论董事篡夺公司机会的公司法规制

发布时间：2018-06-01 03:23

本文选题：公司机会 + 忠实义务　；参考：《中国政法大学》2011年硕士论文

【摘要】：公司机会理论(Corporate Opportunity Doctrine),或称公司机会规则,系源自英美法系国家判例法的一个重要理论,指禁止董事把属于公司的商业机会转归自己利用并从中谋取私利。传统大陆法系国家公司法并没有关于“公司机会”规则的相应条文,一般将其纳入到竞业限制规则当中。我国《公司法》第149条第1款第5项,对于董事谋取公司机会的行为作了原则规定,但缺乏明确的、可操作性的具体规则。本文从比较、分析国内外相关判例、公司法及其学说的基础上,重点探讨公司机会的认定标准、董事和高级管理人员合理利用公司机会的具体情形以及篡夺公司机会的民事责任等问题,以期完善我国公司董事义务制度。本文由绪论、正文、结论构成,正文共分五部分。第一章是公司机会理论的基本问题。本章首先在分析学理有关公司机会理论定义的基础上,对于其内涵及外延作出界定,并追溯、介绍公司机会理论在英美法系国家中的产生、发展,分析公司机会规则的法理基础,从而论证法律对公司机会给予特殊保护,规制董事篡夺公司机会行为的必要性。公司机会规则与自我交易限制、竞业限制规则同属董事忠实义务的具体要求,皆解决董事与公司利益冲突问题,但在调整对象、构成要件以及法律后果等方面存在差别,准确辨析三者之间差异,有助于厘清公司机会理论的内涵以及外延,为下文奠定理论基础。第二章是公司机会的认定标准。如何甄别公司机会,实务界与学界存在一定争议,存在“利益和期待利益”标准、“经营范围”标准、“公平”标准等不同学说。本章重点比较与评析英美两国关于公司机会判断标准的判例、公司法及其学说,并结合国内相关学理,探讨与思考在我国成文法语境下如何构建公司机会标准认定问题。第三章是董事利用公司机会的抗辩事由。即便是公司机会,并不当然意味着董事不可以对其进行利用,这是现代公司法确立的关于公司机会规则的信条。关键是在何种情形下,董事可以利用公司机会。围绕这一问题,判例及学理提出公司放弃机会、公司因财务困难无力利用机会等情形不一而足。如何规范董事善意行使其权利,防止其个人利益与公司发生利益发生冲突为本章重点探讨的问题。第四章是篡夺公司机会的民事责任。篡夺公司机会损害公司利益的行为,违背了忠实义务,必将导致相应的民事法律责任。追究民事责任是对董事违反义务的事后规制,那么其责任性质及其救济方式则是本章探讨的重点。第五章是公司机会规则的制度完善。本章针对我国公司机会制度的立法现状以及存在的主要问题,从公司机会认定标准、合理利用机会情形以及违反规则的法律责任等方面细化相应规定,明确司法适用标准,为规范董事善意行使权力,防止其私利与公司利益发生冲突,提供理论依据与合理化建议,以期对相关立法及司法解释的完善有所助益。
[Abstract]:The corporate opportunity theory (Corporate Opportunity Doctrine), or the corporate opportunity rule, is an important theory derived from the case law of Anglo American legal system countries, which prohibits the directors from turning their business opportunities to their own use and seeking private benefits. According to the provisions, it is generally incorporated into the rules of competition restriction. The company law of China has 149th items and first paragraphs and fifth items, which stipulates the principle for the directors to seek the opportunity of the company, but lacks specific rules for clear and operable. This article focuses on the company, based on the comparison and analysis of relevant domestic and foreign relevant jurisprudence, company law and its theory. The criteria for the identification of opportunities, the specific use of corporate opportunities by directors and senior managers and the civil liability for usurpation of corporate opportunities, in order to improve the system of directors' directors' obligations in our country.
This article is composed of the introduction, the main body and the conclusion. The text is divided into five parts.
The first chapter is the basic problem of corporate opportunity theory. First, on the basis of the analysis of the definition of corporate opportunity theory, this chapter defines its connotation and extension, and traces back to the introduction of the emergence, development and analysis of the legal basis of corporate opportunity rules in the Anglo American countries. Special protection will be given to regulate the necessity of the director's usurpation of corporate opportunities. The corporate opportunities rules and self trading restrictions, and the rules of competition restriction are the specific requirements of the directors' Loyalty Obligations, all of which solve the conflict of interests between the directors and the company, but there are differences in the adjustment object, the constitutive requirements and the legal consequences, and the accurate discrimination of three The difference between people helps to clarify the connotation and denotation of corporate opportunity theory and lay a theoretical foundation for the following.
The second chapter is the standard of corporate opportunity identification. There are some disputes between the practical and academic circles. There are many different theories, such as "interest and expectation interest", "scope of operation", "fair", and so on. This chapter compares and evaluates the jurisprudence of the standard of corporate opportunity judgment, company law and its studies in Britain and America. The third chapter is the defense of the directors using the company opportunity. Even the company opportunity does not necessarily mean that the director can not use it, which is the company opportunity rules established by the modern company law. The key is that in what case the director can make use of the company's opportunity. Around this question, the case and the theory suggest that the company give up the opportunity, and the company can not make use of the opportunity because of financial difficulties. How to regulate the director's right to exercise its right in good faith and prevent the conflict between the interests of the company and the company's interests is the chapter of this chapter. Point out the question.
The fourth chapter is the civil liability to usurp the company's opportunity. To usurp the company's opportunity to damage the interests of the company, violates the duty of loyalty and will inevitably lead to the corresponding civil legal responsibility. The investigation of civil liability is the post regulation of the director's breach of duty, then its nature of responsibility and its remedy are the focus of this chapter.
The fifth chapter is the perfect system of corporate opportunity rules. This chapter, in view of the current legislative status and main problems of the company opportunity system in China, refine the relevant provisions in terms of corporate opportunity identification standards, rational use of opportunities and the legal responsibility of violating rules, clear the applicable standards of the law and exercise the power of the directors in good faith. In order to prevent conflicts between private interests and company interests, we should provide theoretical basis and rationalization proposals so as to help improve relevant legislation and judicial interpretation.
【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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