我国上市公司独立董事勤勉义务判断标准研究

发布时间：2018-05-26 04:59

本文选题：上市公司 + 独立董事　；参考：《华东政法大学》2011年硕士论文

【摘要】：在公司制度兴起早期,公司治理实行的是奉行“谁出钱谁管理”理念的“股东会中心主义”,强调股东会在公司治理中的核心作用。随着社会经济的发展,公司治理结构不断变化,公司治理开始由“股东会中心主义”向“董事会中心主义”转变,“内部人控制”现象也因此开始出现,随之产生了董事和经理在公司经营中的道德风险。为抑制“内部人控制”现象,防范道德风险,独立董事制度应运而生。它最早产生于美国,并相继被英国、法国等发达国家所仿效。我国于二十世纪末期开始引进独立董事制度。1997年12月16日,中国证券监督管理委员会颁布《上市公司章程指引》,该文件第一百一十二条规定:“公司根据需要,可以设独立董事”。2001年8月16日颁布的《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》(以下简称《指导意见》)开始明确要求上市公司应当建立独立董事制度,标志着独立董事制度在我国的正式建立。勤勉义务,又叫注意义务、善管义务,是伴随着独立董事制度的建立而产生的。《指导意见》第一条第二款规定:“独立董事对上市公司及全体股东负有诚信与勤勉义务”,第一次明确规定了独立董事所负有的勤勉义务。2005年10月修订的《中华人民共和国公司法》更是以基本法的形式确定了勤勉义务的法律地位,其第一百四十八条规定:“董事、监事、高级管理人员应当遵守法律、行政法规和公司章程,对公司负有忠实义务和勤勉义务”。但是我国现行相关立法并没有对勤勉义务的定义、内容和判断标准作出进一步规定,更没有将独立董事的勤勉义务和非独立董事(除另有说明外,本文中的董事包括独立董事和非独立董事)的勤勉义务加以区分,进而导致独立董事制度在实施过程中出现诸多问题。本文仅针对实践中问题较多的判断标准问题进行分析,以明确独立董事勤勉义务的判断标准和非独立董事勤勉义务判断标准之间所应具有的区别。基于上述思路,笔者对本文结构作出如下安排: 本文除导言和结论外,全文共分四个部分。首先通过三个案例的比较引出讨论的问题,然后在第一部分从理论基础、现实基础和职责三个方面强调了独立董事勤勉义务研究的必要性。同时,详细介绍了独立董事勤勉义务相对于非独立董事、监事和经理的勤勉义务的特殊性,为阐述独立董事勤勉义务判断标准的特殊规则奠定了基础。第二部分通过介绍判断标准和勤勉义务之间的关联性、独立董事勤勉义务判断标准研究意义和实践中存在的问题,强调了独立董事勤勉义务判断标准研究的必要性。第三部分详细介绍了独立董事和非独立董事、监事和经理的勤勉义务判断标准在注意程度和合理依赖方面的共同性,并根据独立董事勤勉义务的特殊性提出了若干特殊判断规则。第四部分详细介绍了独立董事勤勉义务判断标准的确定形式,并根据发达国家的经验,就我国独立董事勤勉义务判断标准的确立提出建议。
[Abstract]:In the early stage of the rise of the company system, corporate governance was carried out by the "shareholder centralism" which pursues the idea of "who has money to manage", and emphasizes the core role of the shareholders in corporate governance. With the development of the social economy, the corporate governance structure is constantly changing, and the corporate governance begins from the "shareholder centralism" to the "director of the board center" As a result, the phenomenon of "insider control" began to appear, and the moral risk of the directors and managers in the company was created. In order to suppress the "insider control" and prevent moral hazard, the independent director system came into being. It was first produced in the United States and followed by the developed countries such as Britain and France. In the late twentieth Century, the independent director system was introduced in December 16th.1997. The China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the guidelines for the articles of association of listed companies. The 112nd article stipulates that "the company can set up independent directors according to the needs of the company" in August 16th of.2001, "to guide the establishment of an independent director system in the listed company." Opinions (hereinafter referred to as "guidance") began to explicitly require listed companies to establish an independent director system, marking the formal establishment of the independent director system in China.
The duty of diligence, also called the duty of attention, and the obligation to do good, is accompanied by the establishment of an independent director system. The first second paragraph of Article 1 provides that "independent directors have the duty of honesty and diligence to the listed companies and all the shareholders", and the first time clearly stipulates the diligent duty of independent directors in the revised <.2005 'in October. The company law of the people's Republic of China has determined the legal status of the duty of diligence in the form of the basic law. The 148th article stipulates that "directors, supervisors and senior managers shall abide by the law, administrative regulations and the articles of association, and have the duty of loyalty and diligence to the company". However, the current relevant legislation in China is not diligent. The definition, content and standard of the obligation are further stipulated, and the diligence duty of the independent director and the duty of the non independent director (except the other directors, including the independent directors and the non independent directors) are distinguished, and the independent director system has many problems in the process of implementation. The difference between the criterion of judging the duty of the independent director and the criterion of the duty of the non independent director is analyzed. Based on the above thought, the author makes the following arrangements.
In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the full text is divided into four parts. First, the discussion is drawn out through the comparison of three cases. Then, in the first part, the necessity of the study of the duty of diligence of independent directors is emphasized from the theoretical basis, the realistic basis and the responsibility in three aspects. The particularity of diligence obligations of supervisors and managers lays the foundation for expounding the special rules of independent directors' diligence obligation judgment standard.
The second part, by introducing the relevance between the judgment standard and the diligent duty, the research significance and the problems in the practice of the independent director's diligent duty judgment, emphasizes the necessity of the research on the criterion for judging the duty of independent directors.
The third part gives a detailed description of the commonality between the independent director and the non independent director, the supervision and manager's diligent duty judgment standard in the aspect of attention and reasonable dependence, and puts forward some special judgment rules according to the particularity of the diligent duty of the independent director.
The fourth part gives a detailed description of the determination of the criterion for judging the duty of independent directors, and puts forward some suggestions on the establishment of the criteria for judging the duty of diligence of independent directors in China.
【学位授予单位】：华东政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.291.91

【参考文献】