分拆上市引发敌意收购风险的法律防范

发布时间：2018-06-22 14:04

本文选题：分拆上市 + 敌意收购　；参考：《华东政法大学》2011年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着证监会公布了上市公司在境内创业板分拆上市的条件后,分拆上市愈来愈受到欢迎。分拆上市是资产重组的一种方式,也是公司进行融资的途径。自20世纪80年代以来,分拆上市作为一种全新的金融创新和资产重组方式,发展迅速,美国、日本、台湾、香港等地的证券交易所都对此作出相应的规范,主板和二板市场均允许分拆上市。我国法律尚没有对分拆上市作出具体规定,而是由证监会发布规范性文件进行规范。从现有的规则本身看,还有不少问题需要进一步厘清并确定规则,对分拆上市中的问题如关联交易设计具体的监督规范与程序。分拆上市作为市场选择的一种路径,本身就是一个极为复杂的过程,需要公司法、证券法等诸多法律全面规范。本文仅就分拆上市引发潜在的敌意收购为对象进行研究。本文采用比较研究的方法,从分拆上市的动因、国内外法律规范对分拆上市的监管比较等角度入手,论述分析分拆上市行为可能引发敌意收购行为的原因以及上市公司应采取什么样的法律措施防范敌意收购行为,再通过境内外法律对分拆上市规定的比较,指出我国相关法律存在的不足。本文由导言、正文、结语三部分组成。导言介绍了选题的研的背景和意义、课题的研究方法。正文包括以下三章。第一章论述了分拆上市的原因、分拆上市可能引发敌意收购行为的原因以及我国上市公司收购的外部环境,即该环境对敌意收购的影响。首先介绍了公司选择分拆上市动因的若干种理论解释,包括不对称信息理论、管理效率理论、税收与管制理论、扩大市场容量假说以及期权创造假说。其次分析了分拆上市可能导致第三方敌意收购的因素,包括分拆上市造成公司控制权的分散、子公司壳资源化等等。论文还论述了我国上市公司收购的外部环境,包括相应的制度供给、股权分置改革以及中国市场对外资的开放,这些因素不仅扩大了潜在的可能采取敌意收购的主体,而且降低了敌意收购的风险以及成本。第二章着重介绍针对敌意收购行为,上市公司可能采取的法律防范措施。论文首先介绍了一般性反收购的预防性措施和主动措施。其次论述了分拆上市公司防范潜在的敌意收购行为宜采取的法律措施,包括三方面。第一,设置合理的股权结构；第二,完善信：息披露制度,提高信息披露信息,加强公司与市场的联系,防止子公司成为壳资源；第三,发行股本认购权证,增加袭击者的收购成本,抵制敌意行为。第三章介绍了国内外对分拆上市的监督机制并提出我国借鉴的可能性。论文首先介绍了美、日以及香港分拆上市的主要规范；其次介绍了我国对分拆上市的监管中存在的问题。文章结合我国分拆上市实践中的具体情况,提出借鉴香港对关联交易方面的规定,保护子公司的独立性,防止敌意收购行为。
[Abstract]:As the SFC announced the conditions for listing listed companies in the domestic gem, split listing is becoming more and more popular. Split-off listing is a way of asset restructuring and a way for companies to raise funds. Since the 1980s, as a new form of financial innovation and asset restructuring, the split-off listing has developed rapidly. Stock exchanges in the United States, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and other places have all made corresponding regulations on this issue. The main board and the second board market are allowed to split the listing. The law of our country has not made the specific stipulation of the split listing, but the normative documents issued by the Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). From the point of view of the existing rules, there are still many problems that need to be further clarified and determined, and specific supervision rules and procedures should be designed for the problems in the splitting and listing, such as related party transactions. As a way of market choice, splitting and listing is a very complicated process, which needs a lot of laws, such as company law, securities law and so on. This paper only studies the potential hostile takeover caused by split-up listing. This article adopts the method of comparative study, from the angle of the motivation of splitting and listing, the supervision and comparison of the domestic and foreign legal norms to the split listing, etc. This paper analyzes the reasons why the behavior of splitting and listing may lead to hostile takeover, and what legal measures should be taken by listed companies to prevent hostile takeover, and then compares the provisions of splitting and listing through domestic and foreign laws. This paper points out the shortcomings of relevant laws in our country. This paper consists of three parts: introduction, text and conclusion. The introduction introduces the background and significance of the research topic and the research methods of the subject. The text includes the following three chapters. The first chapter discusses the reasons of the split listing, the reasons of the hostile takeover caused by the split listing and the external environment of the takeover of the listed company in China, that is, the influence of the environment on the hostile takeover. Firstly, this paper introduces several theoretical explanations of the motivation of the company's choice of splitting and listing, including asymmetric information theory, management efficiency theory, tax and regulation theory, the hypothesis of expanding market capacity and the hypothesis of option creation. Secondly, the paper analyzes the factors that may lead to hostile takeover by third party, including the dispersion of the control rights of the company due to the splitting up and listing, and the shell resources of the subsidiary company and so on. The paper also discusses the external environment of the acquisition of listed companies in China, including the corresponding institutional supply, the reform of the split share structure and the opening of the Chinese market to foreign capital. These factors not only expand the potential subject of hostile takeover. It also reduces the risk and cost of hostile takeovers. The second chapter focuses on the hostile takeover behavior, listed companies may take legal precautions. The paper first introduces the general anti-takeover preventive measures and active measures. Secondly, it discusses the legal measures that should be taken to prevent potential hostile takeover of listed companies, including three aspects. First, to set up a reasonable equity structure; second, to improve the information disclosure system, to enhance the information disclosure, to strengthen the relationship between the company and the market, and to prevent subsidiaries from becoming shell resources; third, to issue equity subscription warrants. Increase the acquisition costs of the attackers and resist hostility. The third chapter introduces the domestic and foreign supervision mechanism of splitting and listing and puts forward the possibility of our country using for reference. This paper first introduces the main standards of the split listing in the United States, Japan and Hong Kong, and then introduces the problems existing in the supervision of the split listing in China. Based on the specific situation in the practice of splitting and listing in China, this paper puts forward some suggestions for reference in Hong Kong on related party transactions, to protect the independence of subsidiary companies and to prevent hostile takeover.
【学位授予单位】：华东政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.287

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