基于销售努力效率的供应链契约选择研究

发布时间：2019-05-14 06:18

【摘要】：销售努力直接影响产品的市场需求,从而影响零售商的订购量、供应商的供应计划以及双方的库存策略,对整条供应链的成本控制和收益具有重要影响。在与销售努力相关的研究中,回购契约和销量回扣契约是最常用的利益分配机制。基于此,本文同时考虑供应商和零售商的销售努力,构建了回购契约和销量回扣契约基础模型,然后分别讨论了销售努力效率信息对称和不对称时,供应链整体、零售商和供应商的契约选择。本文主要内容如下： 1.归纳总结国内外相关研究。大多学者侧重于研究零售商的销售努力,用于激励销售努力的方式主要有回购契约和销量回扣契约。 2.构建考虑供应商和零售商销售努力的契约模型。首先分析集中决策下供应链的最优决策。然后构建回购契约和销量回扣契约模型,并证明了两种契约都可以实现供应链协调,但是契约条件比不考虑销售努力时更严格。 3.销售努力效率信息对称下的契约选择。研究发现,当销售努力效率达到临界值之后,回购契约和销量回扣契约对整体供应链是等同的。然后分别讨论努力效率对零售商和供应商契约选择的影响,低效率的零售商总是偏好回购契约,而高效率的零售商偏好销量回扣契约；然而,低效率的供应商总是偏好销量回扣契约,而高效率的供应商偏好回购契约。 4.销售努力效率信息不对称下的契约选择。在销售努力效率信息不对称下,改进了回购契约和销量回扣契约,使零售商只能根据自身真实类型选择决策变量。研究发现当零售商是高效率者时,供应链、零售商和供应商的契约选择与对称信息相同；当零售商是低效率者时,回购契约和销量回扣契约都只能使供应链利润达到一个次优解,此时供应链、零售商和供应商进行契约选择的临界点均小于对称信息下的临界值。最后,本文通过数值算例对相关结论进行了验证。综上,销售努力效率影响供应链参与者的收益,并且影响他们对不同契约的选择偏好。
[Abstract]:Sales efforts directly affect the market demand of products, thus affecting the order quantity of retailers, the supply plan of suppliers and the inventory strategy of both sides, which have an important impact on the cost control and income of the whole supply chain. In the research related to sales efforts, repurchase contract and sales rebate contract are the most commonly used benefit distribution mechanisms. Based on this, considering the sales efforts of suppliers and retailers at the same time, this paper constructs the basic models of repurchase contract and sales rebate contract, and then discusses the overall supply chain when the efficiency of sales efforts is symmetrical and asymmetrical. Contract selection between retailers and suppliers. The main contents of this paper are as follows: 1. Summarize the relevant research at home and abroad. Most scholars focus on the sales efforts of retailers, the main ways to stimulate sales efforts are repo contracts and sales rebate contracts. 2. Build a contract model that takes into account the sales efforts of suppliers and retailers. Firstly, the optimal decision of supply chain under centralized decision is analyzed. Then the model of repurchase contract and sales rebate contract is constructed, and it is proved that both contracts can realize supply chain coordination, but the contract conditions are more stringent than when sales efforts are not taken into account. 3. Contract selection under the information symmetry of sales effort efficiency. It is found that when the efficiency of sales effort reaches the critical value, repurchase contract and sales rebate contract are equal to the whole supply chain. Then it discusses the influence of effort efficiency on the choice of retailers and suppliers' contracts. Inefficient retailers always prefer repurchase contracts, while efficient retailers prefer sales rebate contracts. However, inefficient suppliers always prefer sales rebate contracts, while efficient suppliers prefer buyback contracts. 4. Contract selection under asymmetric information of sales effort efficiency. Under the asymmetric information of sales effort efficiency, the repo contract and sales rebate contract are improved, so that retailers can only choose decision variables according to their own real type. It is found that when retailers are efficient, the contract choice of supply chain, retailers and suppliers is the same as symmetrical information. When retailers are inefficient, both repo contract and sales rebate contract can only make the profit of supply chain reach a sub-optimal solution. At this time, the critical point of contract selection between retailers and suppliers in supply chain is less than the critical value under symmetrical information. Finally, the relevant conclusions are verified by numerical examples. In summary, the efficiency of sales efforts affects the income of supply chain participants and their preference for different contracts.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274

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