论有限公司异议股东股权收买评估障碍的克服
本文选题:异议股东股权收买请求权 + 理论 ; 参考:《华东政法大学》2011年硕士论文
【摘要】:公司制企业在当代虽然被视为高效率的资本组织形式,但由于大多数公司决策采用资本多数决,导致了部分对公司重大决策持异议的股东由于持股比例无法与其他大股东抗衡而无法达成自己诉求或无法实现投资初衷,因此,异议股东股权收买请求权应运而生,异议股东可以请求公司收买其股权以取得相应补偿,弥补该表决制度对他们权益可能造成的侵害。该制度最早起源于美国,世界大多数公司立法成熟的国家均对此作了详细规定。1993年我国公司法未认可该制度。2005年修订后的公司法第75条赋予有限责任公司的异议股东股权收买请求权,使异议股东在公司发生基础性变更时得以向公司主张股权收买,保障其合法权益。但在制度的具体设计上,新公司法一是以列举方式明确了适用条件,二是设定了股东和公司无法达成收买协议时提起诉讼的除斥期间。规则设计较为简略。与世界上其他成熟的公司立法相比,存在适用范围狭窄、行使程序粗略、股权价格评估欠缺标准或规则、相关费用分担不清、举证责任分配规则不明等问题。股权公平价值评估程序的规定作为核心内容,尤其需要明确。这些问题的存在使法院在面临纠纷时难以果断裁判,更使公司和股东面对现实的矛盾无法寻找到一条清晰的解决路径,限制了该制度功能的发挥。 本文以有限责任公司异议股东股权收买请求权所涉及的股权评估和公平价格的达成为着眼点,重点论述我国评估权行使过程中可能遇到的一些困惑和障碍,结合外国公司法的立法规定和实践经验进行分析。同时在论述中对有限公司异议股东股权收买请求权的主体、程序和规则也作了相应阐述。 现实的困境是制度改革的绝佳动力,虽然股权收买制度在我国公司立法上已经确立,但实施中仍有许多阻碍和困难需要克服。同时,该制度也需要不断的完善与创新,以提高制度的实施效果,最大限度地平衡股东各方的权利义务。唯此,才能更有效地保护股东的权益。
[Abstract]:Although corporate enterprises are regarded as efficient forms of capital organization in modern times, because most companies adopt capital majority decision,As a result, some shareholders who disagree with the major decisions of the company are unable to achieve their own demands or realize their original intention of investment because the proportion of shares held by them cannot compete with other major shareholders. Therefore, the right of shareholders to ask for the purchase of shares of dissenting shareholders arises at the historic moment.Dissenting shareholders may ask the company to buy their shares in order to obtain corresponding compensation to make up for the possible infringement of their rights and interests caused by the voting system.The system originated in the United States,Most of the countries with mature company legislation in the world have made detailed provisions on this issue. This system has not been approved by China's Company Law in 1993. Article 75 of the revised Company Law in 2005 gives limited liability companies the right to ask for compensation for dissenting shareholders' shares.The dissenting shareholders can claim to buy shares and protect their legitimate rights and interests in the event of fundamental changes in the company.However, in the specific design of the system, the new company law defines the applicable conditions by way of enumeration, and sets the period of action when shareholders and companies cannot reach a buyout agreement.The design of rules is relatively simple.Compared with other mature company legislation in the world, there are some problems, such as narrow scope of application, rough exercise procedure, lack of standard or rules for stock price evaluation, unclear sharing of related expenses, unclear rules of burden of proof distribution, etc.Equity equity evaluation procedures as the core of the provisions, especially need to be clear.The existence of these problems makes it difficult for the court to adjudicate decisively in the face of disputes, and it also makes the contradiction between the company and the shareholders facing the reality to find a clear way to solve, which limits the function of the system.This paper focuses on the equity evaluation and the achievement of fair price involved in the claim of dissenting shareholders' share right of limited liability company, and mainly discusses some puzzles and obstacles that may be encountered in the process of exercising the right of evaluation in our country.Combined with the legislative provisions of foreign company law and practical experience to analyze.At the same time, the main body, procedure and rules of the claim right of dissenting shareholder's share right of limited company are expounded.The dilemma of reality is the best motive force for the reform of the system. Although the system of share buyout has been established in the legislation of our country, there are still many obstacles and difficulties to be overcome in the implementation.At the same time, the system also needs continuous improvement and innovation, in order to improve the implementation of the system and maximize the balance between the rights and obligations of the shareholders.Only in this way, can the rights and interests of shareholders be protected more effectively.
【学位授予单位】:华东政法大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:D922.291.91
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