敌意收购的法律立场

发布时间：2018-06-02 07:18

本文选题：敌意收购 + 上市公司控制权争夺　；参考：《中国法学》2017年03期

【摘要】：争夺上市公司控制权的敌意收购,既可以成为提升公司治理的手段,也可能演变为掠夺公司财富的工具。趋利避害的关键在于,立法者为收购各方提供公平的游戏规则,维护利益相关者的权益,确保上市公司持续承担社会责任。我国上市公司收购监管规则,对敌意收购行为相对较为宽松,限制了反收购活动的展开。对敌意收购方权益披露违规行为的监管应趋严而非放松。我国公司法未来应考虑引入授权资本制与类别股份制度,公司治理由股东会中心主义转向董事会中心主义,从而为反收购活动的展开提供法律空间。上市公司章程指引之中不妨提供反收购条款的示范清单,以降低缔约成本,解决司法判断反收购条款合法性的难题。
[Abstract]:Hostile takeover for the control of listed companies can not only be a means of improving corporate governance, but also a tool to plunder corporate wealth. The key to seeking advantages and avoiding disadvantages lies in the fact that legislators provide fair rules of the game for the acquirers, safeguard the rights and interests of stakeholders, and ensure that listed companies continue to bear social responsibility. The regulation of takeover of listed companies in China is relatively lenient to hostile takeover, which limits the development of anti-takeover activities. Regulation of hostile takeover rights disclosure violations should be tightened, not relaxed. In the future, the company law of our country should consider introducing the authorized capital system and the system of class shares, and the corporate governance should be changed from the centralism of shareholders' meeting to the centralism of board of directors, so as to provide the legal space for the launching of anti-takeover activities. In the guidelines of the articles of association of listed companies, a model list of anti-takeover clauses may be provided in order to reduce the contracting costs and solve the problem of judicial judgment on the legality of anti-takeover clauses.
【作者单位】：吉林大学法学院;
【分类号】：D922.287

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