董事信义义务转化的法律构造——以美国判例法为研究中心

发布时间：2018-04-15 23:01

本文选题：董事 + 债权人　；参考：《比较法研究》2017年05期

【摘要】：20世纪90年代以来,美国法院有关公司财务恶化将导致董事信义义务受益人由股东向债权人转化的一系列判例被认为是"公司法哲学的新变化"。董事信义义务转化的法理基础既有传统的信托基金理论,又有新近发展的风险负担理论。转化后的信义义务不仅包括传统的忠实义务和注意义务,还包括进入事实破产状态后股-债矛盾最尖锐时期的一些特殊义务。为了鼓励董事善意进行有价值的商业决策,经营判断规则和章程免责条款仍可作为其违反信义义务的抗辩理由。未来我国应当确立"事实破产"的概念,关注债权人作为信义义务间接受益主体之后的债权人派生诉讼理论。同时,公司法上的信义义务规则应当更加细化并体现其动态特征,以更有效地发挥信义义务控制代理成本的制度功能。
[Abstract]:Since the 1990s, a series of cases concerning the deterioration of corporate finance in American courts have resulted in the transformation of the beneficiaries of directors' fiduciary obligations from shareholders to creditors, which is regarded as a "new change in the philosophy of corporate law".The legal basis of the transformation of directors' fiduciary obligation includes the traditional trust fund theory and the newly developed theory of risk burden.The transformed fiduciary obligation includes not only the traditional duty of loyalty and care, but also some special obligations in the most acute period of the contradiction between stock and debt after entering the state of de facto bankruptcy.In order to encourage directors to make valuable business decisions in good faith, the rules of business judgment and the articles of association exemption clauses can still be used as a defense for breach of fiduciary obligations.In the future, China should establish the concept of "de facto bankruptcy" and pay close attention to the creditor derivative litigation theory after the obligee is the indirect beneficiary of fiduciary duty.At the same time, the rules of fiduciary obligation in company law should be more detailed and reflect its dynamic characteristics, so as to exert more effectively the system function of fiduciary obligation to control agency cost.
【作者单位】：西南政法大学;福建省厦门市中级人民法院;
【基金】：2016年度国家社科基金重点项目“‘宽进严管’背景下市场主体信用监管制度研究”(项目编号:16AFX016)的研究成果
【分类号】：D971.2;DD912.29

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