控制股东与中小股东在股利分配中的利益平衡机制研究

发布时间：2018-02-23 19:21

本文关键词： 控制股东利益冲突诚信义务利益平衡强制分配股利　出处：《中国政法大学》2011年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：任何向公司投入生产要素的人都是公司的利益相关者,包括公司的股东、债权人及管理层。公司中的利益相关者在股利分配中存在激烈的利益冲突。原因在于任何向公司投入生产要素的人都要求获得回报,而公司在某一时点的利润总是有限的,各利益相关者在股利分配中存在不同的利益,从而利润分配成为公司各利益相关者经常发生纠纷的领域。在所有的利益冲突中,闭锁公司中控制股东与中小股东在股利分配中的利益冲突尤为引人注目。在资本多数决原则下,控制股东滥用控制权侵害中小股东利益的行为时有发生,特别在股权分散程度并不高的我国。控制股东基于其控制公司的地位,并不在乎股利分配与否,因为他们拥有多元化的谋利方式。通过各种合法或非法的途径,控制股东可以轻而易举的实现从公司到自己的利益输送。在控制股东的压榨下,广大中小股东甚至会失去获得投资回报的唯一途径,这显然是不公平的,中小股东是需要公司法特殊保护的弱者。相比于公开公司,闭锁公司中控制股东与中小股东的利益冲突更加严重,因为闭锁公司的人合性更强,转让股份限制更多。第一章首先界定控制股东与中小股东。对控制股东的定义,经历了从形式到实质的转变,而将形式标准和实质标准相结合,更具合理性,是大多数国家立法的方向。第二章描述了控制股东与中小股东在股利分配中的利益冲突现象。公司中存在利益冲突是正常的,股利分配中合理的利益冲突属于公司自治的范畴,法律不应加以干预。不过如果利益冲突极不合理,则构成了对中小股东的利益侵害,这是法律应当否定的。二者的界限即在于控制股东对资本多数决原则的滥用。为了平衡二者的利益冲突,需要寻找合适的利益平衡机制。第三章主要谈控制股东的诚信义务。绝对的资本多数决原则会导致资本多数决原则的异化。控制股东侵害中小股东利益的情形,大都存在控制股东控制权的滥用。为彻底的解决这个问题,引入控制股东对中小股东的诚信义务制度是必要的。以控制股东的诚信义务为基础,可以追究控制股东滥用控制权的法律责任。第四章介绍另一种重要的利益冲突平衡机制,那就是强制分配股利之诉。该制度与控制股东的诚信义务制度存在紧密的关联。英美国家在这方面有丰富的法律实践,且取得了巨大的法律效益,是值得我们学习研究的一项制度。现有的公司法提供了一些救济途径,但都存在着显而易见的缺陷。本文探讨了我国引入该制度的可行性,指出了采用商业判断原则判断控制股东是否违反诚信义务的局限性,提出了强制分配股利请求权的具体构成要件。
[Abstract]:Anyone who puts elements of production into the company is a stakeholder of the company, including the shareholders of the company, Creditors and management. Stakeholders in the company have fierce conflicts of interest in dividend distribution. The reason is that anyone who puts elements of production into the company demands a return, and the company's profits at a certain point are always limited. Different stakeholders have different interests in dividend distribution, so profit distribution becomes an area in which the stakeholders of the company often have disputes. In all conflicts of interest, The conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in locked-up companies is particularly noticeable. Under the principle of capital majority decision, the abuse of control rights by controlling shareholders against the interests of minority shareholders occurs from time to time, especially in China, where the degree of equity dispersion is not high. It doesn't matter whether dividends are distributed or not, because they have diversified ways of profiting. Through various legal or illegal channels, controlling shareholders can easily deliver their interests from company to themselves. The majority of minority shareholders will even lose the only way to obtain return on investment, which is obviously unfair. Minority shareholders are the weak people who need special protection under the Company Law. The conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders are more serious in locked companies, because of the stronger combination of people and the more restrictions on the transfer of shares. The first chapter defines controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The definition of controlling shareholders has undergone a transformation from form to substance, and it is more reasonable to combine formal standards with substantive standards, which is the direction of legislation in most countries. The second chapter describes the conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in dividend distribution. It is normal to have conflict of interest in the company, and the reasonable conflict of interest in dividend distribution belongs to the category of corporate autonomy. The law should not interfere. However, if the conflict of interest is extremely unreasonable, it constitutes an infringement of the interests of minority shareholders. This should be denied by law. The limit of the two lies in the abuse of the capital majority principle by controlling shareholders. In order to balance the conflict of interests between the two, it is necessary to find an appropriate mechanism of interest balance. The third chapter mainly talks about the fiduciary obligation of controlling shareholders. The absolute capital majority principle will lead to the alienation of capital majority decision principle. In order to solve this problem, it is necessary to introduce the system of fiduciary obligation of controlling shareholders to minority shareholders, which is based on the good faith obligation of controlling shareholders. The legal liability of controlling shareholders for abuse of control rights can be investigated. Chapter 4th introduces another important mechanism of conflict of interest balance, that is, compulsory dividend distribution. This system is closely related to the system of fiduciary obligation of controlling shareholders. The existing company law provides some relief ways, but all of them have obvious defects. This paper discusses the feasibility of introducing this system into our country. This paper points out the limitation of using the commercial judgment principle to judge whether the controlling shareholder violates the obligation of good faith, and puts forward the specific constituent elements of the compulsory distribution of dividend claim.
【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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