合同订立过程中的信息披露

发布时间：2018-04-12 22:29

本文选题：信息不对称 + 单方错误　；参考：《西南政法大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：在合同法领域，似乎存在着这样一个矛盾现象，在一些案件中——一般归于“单方错误”规则下——认为当承诺人关于某些重要事实存在误解且他的错误为另一方所知悉（或应当知悉）时，他就免除了履约或者支付赔偿金的义务。另一方面，，也存在一些案件，主张在某些情形下，合同一方有权保有他明知而另一方缺乏的信息。这两类看似矛盾的案件所反映的本质问题是相同的，即如果合同一方知道或有理由知道另一方关于特定事实的错误，拥有信息的一方有义务说出来吗？还是他可以保持沉默并利用另一方的错误获利？或者说这两类案件所要解决的都是关于错误的风险分配问题。产生错误的根本原因在于信息的不完全性与信息的非对称性，正是由于交易中的一方掌握了他方所不知悉的信息，才产生了上述的矛盾案件。信息可有效消除错误，但产生信息的成本可能是高昂的。信息与资源控制权的结合总是需要一定的交易成本，合理的法律应当在效率原则的要求下通过对错误风险的合理分配来降低交易成本。然而具体案件中对哪些信息的不披露能够作为撤销合同的理由而哪些信息又允许不予披露是一个十分复杂的问题。基于合同效率原则的要求，应当将错误的风险分配给能够以最低成本防止错误发生的一方当事人，也就是能以最低成本搜集信息的一方当事人。为设立一个一般性的参考标准，本文基于不同的标准对信息做了分类，主要包括实质性信息和非实质性信息、努力搜寻的信息与偶然获取的信息、生产性信息与再分配性信息以及买方信息与卖方信息。通过将各种信息与我们所设立的将错误风险分配给能以最低成本搜集信息的一方的规则相对比，最终得出结论：首先无论是作为撤销合同理由的被误解的信息还是享有不予披露权利的信息都应当是涉及合同基本假设的实质性信息。对买方而言，如果其所掌握的信息是生产性信息或者既是生产性信息又是再分配性信息，并且他在获取此信息的过程中进行了一定的投入，那么就应当允许其订立并执行其信息表明是可以获利的合同而不必向另一方披露信息，甚至在卖方问及是否知悉与合同相关的有价值信息时可以拒绝回答或者说谎。而卖方却必须披露其所知道的与合同相关的有价值信息，不论此种信息是生产性的还是再分配性的，是努力搜寻的结果还是偶然获取的。
[Abstract]:In the field of contract law, there seems to be such a contradiction.In some cases-generally attributable to the "unilateral error" rule-it is assumed that when the promise is misunderstood about certain material facts and his error is known to (or should be known to) the other party,He was relieved of the obligation to perform or pay damages.On the other hand, there are cases in which one party to the contract is entitled under certain circumstances to keep information which he knows but the other party lacks.The two seemingly contradictory types of cases reflect the same underlying problem, that is, if one party to the contract knows or has reason to know the other party's error in relation to a particular fact, does the party in possession of the information have an obligation to say so?Or can he remain silent and take advantage of the other's mistakes?In other words, the two types of cases are concerned with the problem of misallocation of risk.The fundamental reason for the error lies in the incompleteness of information and the asymmetry of information. It is precisely because one party in the transaction has grasped the information which the other party does not know that the contradiction cases mentioned above have arisen.Information can effectively eliminate errors, but the cost of generating information can be high.The combination of information and resource control always requires a certain transaction cost, and reasonable law should reduce transaction cost through the rational allocation of wrong risk under the requirement of efficiency principle.However, it is a very complicated problem that what information is not disclosed in specific cases and which information can be used as grounds for rescission of the contract and which information is allowed not to be disclosed.Based on the principle of contract efficiency, the risk of error should be assigned to the party who can prevent the error at the lowest cost, that is, the party who can collect information at the lowest cost.In order to establish a general reference standard, this paper classifies information based on different criteria, mainly including substantive and non-substantive information, information sought and information obtained by chance.Productive and redistributive information and buyer's and seller's information.By comparing all kinds of information with the rules that we have set up to assign error risks to those who can collect information at the lowest cost,Finally, the conclusion is drawn that, first of all, the misinterpreted information as the reason for rescission of the contract or the information with the right not to disclose should be the substantive information concerning the basic assumptions of the contract.For the buyer, if the information in his possession is productive information or is both productive and redistributed information, and he has made a certain investment in the process of obtaining this information,It should then be allowed to enter into and enforce a contract in which its information indicates that it is profitable without having to disclose information to the other party, or even refuse to answer or lie when the seller asks if he knows of valuable information relating to the contract.On the other hand, the seller must disclose valuable information which he knows is relevant to the contract, whether it is productive or redistributive, the result of hard search or accidental acquisition.
【学位授予单位】：西南政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D913

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