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论公司的交叉持股及其法律规制

发布时间:2018-02-22 00:16

  本文关键词: 交叉持股 公司法 法律规制 立法建议 出处:《中国政法大学》2011年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:在我国,公司之间交叉持股是国家在国有企业改革的过程中提出并实施的一项政策性措施,目的是国家要进行国有企业改革,使国企适应社会主义市场经济的要求,增强市场竞争力,建立现代化的公司制度。在当时,我国的经济成分单一,公有制经济在国民经济中占绝对统治地位,因此国有企业之间相互持股成为很好的策略,既实现了股东的多元化,便于加强对公司生产运营的监督,又节省了资金,解决了当时资金短缺的问题。因而,交叉持股自产生以来即受到国家的保护、支持和推广,对其进行的法律规制却是极其薄弱的。 近年来,我国资本市场上频频出现由交叉持股引起的重大案例,引起人们广泛关注,使得交叉持股这一公司法律制度成为学界乃至广大投资者热议的话题。从最早的“辽宁大成股份有限公司与广发证券有限责任公司互相成为对方的第二大股东,形成上市公司与证券公司交叉持股的我国第一起交叉持股案例”1到后来不断出现的造系运动——从德隆系、中广系到涌金系及现在正被中国证监会立案调查的天宝系等,让人眼花缭乱。 交叉持股存在有利的一面,如:实现企业间的战略联盟,防止恶意收购,交叉持股可以在节省企业资金支出同时也为企业的融资提供了极为便利的条件,而且交叉持股还是实现产业布局的很好的手段。当然交叉持股也有极大地消极作用:“虚增公司资本,危害资本三原则”2;“干扰资本市场交易秩序,诱发内幕交易和关联交易”3;“相互持股的公司间易形成内部控制,造成监督机制缺位”4,甚至股东被架空,致使公司的治理结构不能发挥投资者期待的作用;在极端的情况下,还会推动经济泡沫的产生和破灭。 笔者试图通过对公司之间交叉持股的基本法律理论的研究,分析其效用:何种情形下产生积极效用,哪种情况下产生消极的效用。在此基础上,考察日本、英美法系及法德等大陆法系国家对公司间交叉持股所采取的对策其原因分析,吸收借鉴外国立法的有益之处,以完善我国的法律制度。 全文共分正文和结论两个部分,其中正文分为五章:第一章主要介绍了交叉持股的基本理论及其起源和发展;第二章着重分析了交叉持股的效用:正面效用和负面效用;第三章考察了域外法——主要是英美法系和大陆法系的主要国家关于交叉持股的立法情况;第四章探讨了我国立法以及司法实务中关于交叉持股的现实状况,阐释了我国交叉持股的制度环境,并分析了相关案例;第五章阐述构建和完善我国交叉持股制度的法律对策,参照外国的立法经验并结合我国国情的基础上,提出了如何构建和完善我国公司交叉持股的法律建议,为我国社会主义法制建设做出自己的努力。
[Abstract]:In China, cross-shareholding among companies is a policy measure put forward and implemented by the state in the course of the reform of state-owned enterprises. The purpose of the policy is that the state should carry out the reform of state-owned enterprises and adapt the state-owned enterprises to the requirements of the socialist market economy. Strengthening market competitiveness and establishing a modern corporate system. At that time, the economic component of our country was single, and the public ownership economy occupied an absolute dominant position in the national economy. Therefore, cross-shareholding among state-owned enterprises became a good strategy. It not only realizes the diversification of shareholders, facilitates the supervision of the production and operation of the company, but also saves funds and solves the problem of the shortage of funds at that time. Therefore, cross-shareholding has been protected, supported and popularized by the state since it came into being. But its legal regulation is extremely weak. In recent years, major cases caused by cross-shareholding have frequently appeared in China's capital market, which has aroused widespread concern. The cross-shareholding system has become a hot topic in academic circles and even among investors. From the earliest "Liaoning Dacheng Co., Ltd. and Guangfa Securities Limited liability Company" to each other's second largest shareholder, The first case of cross-shareholding between a listed company and a securities company in China was "1 to the subsequent system building movement-from the Delong system, the Zhongguang Department to the Yongjin Department, and the Tianbao Department, which is now being filed and investigated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission," and so on. It was dazzling. Cross-shareholding has its advantages, such as realizing strategic alliance among enterprises, preventing hostile takeover, cross-shareholding can save the enterprise's capital expenditure, and it can also provide a very convenient condition for enterprise's financing. And cross-shareholding is also a good means to achieve the industrial layout. Of course, cross-shareholding also has a great negative effect: "fictitious increase in corporate capital, endangering the three principles of capital" 2, "interfere with the order of capital market transactions," Inducing insider trading and related party trading "3;" "internal control of cross-shareholding companies is easy to form, resulting in the absence of supervisory mechanism" (4) and even shareholders being set up, resulting in the corporate governance structure being unable to play the role expected of investors; in extreme cases, Will also promote the emergence and burst of economic bubbles. By studying the basic legal theory of cross-shareholding among companies, the author tries to analyze its utility: under what circumstances it produces positive utility, and under which circumstances it produces negative utility. This paper analyzes the causes of the countermeasures taken by the countries of the common law system and France and Germany to cross shareholding among companies, and draws on the beneficial points of foreign legislation to perfect the legal system of our country. The text is divided into two parts: the first chapter mainly introduces the basic theory of cross-shareholding and its origin and development, the second chapter mainly analyzes the utility of cross-shareholding: positive utility and negative utility. The third chapter examines the legislation on cross-shareholding in the main countries of the Anglo-American law system and the continental law system, and the 4th chapter discusses the reality of cross-shareholding in the legislation and judicial practice of our country. This paper explains the institutional environment of cross-shareholding in China, and analyzes the relevant cases. Chapter 5th expounds the legal countermeasures to construct and perfect the cross-shareholding system in China, referring to the legislative experience of foreign countries and combining with the national conditions of our country. This paper puts forward some legal suggestions on how to construct and perfect the cross-shareholding of Chinese companies, and makes its own efforts for the construction of socialist legal system in our country.
【学位授予单位】:中国政法大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:D922.291.91

【引证文献】

相关期刊论文 前1条

1 李晓春;;交叉持股下公司治理的困境及出路[J];暨南学报(哲学社会科学版);2013年04期

相关硕士学位论文 前1条

1 余芳;上市公司交叉持股的反垄断规制[D];浙江财经学院;2012年



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