债权人参与公司治理研究

发布时间：2018-06-21 20:23

本文选题：债权人 + 公司治理　；参考：《中国政法大学》2011年博士论文

【摘要】：公司治理的最终目标是在保障利益相关者利益的基础上,实现公司价值最大化。债权人作为公司最主要的利益相关者,显然不能被排除在公司治理体系之外。因此,本文综合运用法学、经济学方法对债权人参与公司治理问题进行了专题研究。内容涵盖了债权人参与公司治理基础理论、构造论、运行论和保障论。除导论和结论以外,全文共分四章。导论部分主要介绍了本文的选题背景和意义,以及国内外关于债权人公司治理研究现状。针对当前研究中存在的重实证分析轻规范分析、重效应分析轻机制分析、重经济分析轻法学分析的缺陷,提出本文的研究思路和主要研究方法。第一章是债权人参与公司治理的基础理论。在合理界定公司治理概念的基础上,分析作为公司治理概念核心的公司控制权的特征。以企业理论的研究成果为基础,对公司契约性质和公司法规范的性质进行分析,并提出公司治理的基本原则,即公司治理自治原则。通过对股东主权理论的反思,并结合利益相关者理论和相机治理理论,研究债权人参与公司治理的必要性。基于公司治理的基础概念,提出将债权人作为利益相关者参与公司治理的概念,明确债权人参与公司治理制度体系的框架,并提出债权人参与公司治理的基本原则。第二章是债权人参与公司治理的构造论。在剖析债权和股权区别的基础上,通过法学和经济学的方法对债权人与股东之间的利益关系,债权人与管理层之间的利益关系进行深入研究,分析其利益一致性和利益冲突,特别关注债权人与股东对公司债务金额、资产波动率、债务融资期限等因素的利益冲突,为构建债权人参与公司治理机制奠定基础。通过对德日银行参与公司治理模式和英美银行参与公司治理的实践进行比较分析,结合我国实际金融市场现状和法律框架,提出我国债权人参与公司治理基本模式的选择,即选择以债权债务合同为核心的债权人参与公司治理模式。针对债权人与股东、管理层之间的利益冲突,通过对美国相关判例的研究,分析债权人参与公司治理的界限。第三章是债权人参与公司治理的运行论。根据债权人参与公司治理体系框架,将债权人参与公司治理区分为合同债权人参与公司治理、债券持有人参与公司治理、公司破产程序中债权人参与公司治理、董事对债权人的义务四部分。根据合同债权人的特点,分析债务合同在公司治理中的作用,通过对债务合同保护性条款的分类研究,讨论其在分配公司控制权及调整债权人、股东和管理层利益关系方面的作用。基于合同的相对性分析保护性条款的效力,并对国内已经出现和应用的银行借款合同保护性条款进行实证研究。根据债券债权的特点,分析债券协议中可能出现的保护性条款,针对债券持有人分散、多元的特点,从公司治理的角度对债券持有人会议和债券受托管理人制度进行研究,并对相关制度提出建议。从相机治理理论出发,将公司破产程序视为特殊状态的公司治理,并根据公司治理基本理论,研究和分析了破产程序启动、破产管理人制度和破产重整制度,并针对我国《企业破产法》的相关规定提出完善意见。基于大陆法系和英美法系相关立法和司法实践的比较分析,研究了董事对债权人的义务问题,提出公司在正常经营状态下,董事对债权人承担注意义务,在公司破产或濒临破产状态下,董事对债权人承担间接信赖义务,但并不承担直接信赖义务。第四章是债权人参与公司治理的保障论。债权人参与公司治理与股东不同,其参与公司治理的权利并非是先天具备的,而往往是基于合同约定后天受让的,因此,债权人参与公司治理的权利需要强有力的司法保障,对于债务协议中规定的保护性条款,债权人可以基于普通民事诉讼程序要求法院提供司法保障,同时,笔者认为还有必要建立债权人派生诉讼制度,强化债权人参与公司治理权利的司法保障。债券持有人作为特殊类型的债权人参与公司治理还需要相应的市场环境,笔者结合我国债券市场发展的现状提出了下一步发展建议。银行作为专业债权人,参与公司治理具有先天优势,但笔者认为要发挥银行在公司治理方面的作用,需要增强银行的治理能力,即提高银行自身公司治理水平,合理设计债务合同,并合理运用破产程序维护自身权利。同时,还应该建立非上市公司的强制信息披露制度,以缓解公司治理过程中存在的信息不对称问题。最后是结论部分。将公司视为股东“所有”的传统理论已经过时,在保障利益相关者利益的前提下实现公司价值最大化是公司治理的最终目标。而保护利益相关者的最有效手段,就要破除传统上将其视为公司治理旁观者的观点,而将其引入公司治理的框架。但债权与股权自身法律性质的区别,决定了债权的有限性、期限性和不稳定性,这也就决定了债权人通过公司内部组织机构参与公司治理的高成本性。因此,债权人参与公司治理的方式应当回到债权本身的载体——债务合同,通过保护性条款对公司控制权在法律规定的基础上再次分配,对股东和管理层控制权进行限制和约束,实现债权人参与公司治理的目的。而且,破产程序不仅仅是对债务人财产的公平受偿程序,也可以视为特殊状态下的公司治理,因此,破产程序应坚持和贯彻债权人自治原则。
[Abstract]:The ultimate goal of corporate governance is to maximize the value of the company on the basis of guaranteeing the interests of the stakeholders. As the most important stakeholder of the company, the creditor can not be excluded from the corporate governance system. Therefore, this paper makes a comprehensive application of jurisprudence and economic methods to the problem of the creditor's participation in corporate governance. The study covers the basic theory of creditors' participation in corporate governance, construction theory, operation theory and guarantee theory. Besides the introduction and conclusion, the paper is divided into four chapters.
The introduction part mainly introduces the background and significance of this paper, as well as the status quo of the research on the governance of creditor companies both at home and abroad. In the light of the current research on the light normative analysis, the light mechanism analysis of heavy effect analysis, the defects of the heavy economic analysis and the light jurisprudence analysis, this paper puts forward the research ideas and main research methods in this paper.
The first chapter is the basic theory of the creditor's participation in corporate governance. On the basis of the rational definition of the corporate governance concept, the characteristics of the corporate control right as the core of the corporate governance concept are analyzed. Based on the research results of the enterprise theory, the nature of the company contract and the standard of the company law is analyzed, and the basic original of the corporate governance is put forward. On the other hand, it is the principle of corporate governance autonomy. Through the reflection on the theory of shareholder sovereignty and the theory of stakeholder and camera governance, the necessity of the creditor's participation in corporate governance is studied. Based on the basic concept of corporate governance, the concept of the creditor as the stakeholder in the corporate governance is proposed, and the creditor is clearly involved in the corporate governance. The framework of the system is put forward and the basic principles of creditors' participation in corporate governance are put forward.
The second chapter is the theory of the creditor's participation in corporate governance. On the basis of the analysis of the difference between creditor's rights and equity, the interests of creditors and shareholders, the interests of creditors and management are deeply studied through legal and economic methods, and their interest conformance and conflict of interest are analyzed, and the creditors and shares are paid special attention to. The conflict of interest in the amount of debt, the rate of asset volatility and the maturity of debt financing is the foundation for the construction of the creditor's participation in the corporate governance mechanism. The choice of the basic mode of the creditor participation in corporate governance in our country is to choose the creditor participating in the corporate governance model with the creditor and debt contract as the core.
The third chapter is the operation theory of the creditor participating in the corporate governance. According to the creditor's participation in the corporate governance framework, the creditor participates in the corporate governance in the corporate governance, the bondholders participate in the corporate governance, the creditors participate in the corporate governance in the bankruptcy proceedings, and the four part of the obligations of the directors to the creditors. The characteristics of the contractual creditor, analyze the role of the debt contract in the corporate governance. Through the classification of the protective clauses of the debt contract, it discusses its role in distributing the control of the company and adjusting the interests of the creditor, the shareholders and the management. On the basis of the characteristics of the bank loan contract, this paper analyzes the protective clauses that may appear in the bond agreement. In view of the decentralization and diversity of the bondholders, the bond holder meeting and the debt voucher management system are studied from the perspective of corporate governance, and the related system is also made. From the point of view of the theory of camera governance, the company's bankruptcy procedure is regarded as a special state of corporate governance. According to the basic theory of corporate governance, the starting of the bankruptcy procedure, the bankruptcy administrator system and the bankruptcy reorganization system are studied and analyzed, and some suggestions are made to the relevant regulations of the enterprise bankruptcy law in China. Compared with the relevant legislation and judicial practice in the common law system, the author studies the obligation of the director to the creditor, and puts forward that the director assumes the duty of attention to the creditor in the normal operation state. Under the condition of the company bankruptcy or the insolvency, the director assumes the obligation of indirect trust to the creditor, but does not bear the direct trust obligation.
The fourth chapter is the theory of the creditor's participation in corporate governance. The creditor's participation in corporate governance is different from the shareholders, and the right to participate in corporate governance is not innate, but is often based on the contract agreement the day after the contract. Therefore, the creditor's right to participate in corporate governance requires a strong judicial guarantee, as stipulated in the debt agreement. The creditor can require the court to provide judicial guarantee based on the ordinary civil procedure. At the same time, I think it is necessary to establish the creditor's derivative litigation system and strengthen the judicial guarantee of the creditor's participation in the corporate governance. As a special type of creditor, the bondholder needs corresponding city governance. According to the present situation of the development of our country's bond market, the author puts forward the next development proposal. As a professional creditor, the bank has a congenital advantage to participate in corporate governance. But the author believes that the role of the bank in corporate governance is to enhance the management ability of the bank, that is, to improve the management level of the bank itself and to rationally design the bank. In addition, the compulsory information disclosure system of non-listed company should be established to alleviate the problem of information asymmetry in the process of corporate governance.
The last is the conclusion. The traditional theory that regards the company as the shareholder is out of date. It is the ultimate goal of corporate governance to realize the maximum value of the company under the premise of guaranteeing the interests of the stakeholders. The difference between the legal nature of the creditor's right and the equity determines the limitation, the duration and the instability of the creditor's rights, which determines the high cost of the creditor's participation in corporate governance through the internal organization of the company. Therefore, the way the creditors participate in the corporate governance should return to the carrier of the claim itself. - a debt contract, redistributing the control right of the company on the basis of the law, restricting and restricting the control of the shareholders and management, and realizing the purpose of the creditor's participation in corporate governance. Moreover, the bankruptcy procedure is not only a public compensation procedure for the property of the debtor, but also the public in a special state. Therefore, bankruptcy proceedings should adhere to and implement the principle of creditor autonomy.
【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D912.29

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