关联企业破产法律制度研究

发布时间：2018-04-27 12:55

本文选题：关联企业破产 + 揭开公司面纱制度　；参考：《吉林大学》2011年博士论文

【摘要】：企业作为市场经济的主体,为适应市场经济的蓬勃发展,必须增强自己的实力,当扩大企业经营规模所要求的管理成本巨大时,企业便会选择联合形态——关联企业,以抵御市场风险。如果企业在市场竞争中被淘汰,进入破产程序时,作为关联企业破产和单体企业破产有着巨大的差别。传统的规制单体企业破产的基础理论——法人格独立制度和有限责任制度都面临着巨大的挑战,甚至成为破产企业不承担破产债务的借口、逃废债务的工具。与此同时,关联企业破产时,由于涉及的利害关系人较为复杂,既包括破产企业的债权人、债务人,还包括关联企业中非破产企业的债权人与股东,他们之间存在着交织的利益冲突。法律的功能在于调和利益相关者之间的利益冲突,维护法律之公平、正义。本文通过规范分析、法经济学等方法,积极借鉴各国及地区的理论,结合我国实践,以务实原则兼顾体系化之思考方法,试图解决关联企业破产程序中的利益冲突问题。正文由以下五章构成: 第一章为“关联企业破产法律制度的规制对象”。关联企业是指企业间相互持股,或可对对方施加重大影响,或可以直接控制他公司的业务、人事和财务的独立企业联合形态。由于自身成长的需要、企业经营者的选择或者人为因素而建立关联企业,通过关联交易的形态予以表现。当关联企业中的从属公司破产、控制公司未破产时,就会发生控制公司股东与从属公司债权人与少数股东的利益冲突;当控制公司破产、从属公司未破产时,就会发生控制公司债权人与从属公司股东之间的利益冲突;当控制公司与从属公司均告破产时,便会发生两个公司的债权人之间的利益冲突;当受同一控制的两个或多个关联企业同时破产时,也会发生破产公司债权人之间的利益冲突和破产公司债权人与未破产公司的股东之间的利益冲突。无论哪一种情形,都会对规制单体企业破产的法律制度构成威胁:法人格独立制度成为关联企业破产债务人的避风港;有限责任制度成为关联企业破产债务人逃废债务的工具。第二章为“关联企业破产法律制度的规制目的”。法律的作用之一就是调整利益冲突。当冲突的双方并不是简单明了的对或错时,采取一种妥协或相互调整形式应该比“二者取其一”的方式更为可取。公平清偿是破产法的灵魂,而集体受偿原则是公平清偿的有效实现形式。破产作为一种商业制度,需要满足破产效益的最大化,故在追求公平清偿的同时必须满足效率的原则。由于关联企业破产时涉及的利益冲突更为复杂和广泛,应在破产法多元立法目标的指引下,有效运用衡平规范解决关联企业破产程序中的利益冲突问题。第三章为“规制关联企业破产的基础性法律制度”。基础性法律制度并非针对关联企业破产而特别设计,其适用的领域较为宽泛,对关联企业的破产规制也有一定的效果。首先为破产撤销权以及破产无效制度。当关联企业之一进入破产程序时,如果在临界期间,关联企业之间存有法律规定的可撤销行为,那么可以予以撤销。如果存有绝对无效的行为,亦可宣告无效。由于破产撤销权制度临界期间的规定,以及关联企业间存有的复杂的、隐蔽的关系“外衣”,其制度的适用较为困难。其次为揭开公司面纱制度。原本具有独立人格的公司,基于特定的事件,其公司的独立人格被忽视,公司的股东应对公司的债务承担连带责任。关联企业破产原则上仍然适用单体企业破产的法律制度,只有在利用关联关系,实施不当控制或者交易,威胁到债权人利益的时候,法律才会启动揭开公司面纱制度,对其进行规制。由于揭开公司面纱制度主要规制破产公司与破产公司的控制股东之间存在的不当行为,对其他损害破产公司债权人利益的行为则无能为力,故也有其局限性。第四章为“规制关联企业破产的特殊性法律制度”。首先为衡平居次制度,指在存在控制与从属关系的关联企业中,在控制公司对从属公司实施违反公平正义原则的不当行为时,规定在从属公司的破产清算或重整程序中,控制公司对从属公司的债权,不论其有无别除权或优先权,均应次于从属公司的其他债权人受偿。衡平居次的功能在于补救而非惩罚。其次为实质合并制度,是指在关联企业同时或相继进入破产程序中,对存在有高度一致性或对外作为一个整体的关联企业,归入同一破产程序,合并其资产与债务,所有关联企业的普通破产债权人适用同一比例的破产清偿程序。无论是衡平居次制度还是实质合并制度都针对关联企业的破产而设计,对关联企业破产有很好的规制效果,但由于这两种制度均为衡平性制度,赋予了破产法官较宽松的自由裁量权,故其适用应相当谨慎。第五章为“我国关联企业破产法律制度的完善”。虽然我国《公司法》中明确规定了揭开公司面纱制度,但法律规定过于原则,缺乏可操作性。论文指出当关联企业间存在着资本显著不足、公司之间人格的高度混同和过度控制三种情形,并对破产子公司造成了严重的损害,当其破产时,破产管理人可以提起揭开公司面纱之诉,要求控制公司对破产子公司承担连带责任。如果控制公司对从属公司的控制并没有达到严重的程序,可以引入衡平居次制度进行规制,将其控制公司因控制关系所享有的债权进行降格处理。当控制公司与从属公司同时或相继进入破产程序时,当二者之间的财产、账务以及人事已经达到难以区分的混同程度时,或者为区分控制公司与从属公司之间的财产、账务等所花费的资金已经严重消耗破产财产时,可以引入实质合并制度,对控制公司与从属公司的资产以及债务进行合并处理,对其债权人适用同一比例进行清偿。唯有如此,才能体现公平保护破产债权人合法利益的破产法立法目标。
[Abstract]:As the main body of the market economy, enterprises must strengthen their own strength in order to adapt to the vigorous development of the market economy. When the cost of management is huge, enterprises will choose joint form - related enterprises to resist market risk. If enterprises are eliminated in the market competition and enter the bankruptcy procedure, the enterprises will be used as the bankruptcy procedures. There is a great difference between the bankruptcy of the affiliated enterprise and the bankruptcy of the single enterprise. The basic theory of the bankruptcy of the traditional regulatory single enterprise, the independent system of the legal person and the limited liability system, is faced with great challenges, even the excuse for the bankrupt enterprise not to bear the debt of bankruptcy and the tool to escape the debt. At the same time, when the affiliated enterprise is bankrupt, Because the stakeholders involved are more complex, including the creditors of the bankrupt enterprises, the debtors, and the creditors and shareholders of the non bankrupt enterprises in the affiliated enterprises, there are interlaced conflicts of interest between them. The function of the law is to reconcile the interests conflict between the stakeholders and safeguard the fairness and justice of the law.
In this paper, through normative analysis, law and economics and other methods, we actively draw on the theories of various countries and regions, combine the practice of our country with the practical principles and take into account the thinking method of systematization, and try to solve the conflict of interests in the bankruptcy procedure of related enterprises. The text is composed of the following five chapters:
The first chapter is "the object of the regulation of the legal system for the bankruptcy of affiliated enterprises". The related enterprise refers to the mutual ownership of the enterprise, or the great influence on the other party, or the joint form of the independent enterprise which can directly control the business of his company, the personnel and the finance, and the choice of the business operator or the human factor, due to the needs of his own growth. When the affiliated company in the affiliated enterprise is bankrupt and the control company is not bankrupt, it will take control of the conflict of interests between the shareholders of the company and the subordinate company and the minority shareholders when the company is not bankrupt. When the company is not bankrupt, the company will control the company's creditor and the subordinate public. Conflict of interests between shareholders; when both the control company and the subordinate company are insolvent, a conflict of interest between the creditors of the two companies will occur; when the two or more affiliated enterprises of the same control are bankrupt at the same time, the conflict of interests between the creditors of the bankrupt company and the creditors of the bankrupt company and the non bankrupt company will also occur. The conflict of interests between shareholders, in any case, threatens to regulate the legal system of the bankruptcy of a single enterprise: the independence of the legal person becomes the refuge of the bankrupt debtor of the enterprise, and the limited liability system becomes the tool for the bankrupt debtor to escape the debt.
The second chapter is "the purpose of the regulation of the legal system of the bankruptcy of affiliated enterprises". One of the functions of the law is to adjust the conflict of interest. When the parties to the conflict are not simple and wrong, it is more possible to take a form of compromise or mutual adjustment than the "one" of the "two parties". The principle of compensation is an effective realization form of fair payment. Bankruptcy, as a commercial system, needs to meet the maximization of the bankruptcy benefit. Therefore, it must meet the principle of efficiency while pursuing fair payment. Because the conflict of interest involved in the bankruptcy of related enterprises is more complex and extensive, it should be guided by the multiple legislative objectives of the bankruptcy law. We should use the equity rules to solve the conflict of interests in the bankruptcy proceedings of affiliated enterprises.
The third chapter is "the basic legal system to regulate the bankruptcy of affiliated enterprises". The basic legal system is not specially designed for the bankruptcy of related enterprises. The application of the basic legal system is more extensive. It also has some effect on the bankruptcy regulation of related enterprises. First, the bankruptcy revocation right and the system of breaking the production invalid. In the case of a procedure, if there is a legal revocable act between the affiliated enterprises during the critical period, it can be revoked. If there is an absolutely invalid act, it may also be declared invalid. Due to the provisions of the critical period of the insolvency revocation system and the complex, covert relationship between the affiliated enterprises, the system is suitable. It is more difficult to use. Secondly, it is to uncover the corporate veil system. The company whose original independent personality is based on specific events, the company's independent personality is ignored and the shareholders of the company should bear joint liability for the company's debt. When the improper control or transaction threatens the interests of the creditor, the law will start to uncover the system of the company's veil and regulate it. As the disclosure of the company's veil system mainly regulates the misconduct between the controlling shareholders of the bankrupt company and the bankrupt company, it is incapable of other acts that damage the interests of the creditors of the bankrupt company. Force, so it also has its limitations.
The fourth chapter is "the special legal system for the regulation of the bankruptcy of affiliated enterprises". First, the equitable subordination system refers to the control of the company in the bankruptcy liquidation or reorganization procedure of the subordinate company when controlling the improper conduct of the subordinate company against the principle of fairness and justice in the control and subordinate Corporation. A company's claim, regardless of its exclusive right or priority, shall be repaid to other creditors of a subordinate company. The function of equity is remedies rather than punishment. Secondly, it is a substantive consolidation system, which refers to the high consistency of existence or as a whole as a whole in the associated or successively entered insolvency proceedings. The joint venture, incorporated into the same bankruptcy procedure, combines its assets and debts, and applies the same proportion of bankruptcy liquidation procedures for the ordinary bankrupt creditors of all related enterprises. Both the equitable system and the substantive consolidation system are designed for the bankruptcy of the affiliated enterprises, and have a good regulatory effect on the bankruptcy of the affiliated enterprises, but the two kinds are due to these types. The system is equitable system, which gives the bankruptcy judge a more liberal discretion, so its application should be very prudent.
The fifth chapter is "the perfection of the legal system for the bankruptcy of affiliated enterprises in our country". Although the company law clearly stipulates the disclosure of the corporate veil system, the legal provisions are too principled and lack of operability. This paper points out that there are three situations in which there are significant shortage of capital among related enterprises, high degree of confusion and over control of personality among companies, The bankrupt subsidiary is seriously damaged. When it goes bankrupt, the bankruptcy administrator can lift the claim of the company's veil and require the company to undertake joint and several liability to the bankrupt subsidiary. If the control of the company's control of the subordinate company does not reach a serious procedure, it can introduce the equitable subordination system for regulation and control the public. A degrading treatment of a creditor's claim due to a control relationship. When the control company and a subordinate company are at the same time or successively entering the bankruptcy proceedings, the assets, accounts, and personnel between the two have reached an indistinguishable degree of confusion, or the funds are spent to distinguish between the property and the accounts between the control company and the subordinate division. When the bankruptcy property is severely depleted, the substantive consolidation system can be introduced to combine the assets and debts of the controlled company with the subordinate company and to apply the same proportion to its creditors. Only in this way can it embody the legislative goal of the law of breaking the law of breaking the legitimate interests of the bankrupt creditors.

【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.291.92

【引证文献】