供应链融资下应收账款模式中委托代理关系研究

发布时间：2018-03-01 07:32

本文关键词： 供应链融资应收账款模式多任务委托代理激励约束机制　出处：《贵州财经大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着我国经济社会的发展，中小企融资难的问题得到了社会与国家的广泛关注，由此产生的供应链融资也得到了迅速的发展。近几年，供应链融资作为一项创新的业务领域，引起了企业界与学术界的广泛关注，它不仅在一定程度上缓解了中小企业融资难的问题，还为商业银行提供了广阔的市场和全新的盈利模式，更是降低了整体供应链的管理成本，提高了供应链整体的竞争力。而随着2007年《物权法》的出台，明确规定了应收账款可以作为有效抵押物，为供应链融资中的应收账款模式的发展提供了更为有利的条件，也为缺乏不动产抵押的中小企业提供了新的融资方式。本文以供应链融资为背景，首先阐述了供应链融资的概念，发展以及基本的运作模式，着重介绍了供应链融资中应收账款模式的运行机制、现有的基于应收账款模式的融资业务以及存在的主要风险。在分析了供应链融资中应收账款模式的运作机制的基础上，提出依托核心企业信用的供应链融资业务，成功运行的决定性因素在于中小企业的努力程度，银行与核心企业都存在对中小企业进行激励的必要性。随后分别对银行与中小企业，核心企业与中小企业之间的委托代理关系进行分析，得出银行与中小企业、核心企业与中小企业之间的委托代理关系并不是单一任务的委托代理关系，因此引入Holmstrom和Milgrom（1991）[1]提出的多任务委托代理理论，分别构建了银行激励中小企业提高销售利润和合理使用资金的多任务委托代理模型；核心企业激励中小企业降低生产成本，提高产品质量的多任务委托代理模型，再对努力成本相互独立和相互依存两种情况下的中小企业激励问题进行分析，希望在此基础上设计出最优激励合约，为供应链融资应收账款模式的有效运作与发展提供有效依据。本文的创新之处在于系统的分析了供应融资中应收账款模式下各主体之间的委托代理关系，并针对中小企业的激励约束问题，首次在供应链融资中引入多任务委托代理理论，，并建立了有关委托代理的数学模型，通过分析两项任务下的委托代理问题，构建了合适的激励约束机制。
[Abstract]:With the development of our country's economy and society, the problem of financing difficulty of small and medium-sized enterprises has been paid more and more attention by the society and the country, and the supply chain financing has also been developed rapidly. In recent years, supply chain financing has become an innovative business field. It not only alleviates the difficulty of financing for small and medium-sized enterprises to some extent, but also provides a broad market and a new profit model for commercial banks. It also reduces the management cost of the whole supply chain and improves the overall competitiveness of the supply chain. With the introduction of the property Law in 2007, it is clearly stipulated that the accounts receivable can be used as effective collateral. It provides more favorable conditions for the development of accounts receivable model in supply chain financing, and also provides a new financing method for small and medium-sized enterprises lacking real estate mortgage. Based on the background of supply chain financing, this paper first expounds the concept, development and basic operating mode of supply chain financing, and emphatically introduces the operating mechanism of account receivable model in supply chain financing. On the basis of analyzing the operation mechanism of the account receivable model in supply chain financing, the paper puts forward the supply chain financing business which relies on the credit of the core enterprise. The decisive factor of successful operation is the degree of effort of small and medium-sized enterprises. Banks and core enterprises both have the need to encourage small and medium-sized enterprises. By analyzing the principal-agent relationship between the core enterprises and the small and medium-sized enterprises, it is concluded that the principal-agent relationship between the banks and the small and medium-sized enterprises and the core enterprises and the small and medium-sized enterprises is not a single-task principal-agent relationship. Therefore, by introducing the multi-task principal-agent theory proposed by Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991 (1), the multi-task principal-agent model of encouraging SMEs to increase their sales profits and reasonably use funds is constructed, and the core enterprises encourage SMEs to reduce production costs. The multi-task principal-agent model to improve the quality of products is used to analyze the incentive problem of small and medium-sized enterprises under the condition of independent and interdependent effort cost, and the optimal incentive contract is designed on this basis. It provides an effective basis for the effective operation and development of the supply chain financing accounts receivable model. The innovation of this paper lies in the systematic analysis of the principal-agent relationship between the agents under the account receivable model in supply financing, and the introduction of multi-task principal-agent theory into supply chain financing for the first time, aiming at the incentive and constraint problems of small and medium-sized enterprises. The mathematical model of principal-agent is established, and the appropriate incentive and constraint mechanism is constructed by analyzing the principal-agent problem under two tasks.
【学位授予单位】：贵州财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F274;F832.4

【参考文献】