基于复杂多任务的创业投资引导基金委托代理机制研究

发布时间：2018-08-04 08:35

【摘要】：在建设“创新型国家”的战略目标指引下，为扶植作为技术创新主体的中小企业迅速发展，充分发挥财政资金的杠杆放大效应，我国开始设立创业投资引导基金。经过几年的运作，创业投资引导基金取得了良好效果。但是，由于创业投资引导基金的运作时间较短，有些问题越来越突出。例如创业投资引导基金操作主体能力不足；各方参与人的目标冲突；投资方向混乱；利益分配及激励监管机制不完善等复杂的委托代理问题。如何组建、管理创业投资引导基金、提高政府对引导资金的使用效率是摆在我国政府面前的重要课题。在这一背景下，分析政府创业投资引导基金管理中复杂的委托代理关系和性质，考查创业投资引导基金运作过程中的各方参与人的行为特征势在必行。本文借助复杂性和复杂系统理论、委托代理理论、共同代理理论等，综合使用理论研究、模型构建、实证分析等方法，创新性的从复杂系统角度研究创业投资引导基金委托代理机制，提出创业投资引导基金委托代理系统这一概念。基于系统的角度构建了创业投资引导基金内部管理委托代理模型，得出了内部管理委托代理机制，并为我国当前引导基金管理模式提出完善建议；同时构建了系统的核心节点要素多任务创业投资机构委托代理模型，，得出多任务创业投资机构的委托代理机制。此外，还以浙江省创业投资引导基金为例进行分析，为创业投资引导基金的实践运作提供理论支撑。通过研究，本文获得了以下研究成果和研究结论。（1）创业投资引导基金运作具有复杂系统的特征，例如多方参与主体的整体呈现性，结构、目标及时间上的多层次性，与外界环境联系并交换的开放性、动态适应各种变化性质、为应对变化而具有的自组织性等，构成了创业投资引导基金委托代理系统。此系统的节点要素是政府、引导基金管理机构、社会投资者、创业投资机构、创业企业五方参与主体，并且都是系统不可或缺的；节点要素之间的连接是复杂的委托代理关系；各节点元素有极强的“责任意识”，各自的行为选择要以达到系统的整体目标——促进高新技术产业及中小创业企业发展为原则；能对外界的变化做出反应，具有动态适应性和自组织性。（2）在创业投资引导基金委托代理系统的背景下，要以实现系统整体性目标为原则，设计合理的创业投资引导基金内部管理委托代理机制。本文构建了对称条件下和不对称条件下的引导基金管理机构激励机制模型。通过分析模型得出：在对称条件下，政府只要支付给引导基金管理机构合理的工资，使得引导基金管理机构努力的边际收益等于其边际成本，就会促使引导基金管理机构采取最优努力水平；在不对称条件下，要对引导基金管理机构形成固定报酬和浮动激励报酬相结合的薪酬激励机制，最优薪酬激励合同中的激励强度受到引导基金管理机构的专业能力、绝对风险规避程度、努力成本系数、创投机构的收益方差、政策性投资限制等因素的影响。具体来说，当政策性限制较少，对于专业水平较高的、富有冒险精神的、处于较为稳定环境中的、努力成本较低的引导基金管理机构可提高激励强度，使其积极工作，获得最大化收益。（3）本文从复杂系统的角度，对我国创业投资引导基金内部管理模式提出改进意见。指出无论是直接管理模式还是委托社会机构管理模式都应以实现系统的整体性目标——促进高新技术产业及中小创业企业发展为原则，设计引导基金管理机构的激励机制时要因地制宜、因情制宜，并在激励和保险之间求得平衡。其中，实行事业性质单位管理模式的创业投资引导基金，要形成固定报酬和浮动激励报酬相结合的薪酬激励机制，以防止代理人不努力和寻租行为发生；对实行国有公司管理模式的创业投资引导基金，要注意掌握和调整设立方式、收益分配方式，对国有公司施以必要的约束和监管，以防止忽略“政策性策略”行为发生；实行委托社会机构管理的创业投资引导基金，要根据具体情况确定不同的激励强度，并保证激励强度所在区间为（0,1），以防止严重的委托代理问题出现。（4）创业投资机构有投资政策扶植企业和投资高收益性企业双重替代性任务，通过构建投资者与多任务创业投资机构的委托代理模型可得：两种任务的替代性弱化了多任务报酬机制的激励效果。同样的激励程度，会使创业投资机构降低对可观测度低的任务——投资政策扶植企业任务的努力水平，也即创业投资引导基金的“政策性目标”常被忽视。通过弱化创业投资机构的任务替代性，或将创业投资机构的替代关系任务变为互补关系任务，对达成系统整体性目标有极大的促进作用。（5）本文从有利于创业投资引导基金委托代理系统有序运行的角度，基于弱化创业投资机构的任务替代性，或将创业投资机构的替代关系任务变为互补关系任务的原则，提出多任务的创业投资机构委托代理机制。具体包括：优质投资项目的识别与培育机制、具有产业特色的创投机构遴选机制、资金分期到位的参股约束机制、客观和主观方法相结合的多任务创投机构绩效评价机制、合理的多任务创投机构监管机制以及多任务创投机构声誉机制。
[Abstract]:Under the guidance of the strategic goal of building a "innovative country", in order to foster the rapid development of small and medium-sized enterprises as the main body of technological innovation and give full play to the leverage amplification effect of financial funds, China began to set up a guidance fund for venture capital. After several years of operation, the venture investment guidance fund has achieved good results. The operation time of the guidance fund is short, and some problems are becoming more and more prominent. For example, the ability of the operating main body of the venture capital guidance fund is insufficient; the parties involved in the target conflict; the investment direction is confused; the interests distribution and the incentive supervision mechanism are not perfect. How to form, manage the venture capital guidance fund and improve the government The efficiency of the government's use of guided funds is an important issue in front of our government. In this context, it is imperative to analyze the complex principal-agent relationship and nature of the government venture capital guidance fund management, and to examine the behavior characteristics of all parties involved in the operation of the venture capital guidance fund.
This paper, with the help of complexity and complex system theory, principal-agent theory, common agent theory, comprehensive use of theoretical research, model construction, empirical analysis and other methods, innovatively study the principal-agent mechanism of venture capital guidance fund from the perspective of complex system, and put forward the concept of the principal-agent system of venture investment guidance fund. The model of internal management Principal-agent of venture capital guidance fund is constructed, and the internal management principal-agent mechanism is obtained, and the suggestions are put forward for the current guide fund management model in China. At the same time, the principal agent model of the system's core element multi task venture capital organization is constructed, and the multi task venture capital institution is obtained. In addition, the paper takes Zhejiang Venture Capital Guidance Fund as an example to provide theoretical support for the practical operation of the Venture Capital Guidance Fund.
Through research, the following research results and conclusions are obtained.
(1) the operation of the venture capital guidance fund has the characteristics of complex system, such as the overall presentation, structure, target and time of multi party participation, the openness of connection with the external environment and the openness of exchange, dynamic adaptation to various changes of nature, and self-organization in response to the change, which constitutes the guiding foundation for venture capital. The proxy system.
The node elements of this system are government, guide the fund management organization, the social investor, the venture capital institution, the venture enterprise five parties participate in the main body, and all are the system indispensable; the connection between the node elements is the complex principal-agent relationship; each node element has the very strong "responsibility consciousness", their respective behavior choice should be reached To the overall goal of the system - to promote the development of high and new technology industries and small and medium-sized enterprises as a principle; to respond to changes in the outside world, with dynamic adaptability and self-organization.
(2) under the background of the principal-agent system of the venture capital guidance fund, the principal-agent mechanism of the internal management of the venture capital guidance fund should be designed by the principle of realizing the overall goal of the system. The incentive mechanism model of the guidance fund management institution under symmetrical conditions and asymmetric conditions is constructed in this paper.
Through the analysis of the model, it is concluded that, under the symmetrical condition, the government should pay the reasonable salary to the guidance fund management organization and make the marginal cost of the leading fund management institution equal to its marginal cost, which will urge the fund management organization to take the optimal level of effort. Under the condition of asymmetric, it is necessary to guide the management of the fund. The incentive mechanism of combination of fixed remuneration and floating incentive compensation, the incentive intensity in the optimal compensation incentive contract is influenced by the factors such as the professional ability of the fund management agency, the degree of absolute risk aversion, the cost coefficient, the variance of the investment institution, the limit of policy investment and so on. Fewer, for the higher professional level, the adventurous spirit, in a more stable environment, the lower cost of the guidance fund management institutions can improve the incentive intensity, make it work actively, to maximize the income.
(3) from the perspective of complex system, this paper puts forward some suggestions for improving the internal management model of the venture capital guidance fund in China. It is pointed out that both the direct management model and the entrusting social organization management mode should aim to achieve the overall goal of the system, the principle of promoting the development of the high-tech industry and the small and medium enterprises, and the design of the guidance fund The incentive mechanism of a management organization should be adapted to local conditions, suit for circumstances, and strike a balance between incentives and insurance.
Among them, the venture capital guidance fund, which implements the management mode of the enterprise, should form a compensation incentive mechanism combining fixed remuneration and floating incentive compensation to prevent agents from not working hard and rent-seeking behavior. The way of distribution is to impose necessary constraints and supervision on state-owned companies so as to prevent the neglect of the "policy strategy". The venture capital guidance fund, which is entrusted with the management of the social organizations, should determine the different incentive intensity according to the specific circumstances and ensure that the incentive intensity is (0,1) in order to prevent the serious principal-agent problem. Now.
(4) the venture capital institution has the dual substitution task of the investment policy and the high income enterprise. By constructing the principal agent model of the investor and the multi task venture capital institution, the substitution of the two tasks weakens the incentive effect of the multi task reward mechanism. The same incentive degree will reduce the venture capital institution. The task of low degree of observability is low: the level of the investment policy to foster the enterprise task, that is, the "policy goal" of the venture capital guidance fund is often ignored. By weakening the task substitution of the venture capital institution, or changing the replacement relationship task of the venture capital institution into the complementary relationship task, the overall goal of the system is reached. It has a great boost.
(5) from the point of view of the orderly operation of the principal-agent system of the venture capital guidance fund, based on the weakening of the task substitution of the venture capital institution, or the principle that the replacement relationship task of the venture capital institution becomes the complementary relationship task, the principal-agent mechanism of the multi task venture capital institution is proposed.
It includes: the recognition and cultivation mechanism of high quality investment projects, the selection mechanism of the venture capital organization with industrial characteristics, the participation restriction mechanism of the funds in place, the performance evaluation mechanism of the multi task venture capital organization, the rational multi task venture capital institution supervision mechanism and the reputation mechanism of the multi task venture capital organization.
【学位授予单位】：中国海洋大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.48;F224

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