行政裁量基准效力研究

发布时间：2018-01-20 10:24

本文关键词： 裁量基准内部效力外部效力　出处：《南京大学》2011年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：裁量基准制度的兴起,是行政机关谋求行政裁量正当化和理性化的一次有益尝试。本文仅从裁量基准效力角度出发,明确了裁量基准在实践运作中的内部效力与外部效力。第一部分在厘清裁量基准概念的基础上,明确了裁量基准的性质是解释性行政规则,其制度设计是为规范行政裁量权之行使。裁量基准制度符合我国宪法和法律规定,在实践运作中取得了显著成效,其存在具有正当性。第二部分探讨裁量基准的内部效力问题,指出裁量基准约束的直接对象是制定机关自身及其下级行政机关和公务人员。一方面,裁量基准通常应当优先于笼统的上位法得到适用,下级机关和公务人员不适用上级机关制定的裁量基准必须充分说明理由,禁止其向上位法消极逃逸。另一方面,当上下级行政机关均依据行政法律规范制定裁量基准,可能引发不同层级基准之间的效力冲突。通过明确裁量基准的适用规则可以在一定程度上缓解这一难题,治本之道在于规范裁量基准的制定主体。由省部级行政机关制定一般原则,由县级以上人民政府及其职能部门结合自身实际制定具体规则。此举既考虑了一线执法机关的“经验理性”和具体执法经验的总结,不同地方及部门的局部性知识,亦可防止因制定主体过度泛化而导致裁量基准良莠不齐、效力冲突。第三部分着重论述裁量基准的外部效力,一方面,裁量基准通过具体行政行为能够发生影响行政相对人权利义务的外部效果,因而对行政相对人具有拘束力,其外部效力的依据包括了行政自我拘束原则、平等原则以及信赖保护原则。另一方面,行政机关制定的裁量基准对法院的拘束力非常有限,大量以规范性文件形式出现的裁量基准仅作为衡量和判断行政行为是否合法的标准和尺度,在判决的理由部分被法官所引用。考察最高法院规定及司法实践的运作,现有的对裁量基准的适用性审查只是一种间接的审查监督,当行政裁量基准违法时,法院仅能就其审理的个案,将依据违法裁量基准所作出的行政决定予以撤销,并不能直接宣告裁量基准无效。第四部分基于裁量基准实践中暴露出的一些问题,对裁量基准制度的构建提出一些设想。首先,公开裁量基准是使其获得外部效力的前提条件,通过公开与公众参与,强化公众与行政机关的沟通与互动,降低裁量基准的执行成本与遵行成本,增强裁量基准的外部效力。其次,在具体的行政执法过程中,行政机关及其公务人员可以通过说明理由逸脱裁量基准,实现“同案不同判”的实质正义,避免僵硬、机械地适用裁量基准。再次,重构裁量基准的司法审查模式,使其成为裁量基准外部效力的可靠保证。
[Abstract]:The rise of the system of discretion benchmark is a beneficial attempt for administrative organs to seek legitimacy and rationalization of administrative discretion. This paper only from the point of view of the effectiveness of the standard of discretion. It clarifies the internal and external effectiveness of the standard of discretion in practice. The first part clarifies the concept of discretion benchmark, and clarifies that the nature of discretion benchmark is interpretative administrative rules. The system is designed to standardize the exercise of administrative discretion, and the system of discretion benchmark conforms to the constitution and legal provisions of our country, and has achieved remarkable results in practical operation, and its existence is legitimate. The second part discusses the internal effectiveness of the discretion benchmark, pointing out that the direct object of the discretion benchmark constraint is the establishment of the organ itself and its lower administrative organs and public servants. On the one hand. The discretionary benchmark should usually be applied in preference to the general superior law, and the lower authorities and public servants should not apply the discretionary benchmark established by the superior authority. On the other hand, when the upper and lower administrative organs are in accordance with the administrative law norms to formulate a standard of discretion. It may lead to conflict of effectiveness between different levels of benchmarks. This problem can be alleviated to some extent by clear applicable rules of discretion benchmarks. The solution to the problem lies in the main body of standardizing the standard of discretion, and the general principles are formulated by the provincial and ministerial administrative organs. The people's governments at or above the county level and their functional departments shall formulate specific rules in combination with their own practice, which not only takes into account the "empirical rationality" of the front-line law enforcement agencies and the summary of the specific law enforcement experience. The local knowledge of different places and departments can also prevent the effectiveness conflict caused by the overgeneralization of the main body. The third part focuses on the external effectiveness of the discretionary benchmark. On the one hand, the discretionary benchmark can affect the external effects of the rights and obligations of the administrative counterpart through specific administrative acts, so it has binding force on the administrative counterpart. The basis of its external effect includes the principle of administrative self-restraint, the principle of equality and the principle of the protection of trust. On the other hand, the standard of discretion established by the administrative organ is very limited to the court. A large number of discretion benchmarks in the form of normative documents are only used as the standard and yardstick to measure and judge whether the administrative act is legal or not. In part of the reasons cited by the judge. To investigate the Supreme Court provisions and the operation of judicial practice, the existing review of the applicability of the discretion benchmark is only an indirect review supervision, when the administrative discretion benchmark is illegal. The court can only annul the administrative decision made according to the standard of illegal discretion, and can not directly declare the standard of discretion null and void. Part 4th based on some problems exposed in the practice of discretionary benchmark, put forward some assumptions on the construction of the system of discretionary benchmark. First of all, disclosure of the basis of discretion is the prerequisite to achieve external effectiveness. Through the public and public participation, strengthen the communication and interaction between the public and administrative organs, reduce the implementation cost and compliance costs of the discretion benchmark, enhance the external effectiveness of the discretion benchmark. Secondly, in the specific administrative law enforcement process. The administrative organ and its public servants can realize the substantive justice of "different judgment in the same case" by explaining the reason and free discretion standard, avoid rigidity, and apply the discretion standard mechanically. Reconstructing the judicial review mode of the standard of discretion makes it a reliable guarantee of the external effectiveness of the standard of discretion.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.1

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