独立董事监督力与上市公司违规行为的关系研究

发布时间：2018-06-29 07:49

本文选题：独立董事 + 监督力　；参考：《西南财经大学》2011年硕士论文

【摘要】：2001年8月16日,中国证监会颁布了《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》(以下简称：“《指导意见》”),这标志着独立董事制度正式进入我国。《指导意见》的颁布确认了独立董事在我国上市公司董事会中的地位,使得独立董事制度成为完善我国上市公司治理结构的重要举措。2005年10月27日,《公司法》规定上市公司需设立独立董事,这标志着独立董事制度在我国正式取得法律地位。在引入独立董事制度的初期,学术界针对独立董事制度的有效性、独立董事制度在我国出现的“水土不服”现象进行过广泛而深入的讨论,从郑百文作假事件到科龙电器独立董事集体辞职,一系列的丑闻都将独立董事推到了风头浪尖上。然而,随着我国独立董事制度的不断发展和成熟,实务界和学术界已经形成了共识,即我国的独立董事制度能否真正起到完善上市公司治理结构的作用,关键不在于制度本身设计得有多精良,而是依赖于每位独立董事是否能够切实履行自身职责,是否能够真正担负起维护全体股东利益的重要责任。如今,独立董事制度在我国已经迈进了第10个年头,那么,经过将近十年的实践,我国的独立董事究竟表现如何,在上市公司中是否发挥出了积极的作用,为完善上市公司治理结构是否做出了应有的贡献呢? 在研究独立董事是否发挥了其作用之前,本文首先对我国独立董事的职能进行了界定。通过对我国相关法律法规的解读,结合我国上市公司引入独立董事制度的动机和发展现状分析,本文认为我国独立董事在现阶段主要扮演着监督角色,通过自身监督职能的实现来体现独立董事的有效性。独立董事的监督职能主要体现在监督控股股东的滥权行为,约束管理层的行为以降低代理成本,防止非正常关联交易的发生,确保会计信息如实披露,切实维护股东特别是中小股东利益。然而,目前我国上市公司的违规行为主要集中在会计信息披露、大股东占用上市公司资产、违规对外担保和违反其他相关法律等方面。结合我国独立董事的监督职能范围来看,上市公司的很大一部分违规行为都属于独立董事的职能范畴,违规行为的发生在一定程度上受到了独立董事监督力的影响,也就是说,独立董事作为上市公司的重要监督力量,其职责履行的好坏在很大程度上直接影响到上市公司违规行为的发生。因此,本文回归到我国引入独立董事的基本出发点,立足于独立董事的监督职能,检验独立董事监督力与上市公司违规行为之间的关系,探究独立董事是否能够对上市公司的违规行为进行监督和制约,独立董事在公司治理中是否有效地履行了其职能。本文首先从上市公司违规行为的动因研究、独立董事监督职能的有效性、独立董事监督力的衡量等方面进行了文献回顾,发现从公司治理结构的角度对违规行为的动因研究是学者们的研究重点,董事会与上市公司违规行为存在着密切的关系；然后再从国内外学者对监督职能的有效性的角度进行综述,归纳成肯定派和谨慎派两种观点；最后通过文献回顾,总结出从独立董事的规模、专业能力、薪酬、投入的时间精力及声誉水平这五个方面来衡量独立董事监督力。本文认为,独立董事的规模是独立董事行使职责的基本前提,独立董事的专业能力保证了独立董事胜任这一职位的专业性,独立董事的薪酬是独立董事任职的物质保障,独立董事投入的时间精力体现了独立董事服务的意愿程度,独立董事的声誉水平则反映了独立董事被认可的程度。同时,在理论分析部分,本文主要分析了委托代理理论、利益相关者理论、信号传递理论和人力资本理论这四个理论以及它们与独立董事制度的关系。通过对相关文献的回顾和基本理论的分析,本文从衡量独立董事监督力的五个方面,分别提出了对应的五个假设,假设独立董事的比例、独立董事中会计专业人数、独立董事的平均薪酬、独立董事发表独立意见的次数及独立董事的任职家数这五个因素与上市公司的违规行为都呈现负相关关系,即预期独立董事的监督力能够抑制上市公司违规行为的发生,独立董事的监督职能够得到有效的发挥。实证分析部分,本文首先对研究变量进行了描述性统计,对样本中的违规行为和衡量独立董事监督力的各变量进行了分类统计。然后通过建立Logistic回归模型,对其进行了单变量回归分析和多元回归分析,发现独立董事的比例、独立董事的平均薪酬与上市公司违规行为呈显著的负相关关系,这很好地解释了独立董事能够履行其监督职能,对上市公司违规行为的发生有明显的抑制作用。独立董事中会计专业人数、独立董事发表意见的次数以及独立董事的任职家数与上市公司的违规行为都不存在显著关系。同时,为了证实模型的可靠性,本文运用White修正后的OLS回归方法对模型再次进行了综合检验,回归结果与Logistic模型的结果完全一致。最后,替代部分变量后对模型进行了稳健性测试,回归结果也与前文一致,说明该模型的稳健性较好。针对实证研究的结果,本文认为独立董事的比例对上市公司违规行为的发生有明显的抑制作用,这表明独立董事作为董事会的一员,一定规模的独立董事拥有着更多的话语权,独立董事的比例越高,独立董事的独立性就越强,独立董事的意见也就更为中立和客观；独立董事的平均薪酬对上市公司违规行为的发生有明显的抑制作用,这表明上市公司给予独立董事适当的薪酬后,独立董事的服务意愿得到加强,适当的物质激励能够使独立董事和上市公司达到双赢的局面；独立董事中会计专业人数、独立董事发表独立意见的次数和独立董事的任职家数没有通过显著性检验,这可能与上市公司存在明显的政策迎合行为以及我国独立董事声誉机制的作用没有完全发挥出来有关。总的来说,本文认为,在我国现有的独立董事制度下,独立董事在一定程度上能够有效发挥其监督职能,能够对上市公司的违规行为产生抑制作用,特别是独立董事的规模和薪酬激励两个因素对职能的履行起到了关键作用。最后,本文结合当前我国的实际情况,从适当提高独立董事的比例、完善独立董事的薪酬机制、推进专职独立董事的形成、规范独立董事队伍的管理这四个方面提出了针对性的政策建议。本文的创新之处在于,在设计研究模型时对被解释变量进行了重新的定义,从上市公司违规行为与独立董事监督力是否有关的角度将违规公司分成了两类,而没有采用文献中常用的将违规公司与未违规公司进行配对研究的方法。同时,本文认为在衡量独立董事投入的时间精力这一因素时,应该从独立董事工作业绩的成果上着手,而目前代表独立董事工作成果的公开数据并不多,所以本文选用独立董事发表独立意见的次数来作为替代变量衡量,认为这一变量在考察投入的时间精力时更为直接和合理。
[Abstract]:On August 16 , 2001 , China Securities Regulatory Commission issued a guidance on the establishment of independent director system in listed companies ( hereinafter referred to as " Guidelines on Independent Directors " ) , which marked the formal entry of independent director system into our country . In the early stage of introducing independent director system , the independent director system has become an important measure to perfect the governance structure of listed companies .

This paper defines the function of independent director in our country . In the light of the supervision function of the independent director of our country , the author thinks that the independent director plays a role in supervising controlling shareholder ' s abuses , restraining management ' s behavior so as to reduce agency cost , protect shareholders especially minority shareholder ' s interests .

Therefore , this paper returns to the basic starting point of introducing independent director in our country , based on the supervision function of independent director , checks the relation between independent director ' s supervision force and the violation of listed company , explores whether the independent director can supervise and restrict the violation of listed company , and whether the independent director effectively performs its function in corporate governance .

Firstly , this paper reviews the reasons of the violation behavior of listed companies , the effectiveness of independent director ' s supervision function , the measurement of independent director ' s supervision force and so on . It is found that the research on the motivation of violations is the focus of scholars ' research , and the board of directors is closely related to the violation of listed companies .
Secondly , this paper reviews the effectiveness of supervision function from both domestic and foreign scholars , and induces both positive and conservative views .
Finally , through the review of literature , the author summarizes the supervision force of independent directors from five aspects : size , professional competence , remuneration , time and reputation level of independent directors . In this paper , it is believed that the independent director ' s professional ability ensures that the independent director is qualified for the position . The independent director ' s professional competence reflects the degree of independence director ' s service . At the same time , the independent director ' s reputation level reflects the degree of independent director ' s service . At the same time , in the theoretical analysis part , this paper mainly analyzes the four theories of principal agent theory , stakeholder theory , signal transmission theory and human capital theory and their relationship with independent director system .

Through the analysis of the relevant literature review and the basic theory , this paper puts forward the corresponding five assumptions from five aspects of measuring the supervision force of independent directors . It is assumed that the proportion of independent directors , the number of independent directors , the average remuneration of independent directors , the number of independent directors and the number of independent directors are negatively related to the violations of listed companies , that is , it is expected that the supervision force of independent directors can restrain the occurrence of the violation of listed companies , and the supervision of independent directors can be effectively played .

The empirical analysis shows that the independent director is able to carry out the function of supervision , the average salary of the independent director and the illegal behavior of listed company have significant negative correlation , and then , to prove the reliability of the model , the author uses White modified OLS regression method to carry out the comprehensive test again . At the same time , the regression result is consistent with the result of the Logistic model . Finally , the regression result is consistent with the previous text , which shows that the model has good robustness .

In the light of the results of the empirical research , the author thinks that the ratio of independent directors has obvious restraining effect on the occurrence of the violation of listed companies , which indicates that the independent director is a member of the board of directors . The higher the independent director , the more the independent director is , the stronger the independence of the independent director and the more neutral and objective view of the independent director ;
The average salary of independent directors has obvious effect on the occurrence of the violation of listed companies , which shows that after the listed company gives the independent director the proper remuneration , the willingness of the independent director is strengthened , and the proper material incentive can lead the independent director and the listed company to win a win - win situation ;
On the other hand , in our country ' s current independent director system , the independent director can effectively exert its supervision function and play a key role in the performance of the independent director ' s reputation mechanism . In the end , this paper puts forward some specific policy suggestions from the four aspects of improving the proportion of independent directors , perfecting the compensation mechanism of independent directors , advancing the formation of independent directors and regulating the management of independent directors .

The innovation of this paper is that , when designing the research model , the interpretation variable is redefined , and the violation company is divided into two types from the angle of whether the violation behavior of listed company and the supervision force of the independent director are related .
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：F276.6;F832.51;F224

【参考文献】