管理层持股对企业非效率投资的影响

发布时间：2018-04-21 09:10

本文选题：非效率投资 + 管理层持股　；参考：《西南财经大学》2011年硕士论文

【摘要】：现代财务管理理论中,投资决策是财务决策的逻辑起点,投资行为的有效性直接关系着企业的经营风险、盈利水平以及资本市场对其经营业绩和发展前景的评价,进而关系到企业价值最大化目标能否实现。在现实中,许多公司的投资决策往往会有悖于价值最大化目标,使得实际投资支出不同程度的偏离最优投资规模即出现投资不足或过度投资的非效率投资现象。投资不足致使资金闲置,公司成长缓慢,过度投资会导致大量资本沉淀在产能过剩领域,造成资源和生产要素浪费。非效率投资行为严重制约了企业的长远发展,损害了投资者的利益,同时微观层次上公司投资行为的有效性影响着国家整体经济资源利用的效率及其在国际市场上的整体竞争能力,因此如何有效抑制公司非效率投资行为成为人们不得不思考的问题。随着管理层持股制度的产生发展,研究现代公司治理中的股权激励方式对缓解股东与管理者之间的代理冲突的作用成为学术界探讨的焦点,而非效率投资行为很大程度上是委托代理问题产生的代理成本的一种表现形式,因此,管理层持股也成为研究非效率投资行为的有效切入点之一。在欧美等国家成熟市场中,管理层持股制度实施较早并取得了极大发展,在我国管理层持股制度起步较晚,上世纪90年代开始陆续有少部分企业实行,但是由于相关法规和实施细则不完善制约了管理层持股制度的推广和发展。直到2006年伴随着我国股权分置改革的顺利完成,新修订的证券法、公司法、上市公司股权激励管理办法的实施,股权激励的法律障碍消除,管理层持股制度也迎来了在我国发展的春天。在我国管理层持股制度日渐完善的背景下,本文从对非效率投资和管理层持股的基础认知出发,回顾以往相关研究文献,总结出管理层持股的多种效应和影响非效率投资的多种因素,在此基础上通过理论分析和实证检验的方法研究管理层持股对上市公司非效率投资行为的影响,以期为促进上市公司理性投资,提高投资效率提供借鉴,同时也为实施股权激励,改善激励机制提供参考。实证研究中,本文选取2007年至2009年沪深两市A股的上市公司(除金融业外)为样本,设置三个层层递进的模型,运用描述性统计、回归分析等方法全面系统分析管理层持股与非效率投资的关系。三个模型分别为：非效率投资计量模型、管理层持股与非效率投资关系模型、管理层持股与非效率投资现金流敏感性模型。研究结果表明,我国上市公司普遍存在非效率投资行为,多数企业表现为投资不足。我国现阶段,管理层持股对非效率投资的抑制作用有限,但可以有效降低非效率投资现金流敏感性,在抑制自由现金流引起的非效率投资方面发挥了积极作用。此外,相对于国有控股企业而言,管理层持股对企业非效率投资的抑制作用在非国有控股企业中更为明显。本文结构共分为五个部分,各部分主要内容如下：第一部分为绪论。主要阐述本文的研究背景、意义,介绍本文的研究思路、研究方法等。本文按照发现问题、分析问题进而尝试解决问题的研究思路,在大量阅读相关文献的基础上,结合我国实际情况,针对现存的问题进行较深入的理论分析,构建上市公司管理层持股与非效率投资的研究框架,建立实证模型,收集证券市场上相关数据和指标进行实证研究,最后针对实证结果对存在的问题进行分析并尝试提出解决方案。本文采用的研究方法主要有：规范研究与实证研究相结合、定性研究与定量研究相结合、对比分析法等。第二部分为文献综述。本部分回顾了国内外关于管理层持股制度和非效率投资的研究文献,梳理现有文献的研究思路及研究成果,在此基础上进行后续理论分析和实证研究。以往关于管理层持股的研究主要集中在管理层持股与公司绩效的关系上,对两者的关系理论界尚未达成共识,本文把这些研究分为两大类：主张管理层持股与公司业绩具有相关关系和主张两者之间无相关关系。关于非效率投资我国研究起步较晚,对于以往非效率投资的相关研究文献本文按照非效率投资的各影响因素进行梳理。第三部分为管理层持股与非效率投资的理论分析。界定管理层持股和非效率投资相关概念,回顾管理层持股制度在我国的发展历程,阐述股东与管理者代理冲突下非效率投资的表现形式,并分析管理层持股对非效率投资的影响及作用机制。第四部分为管理层持股对非效率投资影响的实证研究。这是本文的重点,该部分是在前面理论分析的基础之上构建研究框架,通过实际数据分析说明我国目前公司管理层持股与非效率投资水平,并检验研究假设的合理性。实证分析以2007-2009年三年期间沪、深两市A股上市公司(金融行业除外)为样本,建立三个实证研究模型,使用描述性统计分析、回归分析等方法,系统研究管理层持股与非效率投资的关系。首先建立非效率投资计量模型,估计我国上市公司的适度投资水平,进而得到非效率投资的代理变量；模型二为管理层持股与非效率投资关系模型,通过加入管理层持股变量,研究管理层持股与非效率投资的相关关系；模型三为管理层持股与非效率投资现金流敏感性模型,从投资现金流角度研究管理层持股对于非效率投资的作用。此外,按照企业的控股股权性质,将样本分为国有控股和非国有控股两类,讨论不同控股股权性质下,管理层持股发挥的作用及差别。第五部分为研究结论及政策建议。通过实证研究发现我国上市公司普遍存在非效率投资行为,多数企业表现为投资不足。我国现阶段,管理层持股对非效率投资的抑制作用有限,但是可以有效降低非效率投资现金流敏感性,在抑制自由现金流引起的非效率投资方面发挥了积极作用,此外,相对于国有控股企业而言,管理层持股对企业非效率投资的抑制作用在非国有控股企业中更为明显。以上结果在一定程度上肯定了管理层持股的积极作用,因此本文从促进该制度合理健康发展的角度提出建议以求为今后企业更好的实施股权激励,改善激励机制提供参考。本文的主要贡献如下： (1)丰富了管理层持股对非效率投资影响的研究文献。已有研究中,对于管理层持股的研究大多集中在管理层持股与公司绩效上,关于非效率投资的研究很多是将管理层持股作为公司治理的一个层面来研究其和非效率投资的关系,全面系统的研究管理层持股与非效率投资关系的文献相对较少。 (2)揭示了我国非效率投资和管理层持股的现状。我国管理层持股制度起步较晚,从2006年开始完善相关政策法规支持管理层持股制度的发展。本文通过近三年的数据分析我国企业管理层的持股水平和区间分布,并揭示了不同行业、不同股权性质企业管理层持股的差别。企业非效率投资的水平是不断发展变化的,本文通过实证分析,说明了现阶段我国企业非效率投资水平及其呈现的特点。 (3)本文在研究时,比较了不同控股股权性质下管理层持股对非效率投资影响,指出了在国有企业和非国有企业中,管理层对非效率投资的抑制作用的差异性。本文的主要不足如下： (1)在现实中,影响企业非效率投资的因素是多方面的,本文在探究管理层持股与企业非效率投资的关系时主要借鉴国外研究的相关模型,但回归结果的拟合度并不理想,在以后的研究中有待完善影响投资的相关因素的量化,减少误差,以进一步改进模型。 (2)对于管理层持股变量,本文没有具体区分管理层持股的不同来源及类型,而是以管理层持股总数为研究变量。管理层持股来源的不同对于管理层所起到的激励效果也是不同的,目前,我国管理层持股主要来源于发起设立、管理层收购、内部职工股、股权激励等。由于数据查找方面的困难,本文未对管理层持股区分来源。 (3)本文未考虑管理层内部持股结构和和分布,而是将管理层视为利益一致的整体,而这可能存在着问题。因为管理层内部持股比例不公平或分布不均,有可能某个或者某些管理者成为大股东的代表,与公司其他管理者无法形成利益共同体。
[Abstract]:In the modern financial management theory , investment decision is the logic starting point of financial decision . The effectiveness of investment behavior is directly related to the business risk , profit level and non - efficiency investment of capital market .

In the mature market such as the European and American countries , the implementation of the management shareholding system is relatively early and has achieved great development . In the background of the improvement of our management shareholding system , the paper reviews the influence of the management ownership on the non - efficiency investment behavior of the listed company . It also provides reference for the promotion of rational investment of listed companies and the improvement of investment efficiency .

In this paper , the relationship between management ownership and non - efficiency investment is analyzed by means of descriptive statistics , regression analysis , etc . The three models are non - efficiency investment measurement model , management ownership and non - efficiency investment relation model , management shareholding and non - efficiency investment cash flow sensitivity model .

The structure of this paper is divided into five parts , the main contents of each part are as follows :

The first part is preface . The research background and significance of this paper are mainly discussed , and the research thinking , research method and so on are introduced in this paper . On the basis of finding out the problems and analyzing the problems and trying to solve the problem , this paper analyzes the existing problems and tries to put forward the solution . The research methods used in this paper mainly include the combination of normative and empirical research , qualitative research and quantitative research , comparative analysis method and so on .

The second part is a review of the literature review . This part reviews the research literature on management ownership system and non - efficiency investment at home and abroad , combing the research thinking and the research results of the current literature , on the basis of which the following theoretical analysis and empirical research are carried out . In the past , the research on management ownership is mainly focused on the relationship between management ownership and company performance .

The third part is the theoretical analysis of management ownership and non - efficiency investment . The concept of management ownership and non - efficiency investment is defined , the development course of management shareholding system in China is reviewed , the expression of non - efficiency investment in the conflicts between shareholders and managers is expounded , and the influence and mechanism of management ownership on non - efficiency investment are analyzed .

The fourth part is divided into the empirical research on the influence of management ownership on non - efficiency investment . This is the focus of this paper . This part is based on the analysis of the previous theories . This part is based on the analysis of the previous theories . This part is based on the analysis of the actual data . The relationship between management ownership and non - efficiency investment is studied by means of descriptive statistical analysis and regression analysis .
Model II is the relationship model between management ownership and non - efficiency investment , and the relationship between management ownership and non - efficiency investment is studied through the addition of managerial ownership variables .
In addition , according to the nature of the controlling interests of the enterprise , the sample is divided into the state - owned holding and non - state - owned holding two categories , and the role and the difference of the ownership of the management are discussed under the property of different controlling interests .

The fifth part is the research conclusion and policy suggestion . Through the empirical research , it is found that the listed company has the non - efficiency investment behavior , most enterprises appear as underinvestment . At the present stage of our country , the effect of management ownership on non - efficiency investment is limited . In addition , the effect of management ownership on non - efficiency investment in non - state - owned controlling enterprises can be effectively reduced .

The main contributions of this article are as follows :

( 1 ) The research literatures on the influence of management ownership on non - efficiency investment are enriched . In the research , most of the researches on non - efficiency investment focus on the relationship between management ownership and company performance , and many researches on non - efficiency investment are the relationship between management ownership and non - efficiency investment , and the literatures about the relationship between management ownership and non - efficiency investment are relatively few .

( 2 ) The present situation of non - efficiency investment and the holding of management in our country is revealed . The stock holding system of our country starts late , and the development of the management ownership system is supported by the improvement of relevant policies and regulations in 2006 .

( 3 ) At the time of the research , the influence of management ownership on non - efficiency investment was compared , and the difference of management ' s restraining effect on non - efficiency investment was pointed out in the state - owned and non - state - owned enterprises .

The main disadvantages of this paper are as follows :

( 1 ) In reality , the factors that affect the non - efficiency investment of enterprises are manifold . In this paper , the relationship between management ownership and non - efficiency investment is explored , but the fitting degree of regression results is not ideal . In future research , we should improve the quantification of relevant factors that affect investment and reduce the error to further improve the model .

( 2 ) For the management ownership variables , the thesis does not distinguish the different sources and types of the management ownership , but the total number of the management shares is the study variable . The management ownership is different from that of the management . At present , the management ownership of the management is mainly derived from the establishment of the establishment , the MBO , the internal staff stock , the equity incentive , etc . As a result of the difficulty in finding the data , the paper does not distinguish the source of the management ownership .

( 3 ) This paper does not take into account the structure and distribution of the ownership structure within the management , but the management is regarded as a whole of the conflict of interest , which may have a problem . Because the proportion of the internal shareholding of the management is not fair or uneven , it is possible that some or some of the managers become representatives of the big shareholders , and other managers of the company cannot form a benefit community .

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：F271;F275;F224

【参考文献】