股东代表诉讼中的公司参加问题研究

发布时间：2018-08-27 09:40

【摘要】：股东代表诉讼是一种特殊的制度设计,在诉权的性质、诉讼程序的设置、涉及利益主体的广泛性及复杂性等方面,都与普通的民事诉讼有很大的差异。该制度设置的初衷主要是为了保护中小股东的利益,强调公司的参加,看似是一种悖逆,实则不然。在诉讼所涉及的各利益主体之间,公司处于一种事实上的核心地位。既是股东代表诉讼制度能否有效发挥作用的关键,也是构建股东代表诉讼利益平衡机制的中心环节。公司在诉讼中的角色既尴尬又复杂,它可能是诉讼的最大受益者,也可能是最大的利益受损者。这就需要积极发挥公司在诉讼中的作用,使之能够对股东代表诉讼程序的启动与进程、对诉讼的结果施加必要的影响,在股东代表诉讼制度所要实现的各目标之间起到调节与平衡的作用。本文综合运用公司法学、民事诉讼法学、民法学以及法经济学等学科的相关理论及分析工具,并结合我国股东代表诉讼制度、股东权保护、民事诉讼相关制度以及公司治理机制发展的实际,对股东代表诉讼中的公司参加问题进行了系统、深入地探讨。本文除导言及结语之外,共分六章：第一章股东代表诉讼诉权的性质。本章首先分析了“股东权说”.存在的不足,并从法经济学的角度,认为股东享有代表诉讼诉权的权利基础在于相关过错行为人对公司契约义务的违反,揭示出公司法何以仅将该权利配置给股东以及为股东行使该权利设置前置程序背后的经济逻辑,即该种制度安排有利于节约交易成本,提高资源使用的效率。股东代表诉讼诉权承载着事前监督与事后救济两方面的功能。并论证了该权利的程序法基础是诉讼担当。第二章股东代表诉讼中公司的参加。本章分析了公司参加股东代表诉讼的正当性在于其符合正当程序原理及诉讼效率价值的要求,与股东代表诉讼诉权的性质相一致。公司可以选择是否参加诉讼,但不能辅助被告方,也不享有取代原告股东接收诉讼或重新起诉的权利,并应为公司参加诉讼设置相应的通知程序。第三章公司的诉讼地位。本章通过对国内相关争议的梳理、评述与反思,结合对域外公司地位立法的经验性考察,提出公司原则上应作为共同诉讼参加人,在例外情况下可以选择作为无独立请求权第三人。第四章公司在股东代表诉讼中的权利。首先,公司应有条件享有阻止诉讼权,并应改革我国现有的董事会和监事会制度,保证其相关判断的独立性,法院应对公司独立机构的相关决定予以尊重,为了保障该权利的实现,应合理引入经营判断规则。其次,公司应享有对诉讼和解程序及结果的异议权,但不能撇开原告直接与被告进行诉讼和解。再次,公司应对“提起诉讼的依据显属虚构”的败诉股东享有损害赔偿请求权,其要求赔偿的范围主要限于直接损失。最后,公司还享有再审申请、申请执行等权利。第五章公司在股东代表诉讼中的义务。首先,公司基于无因管理理论应对胜诉股东因诉讼所产生的合理费用予以补偿,败诉股东如果基于合理的理由而起诉,又没有明显的违背诚信的行为和过错的,也有权从公司处获得费用补偿,但我国不应确立原告股东直接受偿制度。其次,基于法定的诉讼担当,确定判决的既判力及于公司,而诉讼和解协议则不具有既判力。最后,公司还应负有不起诉理由说明、提供证据等义务。第六章股东代表诉讼中的利益平衡。首先,应强化公司的地位与作用,这符合公司法的价值追求和股东代表诉讼诉权性质的要求,有助于平衡保护各相关主体之间的利益,并改进股东权保护的其他机制。其次,构建股东提诉的激励与约束机制。再次,从法经济学的角度来看,经营判断规则能够合理减轻被告董事的责任,有助于节约交易成本,提高资源配置的效率。最后,要有效发挥股东代表诉讼利益平衡机制的作用,需要合理扩张法官的自由裁量权来加以调节。
[Abstract]:The shareholder's representative action is a special system design, which differs greatly from the ordinary civil action in the nature of litigation right, the setting of litigation procedure, the extensiveness and complexity of the interest subjects involved. The company is in a de facto core position among the various stakeholders involved in the lawsuit. It is not only the key to the effective functioning of the shareholder's representative litigation system, but also the central link to the construction of the interest balance mechanism of the shareholder's representative litigation. This requires the company to play an active role in the litigation, so that it can start and process the shareholder representative litigation process, exert the necessary influence on the results of the litigation, and play a regulatory and balancing role between the objectives of the shareholder representative litigation system. Using the relevant theories and analytical tools of company law, civil procedural law, civil law and law and economics, and combining with the reality of the development of China's shareholder representative litigation system, shareholder rights protection, civil litigation related system and corporate governance mechanism, this paper systematically and thoroughly discusses the problem of company participation in shareholder representative litigation. Discuss.
In addition to the introduction and conclusion, this paper is divided into six chapters.
Chapter one is about the nature of shareholder's representative litigation right. Firstly, this chapter analyzes the shortcomings of the shareholder's right theory, and from the angle of law and economics, holds that the basis of shareholder's right to represent litigation lies in the violation of the contractual obligation of the relevant fault actor to the company, and reveals why the company law only allocates the right to the shareholders and why the company law only allocates the right to the shar The economic logic behind the pre-procedure of the shareholder's exercise of the right is that the institutional arrangement is conducive to saving transaction costs and improving the efficiency of the use of resources.
Chapter 2 The participation of the company in the shareholder's representative lawsuit. This chapter analyzes that the legitimacy of the company's participation in the shareholder's representative lawsuit lies in its conformity with the principle of due process and the requirements of the value of lawsuit efficiency, which is consistent with the nature of the shareholder's representative lawsuit. Shareholders shall receive the right to sue or re prosecute, and the corresponding notification procedures shall be set up for company participation in litigation.
Chapter 3: The status of a company in litigation. Through reviewing and reflecting on the domestic disputes, and combining with the empirical study of the legislation on the status of a company abroad, this chapter puts forward that a company should be a participant in the joint action in principle, and can choose to be a third party without independent claim under exceptional circumstances.
Firstly, the company should be entitled to the right to prevent litigation and reform the existing system of board of directors and board of supervisors in order to ensure the independence of the relevant judgments. The court should respect the relevant decisions of the independent organization of the company. In order to ensure the realization of the right, it should reasonably introduce the management judgment. Secondly, the company should have the right of objection to the procedure and result of litigation settlement, but the plaintiff and the defendant can not be put aside for litigation settlement directly. Thirdly, the company should have the right of claim for damages to the losing shareholder who "the basis of litigation is obviously fictitious" and the scope of claim for damages is mainly limited to direct losses. There are retrial applications, application for enforcement and other rights.
Firstly, the company should compensate the winning shareholder for the reasonable expenses arising from the lawsuit based on the theory of non-cause management. If the losing shareholder sues for reasonable reasons, and there is no obvious breach of good faith and fault, he also has the right to get compensation from the company, but I The state should not establish a system of direct compensation for the plaintiff's shareholders. Secondly, based on the statutory litigation responsibility, the res judicata of the judgment is determined to the company, while the litigation settlement agreement has no res judicata.
Chapter 6 The balance of interests in shareholder's representative litigation. Firstly, the status and role of the company should be strengthened, which conforms to the value pursuit of the company law and the requirements of the nature of shareholder's representative litigation right. It is helpful to balance and protect the interests of all relevant subjects and improve other mechanisms for protecting shareholder's rights. Secondly, the incentive and restraint of shareholder's litigation should be Thirdly, from the perspective of law and economics, the rules of business judgment can reasonably reduce the responsibilities of the defendant directors, help to save transaction costs and improve the efficiency of resource allocation. Finally, to effectively play the role of the mechanism of balancing the interests of shareholders'representatives in litigation, it is necessary to rationally expand the discretion of judges to adjust.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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