公司治理对自愿性信息披露影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-07-27 14:52

【摘要】：自愿性信息披露包括公司的财务和发展等相关信息,它由公司的管理层自主提供,属于强制性信息披露规则要求之外的信息。作为一个整体,自愿性信息披露深化并补充了会计信息。我国上市公司近年来才开始自愿性信息的披露,尽管披露的水平不断在提高,但披露的总体状况仍然不尽人意,应该想办法进一步提高。本世纪初,国内学者开始研究公司治理对自愿性信息披露的影响,但随着新《公司法》、《证券法》、新会计准则和股权分置改革的实施,以往学者的研究结论和现在学者的研究结论有所脱轨。因此,有必要重新研究这一问题,这对上市公司信息披露制度的完善、上市公司信息披露质量的提高、信息透明度的改善、资本市场的有效配置和合理流动、资本市场有效健康和可持续发展具有较高的实用价值。本文将公司治理对自愿性信息披露的影响进行了分析,并提出了股权结构特征、董事会特征和监事会特征对自愿性信息披露水平的影响,运用实证研究方法验证这些影响,对具体怎样提高自愿性信息披露水平从公司治理角度提出了自己的看法。本文包括以下四个部分：第一部分是导论。提出了研究的背景、意义、目的、内容、方法、创新点和不足之处。第二部分从理论上界定了公司治理和自愿性信息披露。完善的公司治理能够促进自愿性信息披露水平的较高。第三部分是公司治理对自愿性信息披露影响的实证研究。实证研究结论得出了公司治理的特征变量和自愿性信息披露的相关关系,基本上验证了第二部分的理论分析结果,对于与理论分析部分不同的实证结论,本文试图根据我国自愿性信息披露的现状做出合理的解释。第四部分是结论和建议。在前三部分研究基础上提出了研究结论和相关建议,从公司治理角度提高我国上市公司自愿性信息披露水平。本文从规范角度和实证角度分别讨论了公司治理对自愿性信息披露的影响,从如何优化公司治理角度出发来提高上市公司自愿性信息披露水平。本文的创新之处在于将监事会是否发挥监督职能作为公司治理变量之一从一个新的公司治理角度来探讨如何提高上市公司自愿性信息披露水平。本文主要从两方面对监事会的监督职能进行判断。一方面,如果监事会成员中没有独立监事,监事会是由职工监事或股东监事组成的,本文认为,这是很难发挥监督职能的监事会。另一方面,我国上市公司的很多高管如董事长、总经理和监事,他们都有某些政治关联,如果政治关联给高管带来一些职务便利,本文认为,这是很难发挥监督职能的监事会。本文主要通过以上两方面来验证监事会的监督职能与自愿性信息披露水平的关系,从一个新的角度改善公司治理,从而提高上市公司自愿性信息披露水平。
[Abstract]:Voluntary disclosure includes related information such as finance and development of the company. It is provided by the management of the company independently and is not required by the mandatory disclosure rules. As a whole, voluntary information disclosure deepens and complements accounting information. In recent years, China's listed companies have only begun to disclose voluntary information. Although the level of disclosure is constantly improving, the overall situation of disclosure is still unsatisfactory, so we should find ways to further improve it. At the beginning of this century, domestic scholars began to study the influence of corporate governance on voluntary information disclosure. However, with the implementation of the new Company Law, the Securities Law, the new accounting standards and the reform of the split share structure, The previous research conclusions of scholars and the current research conclusions of scholars have been derailed. Therefore, it is necessary to re-study this problem, which will improve the information disclosure system of listed companies, improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, improve the transparency of information, effectively allocate and flow reasonably the capital market. The effective and sustainable development of capital market has high practical value. This paper analyzes the influence of corporate governance on voluntary information disclosure, and puts forward the influence of the characteristics of ownership structure, board of directors and board of supervisors on the level of voluntary information disclosure. How to improve voluntary information disclosure level from the perspective of corporate governance put forward their own views. This article includes the following four parts: the first part is the introduction. The background, significance, purpose, content, method, innovation and deficiency of the research are put forward. The second part defines corporate governance and voluntary information disclosure theoretically. Perfect corporate governance can promote the higher level of voluntary information disclosure. The third part is the empirical study of the impact of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure. The conclusion of the empirical study draws the correlation between the characteristic variables of corporate governance and voluntary information disclosure, and basically verifies the theoretical analysis results of the second part, which is different from the empirical conclusions in the theoretical analysis part. This paper tries to make a reasonable explanation according to the present situation of voluntary information disclosure in China. The fourth part is the conclusion and recommendation. On the basis of the first three parts, the author puts forward the conclusions and relevant suggestions to improve the level of voluntary information disclosure of listed companies in China from the perspective of corporate governance. This paper discusses the impact of corporate governance on voluntary information disclosure from the perspective of regulation and demonstration, and how to improve the level of voluntary information disclosure of listed companies from the perspective of how to optimize corporate governance. The innovation of this paper lies in whether the supervisory board plays a supervisory role as one of the corporate governance variables to discuss how to improve the voluntary information disclosure level of listed companies from a new corporate governance perspective. This article mainly carries on the judgment from two aspects to the supervisory function of the board of supervisors. On the one hand, if the members of the board of supervisors do not have independent supervisors, the board of supervisors is composed of staff supervisors or shareholders supervisors. On the other hand, many senior executives of listed companies in China, such as chairman, general manager and supervisor, all have some political connections. This paper verifies the relationship between the supervisory function of the supervisory board and the voluntary information disclosure level through the above two aspects, improves the corporate governance from a new angle, thus enhances the voluntary information disclosure level of the listed company.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：F275;F276.6;F224

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