金融控股公司反垄断法规制研究
本文选题:金融控股公司 + 破坏竞争 ; 参考:《西南财经大学》2011年硕士论文
【摘要】:随着金融市场的不断发展,混业经营成为了各国金融业发展的主要方向,因此金融控股公司这种新的混业经营模式也逐步发展开来。金融控股公司在金融市场竞争中具有一系列优势,包括各子公司联合经营带来的信启、优势以及规模经济、范围经济,这些优势使得金融控股公司能够在竞争中处于优势地位,也使得其对客户具有优势地位。但是,金融控股公司这种运营模式在带来巨大效益的同时,也蕴含了巨大的风险,特别是金融控股公司对于公平竞争秩序的破坏以及对于客户和社会公众利益的侵犯。 随着我国金融体制改革的不断深入,原有的“分业经营,分业管理”原则受到一定的冲击。随着《中共中央关于制定“十一五”规划的建议》的出台,标志着我国金融也从分业迈向了混业经营,金融控股公司在我国开始崭露头角,成为一种新兴的金融机构。 随着金融控股公司这种形式在我国金融界的不断壮大,出现了各种类型的金融控股公司,金融控股公司在金融领域竞争中的强势的地位更为凸显,这源于金融控股公司旗下的各类子公司,控制着金融业务的方方面面,造成金融资源的高度集中,很容易相互联系、相互影响,形成优势地位,同时金融企业本身又有着自然垄断的优势。这些都会对金融市场的竞争产生不利的影响,不仅会影响到金融客户的利益,更可能使得国家金融安全和金融稳定受到影响。 然而,还是有学者认为,在金融自由化和金融竞争日益激烈的环境中,只有当金融机构具备对市场的绝对支配地位,客户才有可能被迫购买它们所提供的服务,否则如果没有这种地位,客户就会转而接受其它经营者的服务,因此金融控股公司不可能会有违反《反垄断法》的行为出现,也就谈不上破坏市场竞争了。甚至还有人缺少远见性和前瞻性的认为,当前我国还只是处在构建金融控股公司制度的探索过程中,还不存在产生垄断风险的条件,不宜对正在成长和壮大中的金融控股公司适用严格的反垄断法规制。 笔者认为,对金融控股公司进行反垄断规制是必不可少的,而且是刻不容缓的。三井住友银行强迫中小企业客户购买其高风险金融产品这个案件,已经为金融控股公司的发展敲响了警钟,我国目前也有类似的案例出现,这说明金融控股公司破坏竞争行为的出现已经不是个别的现象,迫切需要得到控制。因此,笔者选择这个题目,从竞争法的角度出发,期望通过研究金融控股公司破坏竞争行为的成因,以及外国的监管现状,为我国构建监管体系提出建议,以求对金融控股公司的反垄断规制提供一定的参考意见。 论文一共分为六个部分。 第一部分,引言。本部分阐述了本文的研究背景、国内外目前对金融控股公司破坏竞争行为的研究现状、本文的研究意义以及本文使用的研究方法。 第二部分,金融控股公司相关理论基础。首先,本文对金融控股公司概念和类型进行介绍,对我们目前存在的金融控股公司的类型进行了分类,然后详细论述了金融控股公司这种经营模式的优点,包括信息优势、规模经济和范围经济,最后,分析了金融控股公司这种模式产生的不良后果,包括对市场公平竞争环境的影响和对客户利益的影响,主要有影响市场良性竞争、降低经济效率、侵犯客户商业秘密和自由选择权、影响监管效力等。 第三部分,金融控股公司破坏竞争行为的识别。本部分的主旨是介绍如何认定金融控股公司的破坏竞争的行为。首先,本部分从相对市场优势地位入手,对这个概念以及它的特点、判定标准进行了阐述,然后界定金融控股公司在市场中的地位是相对市场优势地位,同时阐述了金融控股公司是如何获得这种优势地位的,最后对金融控股公司滥用市场优势地位的判定,包括介绍了判定的标准以及目前存在的具体行为,例如:搭售、拒绝交易、歧视性待遇等等。 第四部分,他国(地区)监管经验以及我国的监管现状。本部分主要分为两大块,一是介绍外国的监管经验,二是介绍我国目前的监管现状。在第一部分外国的介绍中,本文主要介绍了美国、英国、日本和我国台湾地区的经验,主要包括监管机构的设置、对金融控股公司收购的监管方式以及对滥用行为的监管和处罚;第二部分首先介绍了我国目前对金融控股公司行为进行监管的体制,其次介绍了我国目前对金融控股公司破坏竞争行为进行监管的法律,不仅有金融类和竞争类的法律,也有各个监管部门自己制定的监管细则,以及多个监管部门之间达成的分工备忘录等,再次,介绍了我国目前进行监管的主要内容,主要是介绍了各个法律规定的具体监管权限、监管方式、监管程序等内容。 第五部分,对金融控股公司反垄断规制的完善。本部分主要分为两大板块:我国目前对金融控股公司破坏竞争行为进行监管的缺陷和对监管进行完善的建议。对于我国目前的监管缺陷,笔者认为,最主要表现为由于法律的缺失而导致的监管困境。首先是监管法律的缺失,我国目前有多部法律对金融监管做出了规定,但是却缺乏对金融控股公司进行监管的法律,因为目前还没有任何一部法律明文确定了金融控股公司的概念,这也就给监管造成了困难,同时缺失的还有行业监管和反垄断监管之间进行协调的法律,这也使得二者难以融洽的对金融控股公司破坏竞争的行为进行监管;其次,缺失的是监管的细则,主要是指金融监管机构进行监督的程序、方式以及反垄断执行机构进行监督和惩处的细则;再次,是由于法律法规的缺乏所造成的监管困境,包括目前多种类型金融控股公司存在,致使金融控股公司不良后果产生的风险增加的问题,以及一行三会这个监管体系和反垄断执行机构体系之间监管权限的分配问题。由于存在以上的问题,笔者提出,要完善我国目前对金融控股公司的监管,第一步,完善监管法律,健全对金融控股公司的反垄断监管机制,首先是完善立法,先按照目前的现状修改法律,明确金融控股公司的地位,明晰金融控股公司的经营范围——不得涉足工商产业,然后再制定《金融控股公司法》,在法规中明确金融控股公司的监管内容,包括金融监管机构的监管和反垄断执行机构进行监管的程序和惩罚措施;其次明确金融控股公司的类型,规范金融控股公司的成立或者并购,从源头预防金融控股公司可能产生的破坏竞争的集中;第三,对《反垄断法》进行完善,在《反垄断法》中加入对滥用市场相对优势地位的介绍和规制,用来适应目前经济领域中虽没有支配地位,但利用优势地位对竞争市场和消费者利益进行损害的现状;最后,完善法律中的惩处措施,加大惩处力度,完善惩处的程序,用民事、刑事和行政责任对金融控股公司及其主要经营者进行惩罚,当然也要用法律规范监管机关的行为,防止监管机构滥用职权或者不作为,导致法律不能用于实处。第二步需要完善监管模式,加强监管机构之间的联系,包括完善金融控股公司监管机制,选择美国是伞形监管框架作为模版,形成专门的对金融控股公司进行监管的框架,其次对金融控股公司监管机构进行功能性监管改革,以适应目前金融控股公司发展的需要,也能更好的对金融控股公司破坏竞争行为进行监管,再次要加强金融控股公司监管机构和反垄断执行机构之间沟通,加强两大监管机构之间的沟通,把反垄断监管和金融行业监管结合起来,共同对破坏竞争的行为进行监管,可以采用建立联席会议、增加联合立法、明确相互监管权限的方式,构建一个完善的监管体系。 在研究方法上,本文注重理论与实际的联系,注重多学科知识的融通,主要包括:实证分析的方法,研究国内外已经发生过的金融控股公司滥用优势地位破坏竞争的案例,同时运用比较法学的研究方法,搜集其它国家和地区对金融控股公司破坏竞争行为的监管方式,吸取经验,给我国进行规制提供启示。 由于研究条件、资料搜集和写作时间上的限制,本文对于这个问题的研究不够深入具体;同时由于中国金融业正面临着改革,国情促使我国改革的主体并非放在对破坏竞争行为的监管方面,资料较少,案例不多,给作者写作造成一定困难。另外,笔者的写作水平并非上佳,文章结构和内容存在不少缺点和不足,作者提出的建议,也显得有些稚嫩,因此在本文写作完成之后,还有很多的问题值得后来者研究,为金融控股公司破坏竞争行为的监管提供更为完善的措施。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development of the financial market, mixed operation has become the main direction of the development of financial industry in various countries. Therefore, the new mixed operation mode of financial holding company has been developed gradually. The financial holding company has a series of advantages in the financial market competition, including the opening, advantages and scale of the joint operation of the subsidiary companies. These advantages make the financial holding company advantageous position in the competition and make it advantageous to the customer. However, the operation mode of the financial holding company also has huge benefits, and also contains huge risks, especially the damage of the financial holding company to the fair competition order and the financial holding company. A violation of the interests of the customers and the public.
With the deepening of the reform of the financial system in China, the original principle of "separate operation and division management" has been impacted. With the introduction of the proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the formulation of the "11th Five-Year" plan, China's finance is also moving from division to mixed operation. Emerging financial institutions.
With the growth of financial holding company in China's financial sector, various types of financial holding companies have emerged. The strong position of financial holding companies in the financial competition is more prominent. This comes from all kinds of subsidiary companies under the financial holding company, which controls all aspects of financial services and causes high financial resources. It is easy to connect with each other, interact with each other, to form a dominant position, and the financial enterprise itself has the advantage of natural monopoly. All these will have an adverse impact on the competition in the financial market, which will not only affect the interests of the financial customers, but also affect the financial security and financial stability of the state.
However, some scholars believe that in the environment of financial liberalization and financial competition, only when financial institutions have an absolute dominance of the market, the customers may be forced to buy the services they provide, otherwise, if they do not have such a position, the customers will turn to the services of other operators and therefore have financial holding. It is impossible for a company to violate the "antitrust law" and not destroy the market competition. Even there is a lack of foresight and foresight. At present, our country is still in the process of exploring the system of financial holding companies, and there is no condition to produce monopoly risk. It is not suitable for growing and growing. Financial holding companies are subject to strict anti-monopoly laws.
The author believes that it is essential to carry out anti-monopoly regulation to the financial holding company, and it is urgent. The case of Sumitomo Sumitomo Bank forced small and medium-sized enterprises to buy their high risk financial products has already rounded the alarm for the development of financial holding companies. The emergence of the company's destructive competition is not a other phenomenon, and it is urgently needed to be controlled. Therefore, the author chooses this topic, from the perspective of competition law, to study the causes of the destruction of the competitive behavior of the financial holding companies and the status of foreign supervision, and make suggestions for the construction of the regulatory system in China in order to hold financial holding. The company's Antimonopoly regulation provides certain reference opinions.
The thesis is divided into six parts.
The first part, introduction. This part expounds the research background of this article, the current research status of the financial holding companies' destructive competition behavior at home and abroad, the significance of this paper and the research methods used in this article.
The second part is the theoretical basis of the financial holding company. First, this paper introduces the concept and type of the financial holding company, classifies the types of the existing financial holding companies, and then expounds the advantages of the financial holding company in detail, including the information advantage, the scale economy and the scope economy, and the last one. This paper analyzes the adverse consequences of the financial holding company, including the impact on the fair competition environment in the market and the influence on the interests of the customers, which mainly affect the market benign competition, reduce the economic efficiency, infringe on the customer's business secrets and free choice, and influence the regulatory effectiveness and so on.
The third part is the identification of the financial holding company's destructive competition behavior. The main purpose of this part is to introduce how to identify the behavior of the financial holding company. First, this part, starting with the relative market dominance, expounds the concept and its characteristics and criteria, and then defines the financial holding company in the market. Status is a relative market advantage position. At the same time, it expounds how financial holding companies get this advantage. Finally, the determination of the abuse of market dominance by financial holding companies, including the criteria of judgment and the specific behaviors, such as tying, refusing to deal, discriminatory treatment and so on.
The fourth part, the supervision experience of his country (region) and the current situation of our country's supervision, this part is divided into two major parts, one is introducing the experience of foreign supervision and the two is the present situation of our country's supervision. In the first part of the foreign introduction, this article mainly introduces the experience of the United States, Britain, Japan and the Taiwan region of our country, mainly including the supervisory machine. In the second part, we first introduce the system of supervising the behavior of financial holding companies in our country. Secondly, it introduces the laws that regulate the destruction of the competitive behavior of financial holding companies in our country, not only financial and competitive. The law of contending, the regulations made by the various regulatory departments and the memorandum of division of labor between the various supervisory departments, and the main contents of our country's current supervision are introduced, mainly including the specific regulatory authority, the way of supervision and the procedure of supervision.
The fifth part, the improvement of the anti-monopoly regulation of the financial holding company. This part is divided into two major parts: the defects of our country's current supervision of the financial holding company's destruction and the perfection of the supervision. For the current supervision defects of our country, the author thinks that the main manifestation is the lack of law. The first is the lack of regulatory law. There are many laws in our country that have made regulations on financial supervision and regulation, but there is no law to supervise financial holding companies, because there is no law clearly defining the concept of financial holding companies. The law of coordination between industry supervision and anti monopoly regulation, which also makes the two difficult to regulate the behavior of financial holding companies to destroy the competition; secondly, the lack of supervision rules, mainly refers to the procedures of supervision by the financial regulators, and the rules of the supervision and punishment of the antitrust enforcement agencies. Again, the regulatory dilemma caused by the lack of laws and regulations, including the existence of various types of financial holding companies, the increase of the risk of the adverse consequences of the financial holding companies, and the allocation of regulatory authority between the three meeting of the regulatory system and the system of antitrust executive institutions. In order to improve the regulation of financial holding companies in our country, the first step is to perfect the supervision law and improve the anti-monopoly supervision mechanism of the financial holding company. First, the legislation is perfected. First, the law is amended according to the present situation, the status of the financial holding company is clarifying, and the scope of the financial holding company is clear. It is necessary to set foot in the industrial and commercial industry, and then formulate the law of the financial holding company, to clarify the regulatory content of the financial holding companies in the regulations, including the supervision of the financial regulators and the procedures and penalties for the supervision of the anti monopoly executive agencies; secondly, to clarify the types of the financial holding companies and standardize the establishment or merger of the financial holding companies. The source prevents the possible concentration of competition from the financial holding companies. Third, to improve the antitrust law and to introduce and regulate the relative dominance of the abuse of the market in the antitrust law, to adapt to the current economic field, although it has no dominant position in the current economic field, but to benefit the competitive market and the interests of consumers with advantage status. In the end, we should improve the punishment measures in the law, strengthen the punishment, improve the procedure of punishment, punish the financial holding companies and their main operators with civil, criminal and administrative responsibilities, and, of course, regulate the conduct of the organs by law to prevent the abuse of authority or inaction by the supervision institutions, and the law can not be used. The second step is to improve the regulatory model and strengthen the relationship between the regulatory agencies, including the improvement of the regulatory mechanism of the financial holding companies, the American umbrella regulatory framework as a template, a special framework for the supervision of the financial holding companies, and the functional regulatory reform of the regulatory agencies of the financial and control stock companies. At present, the needs of the development of the financial holding companies can also be better regulated by the financial holding companies to destroy the competitive behavior. Again, we should strengthen the communication between the regulatory agencies of the financial holding companies and the anti monopoly enforcement agencies, strengthen the communication between the two major regulatory agencies, and combine the anti-monopoly supervision and the financial industry supervision, and joint the destruction of the financial holding companies. The supervision of competitive behavior can be achieved by establishing joint meetings, increasing joint legislation, and making clear the way of mutual supervision, so as to build a sound regulatory system.
In the research method, this paper pays attention to the relationship between theory and practice, and pays attention to the integration of multidisciplinary knowledge. It mainly includes the method of empirical analysis, the case of the abuse of advantage status of financial holding companies at home and abroad, and the use of comparative jurisprudential research methods to collect financial holding in other countries and regions. The way in which companies disrupt competition behavior and learn from experience provide enlightenment for our country's regulation.
Because of the research conditions, the collection of information and the limitation of writing time, the study of this problem is not thorough enough and specific. At the same time, because of the reform of China's financial industry, the main body of China's reform is not on the supervision of the destruction of competitive behavior. In addition, the author's writing level is not good, the structure and content of the article have many shortcomings and shortcomings, the author's suggestions, also appear some tender, so after the completion of this article, there are many problems worth studying later, providing more perfect measures for the supervision of the financial holding company to break the supervision of the competitive behavior.
【学位授予单位】:西南财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:D922.294;F832.39
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