F276.1

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