我国机构投资者积极主义的法律思考
发布时间:2018-04-18 08:46
本文选题:公司治理 + 机构投资者 ; 参考:《中南民族大学》2011年硕士论文
【摘要】:上世纪80年代后,机构投资者积极主义在全球范围内兴起,美国机构投资者的表现尤为突出,他们一改往日消极投资者的角色,积极参与到公司治理当中,对公司治理结构的完善产生了积极的促进作用。 我国自2000年大力培育机构投资者,为机构投资者的发展提供了许多便利条件,机构投资者得以蓬勃发展。机构投资者的蓬勃发展给公司治理问题的解决带来了契机。美国机构投资者参与公司治理的态度经历了由消极到积极,方式由单一到多样化的转变过程。我国公司治理问题虽然有异于美国的公司治理问题,但美国机构投资者积极主义的表现还是对我国引导机构投资者改善公司治理的做法具有现实意义。 我国公司治理问题取决于当前我国公司独特的股权结构。因此,对股权结构的优化将是完善我国公司治理结构的重要路径。分析发现相对于个人股东,由于机构股东在持股数、专业知识等方面具有天然的优势,他们选择“用脚投票”的成本支出情况也较以前发生改变,因而机构投资者开始考虑积极的参与到公司治理当中。但机构投资者选择参与公司治理不仅受到其投资方式、自身治理结构、资本市场主体属性等自身因素的限制而且还受到政策环境、资本市场环境、法律环境等外部环境的制约,使得机构投资者在完善公司治理上的积极作用大大受限。 因此,我们需清除机构投资者自身所存在的治理障碍,明确机构投资者受托人的身份及受托人义务、完善信息披露制度等。此外,进一步完善公司法等相关法律中代理投票权征集制度、股东派生诉讼制度等制度,有利于股东权利的保护,降低机构股东参与公司治理的成本,引导机构投资者积极参与公司治理。当然,我们也应认识到机构投资者在我国成长的特殊方式,我们要立足于实践,制定行之有效的法律制度来规范机构投资者行为,推动机构投资者积极参与公司治理并使得机构投资者参与公司治理的行为有法可依。
[Abstract]:After the 1980s, institutional investor activism rose worldwide, and the performance of US institutional investors was particularly outstanding. They changed the role of negative investors in the past and actively participated in corporate governance.To the improvement of corporate governance structure has produced the positive promotion function.Since 2000, China has vigorously cultivated institutional investors, which has provided many convenient conditions for the development of institutional investors, and institutional investors have been able to flourish.The vigorous development of institutional investors brings the opportunity to solve the problem of corporate governance.The attitude of institutional investors to participate in corporate governance in the United States has undergone a process from negative to positive, from single to diversified.Although the corporate governance problem in our country is different from that in the United States, the performance of American institutional investor activism still has practical significance for our country to guide institutional investors to improve corporate governance.The problem of corporate governance in our country depends on the unique ownership structure of Chinese companies.Therefore, the optimization of ownership structure will be an important way to perfect the corporate governance structure in China.It is found that compared with individual shareholders, institutional shareholders have natural advantages in terms of number of shares, professional knowledge and so on, so the cost and expenditure of voting with their feet has also changed compared with the previous ones.As a result, institutional investors began to consider active participation in corporate governance.However, institutional investors' choice to participate in corporate governance is not only restricted by their own factors, such as their investment mode, their own governance structure, the main attributes of the capital market, but also by the external environment, such as the policy environment, the capital market environment, the legal environment, and so on.So that institutional investors in the improvement of corporate governance on the positive role is greatly limited.Therefore, we need to clear the institutional investors own governance obstacles, clear the identity of institutional investors trustee and trustee obligations, improve the information disclosure system and so on.In addition, to further improve the system of soliciting proxy voting rights and shareholder derivative litigation in relevant laws such as the Company Law is conducive to the protection of shareholders' rights and to reduce the cost of institutional shareholders participating in corporate governance.Guide institutional investors to actively participate in corporate governance.Of course, we should also recognize the special way for institutional investors to grow up in our country. We should base ourselves on practice and formulate an effective legal system to regulate the behavior of institutional investors.Promote institutional investors to actively participate in corporate governance and enable institutional investors to participate in corporate governance in accordance with the law.
【学位授予单位】:中南民族大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:F832.51;D922.291.91;D922.28
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