中国商业银行所有权结构、治理机制与风险行为
发布时间：2018-08-17 11:49
【摘要】：银行风险行为在金融领域的研究受到广泛关注，但传统研究主要侧重于资本监管、市场约束等外部视角，较少考虑银行内部的委托代理问题。2007年美国金融危机的爆发，使得人们从公司治理视角反思银行冒险行为的内在动力，也使得银行治理与风险行为的关系成为亟待研究的重要命题之一。自2004年以来，我国正在着力深化商业银行的股份制改造与公司治理改革，在这样的背景下研究中国商业银行所有权结构、治理机制与风险行为的关系显得尤为重要。 本文基于股东与债权人共同治理的视角，研究转型制度背景下所有权结构、内外部治理机制对我国商业银行风险行为的影响。首先，从银行治理的特殊性出发分析了多重代理冲突下银行风险行为的决定，结合转型制度背景提出所有权结构、内外部治理机制影响银行风险行为的OGR分析框架，揭示银行所有权结构影响风险行为的传导路径及作用机理；然后，以我国商业银行为样本对所有权集中、境外战略引资影响银行风险行为的内部治理机制及所有权结构影响市场约束、资本监管进而影响银行风险行为的外部治理机制进行实证检验。 本文的主要贡献及创新如下： ①提出了所有权结构影响银行风险行为的OGR分析框架，揭示了多重代理冲突下银行所有权结构影响风险行为的传导路径和作用机理。现有银行治理文献主要集中于讨论内部治理对绩效的影响，不能揭示出银行价值创造背后所承担的风险水平；而金融学关于银行风险行为的研究主要基于资本监管、市场约束等外部视角，忽视了内部代理问题的存在，削弱了对银行风险行为的解释力度。本文将公司治理理论与金融学理论结合起来探讨了多重代理冲突下银行风险行为的决定，研究发现银行风险行为是股东资产替代问题与内部治理机制共同作用的结果，并在此基础上将以所有权结构为核心的内部治理机制与资本监管、市场约束等外部机制整合起来，结合我国转型制度背景，构建了所有权结构影响内外部治理机制进而影响银行风险行为的OGR分析框架，从而揭示出多重代理冲突下转型银行所有权结构影响风险行为的传导路径和作用机理。这一研究突出了股东资产替代问题与内部治理机制的共同作用，考虑了转型制度背景与银行治理的特殊性，有助于丰富转型国家银行治理与风险行为的理论研究。 ②证实了境外战略投资者对银行风险行为的约束作用以及战略引资效应在不同类别银行中存在的差异。现有研究对于银行境外战略引资效应的分析侧重于讨论境外战略投资者对银行绩效的影响，无法反映出境外战略引资对银行经营活动的直接影响，且忽视了战略引资效果在不同类型银行之间存在的差异。本文结合我国商业银行境外战略引资背景，分析了境外战略投资者对银行风险行为的影响及其在国有控股银行、股份制商业银行、城市商业银行之间存在的差异。这一研究从从银行经营行为的角度验证了境外战略引资政策的有效性，与现有文献相比突出了战略引资效应的差异性，为制定差别化的战略引资监管政策提供了经验证据，且采用行为指标比绩效能更直接地反映外资股东对管理层经营活动的影响，从而更直接地反映了银行改制的效果。 ③揭示了所有权集中度与市场约束共同影响银行风险行为的作用机理。现有关于市场约束效应的研究倾向于把银行视为“黑箱”，不考虑内部委托代理问题的影响，且不考虑股权集中条件下大股东的治理作用。本文基于股东与债权人共同治理的视角，结合中国转型经济条件下银行所有权结构的特征，构建委托代理模型分析了存款保险制度下银行额外风险补贴与债权人监督强度的关系，并以我国上市商业银行为样本对所有权结构、市场约束与银行风险行为的关系进行了实证检验，证实了所有权结构影响外部治理机制进而影响银行风险行为的作用机制。与现有文献相比，这一研究突出了大股东道德风险与债权人市场约束之间的相互作用，，揭示了转型背景下政府股东既通过直接持股控制风险行为又通过强化隐性担保激励风险行为的两面性，有利于丰富银行治理与市场约束效应的研究。
[Abstract]:The study of bank risk behavior in the financial field has attracted wide attention, but the traditional research mainly focuses on capital supervision, market constraints and other external perspectives, and less considers the principal-agent problem within banks. The relationship between bank governance and risk behavior has become one of the important propositions that need to be studied urgently. Since 2004, China has been making great efforts to deepen the joint-stock system reform and corporate governance reform of commercial banks. Under this background, it is particularly important to study the ownership structure of Chinese commercial banks and the relationship between governance mechanism and risk behavior.
Based on the perspective of co-governance between shareholders and creditors, this paper studies the ownership structure and the impact of internal and external governance mechanisms on the risk behavior of commercial banks in China under the background of transition system. Firstly, this paper analyzes the decision of bank risk behavior under multi-agency conflict from the perspective of the particularity of bank governance, and proposes the ownership knot under the background of transition system. The OGR analysis framework of internal and external governance mechanisms affecting bank risk behavior reveals the conduction path and mechanism of bank ownership structure affecting bank risk behavior; then, taking China's commercial banks as a sample, the internal governance mechanism and ownership structure affecting bank risk behavior are analyzed. The external governance mechanism of capital regulation, which affects bank risk behavior, is empirically tested.
The main contributions and innovations of this paper are as follows:
(1) The OGR analysis framework of ownership structure influencing bank risk behavior is proposed, which reveals the transmission path and mechanism of ownership structure influencing bank risk behavior under multiple agency conflicts. The research on bank risk behavior in finance is mainly based on the external perspectives of capital supervision and market restraint, ignoring the existence of internal agency problems and weakening the interpretation of bank risk behavior. In order to make a decision, the study finds that bank risk behavior is the result of the joint action of shareholder asset substitution and internal governance mechanism. On this basis, the paper integrates the internal governance mechanism with the core of ownership structure with the external mechanisms such as capital supervision and market restraint, and constructs the ownership structure influence combined with the background of China's transition system. The OGR analysis framework of the internal and external governance mechanisms which then influence bank risk behavior reveals the transmission path and mechanism of the transition bank ownership structure affecting risk behavior under multiple agency conflicts. The particularity of bank governance helps to enrich the theoretical research on bank governance and risk behavior in transitional countries.
(2) It confirms the restraint effect of foreign strategic investors on bank risk behavior and the difference of strategic attraction effect among different types of banks. This paper analyzes the influence of foreign strategic investors on the risk behavior of banks and the differences among state-owned holding banks, joint-stock commercial banks and urban commercial banks. This study validates the effectiveness of the foreign strategic attraction policy from the perspective of bank operation behavior, highlights the differences in the effect of strategic attraction compared with the existing literature, provides empirical evidence for the formulation of differentiated regulatory policies on strategic attraction, and the adoption of behavioral indicators can more directly reflect foreign shareholders'economic performance than performance. The influence of camp activities directly reflects the effect of bank restructuring.
The existing research on the effect of market constraint tends to regard banks as "black boxes" without considering the impact of internal principal-agent problems and the governance role of large shareholders under the condition of equity concentration. From the perspective of co-governance and combining with the characteristics of bank ownership structure in China's transitional economy, this paper constructs a principal-agent model to analyze the relationship between bank additional risk subsidy and creditor supervision intensity under the deposit insurance system, and takes listed commercial banks in China as samples to analyze the relationship between ownership structure, market constraints and bank risk behavior. Empirical tests are carried out to confirm the mechanism of ownership structure influencing external governance mechanism and then bank risk behavior. Compared with existing literature, this study highlights the interaction between moral hazard of major shareholders and market constraints of creditors, and reveals that government shareholders control risk through direct shareholding in the context of transition. In order to enrich the research on bank governance and market restraint effect, we should strengthen the duality of implicit guarantee incentive risk behavior.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.33;F224
本文编号：2187542
[Abstract]:The study of bank risk behavior in the financial field has attracted wide attention, but the traditional research mainly focuses on capital supervision, market constraints and other external perspectives, and less considers the principal-agent problem within banks. The relationship between bank governance and risk behavior has become one of the important propositions that need to be studied urgently. Since 2004, China has been making great efforts to deepen the joint-stock system reform and corporate governance reform of commercial banks. Under this background, it is particularly important to study the ownership structure of Chinese commercial banks and the relationship between governance mechanism and risk behavior.
Based on the perspective of co-governance between shareholders and creditors, this paper studies the ownership structure and the impact of internal and external governance mechanisms on the risk behavior of commercial banks in China under the background of transition system. Firstly, this paper analyzes the decision of bank risk behavior under multi-agency conflict from the perspective of the particularity of bank governance, and proposes the ownership knot under the background of transition system. The OGR analysis framework of internal and external governance mechanisms affecting bank risk behavior reveals the conduction path and mechanism of bank ownership structure affecting bank risk behavior; then, taking China's commercial banks as a sample, the internal governance mechanism and ownership structure affecting bank risk behavior are analyzed. The external governance mechanism of capital regulation, which affects bank risk behavior, is empirically tested.
The main contributions and innovations of this paper are as follows:
(1) The OGR analysis framework of ownership structure influencing bank risk behavior is proposed, which reveals the transmission path and mechanism of ownership structure influencing bank risk behavior under multiple agency conflicts. The research on bank risk behavior in finance is mainly based on the external perspectives of capital supervision and market restraint, ignoring the existence of internal agency problems and weakening the interpretation of bank risk behavior. In order to make a decision, the study finds that bank risk behavior is the result of the joint action of shareholder asset substitution and internal governance mechanism. On this basis, the paper integrates the internal governance mechanism with the core of ownership structure with the external mechanisms such as capital supervision and market restraint, and constructs the ownership structure influence combined with the background of China's transition system. The OGR analysis framework of the internal and external governance mechanisms which then influence bank risk behavior reveals the transmission path and mechanism of the transition bank ownership structure affecting risk behavior under multiple agency conflicts. The particularity of bank governance helps to enrich the theoretical research on bank governance and risk behavior in transitional countries.
(2) It confirms the restraint effect of foreign strategic investors on bank risk behavior and the difference of strategic attraction effect among different types of banks. This paper analyzes the influence of foreign strategic investors on the risk behavior of banks and the differences among state-owned holding banks, joint-stock commercial banks and urban commercial banks. This study validates the effectiveness of the foreign strategic attraction policy from the perspective of bank operation behavior, highlights the differences in the effect of strategic attraction compared with the existing literature, provides empirical evidence for the formulation of differentiated regulatory policies on strategic attraction, and the adoption of behavioral indicators can more directly reflect foreign shareholders'economic performance than performance. The influence of camp activities directly reflects the effect of bank restructuring.
The existing research on the effect of market constraint tends to regard banks as "black boxes" without considering the impact of internal principal-agent problems and the governance role of large shareholders under the condition of equity concentration. From the perspective of co-governance and combining with the characteristics of bank ownership structure in China's transitional economy, this paper constructs a principal-agent model to analyze the relationship between bank additional risk subsidy and creditor supervision intensity under the deposit insurance system, and takes listed commercial banks in China as samples to analyze the relationship between ownership structure, market constraints and bank risk behavior. Empirical tests are carried out to confirm the mechanism of ownership structure influencing external governance mechanism and then bank risk behavior. Compared with existing literature, this study highlights the interaction between moral hazard of major shareholders and market constraints of creditors, and reveals that government shareholders control risk through direct shareholding in the context of transition. In order to enrich the research on bank governance and market restraint effect, we should strengthen the duality of implicit guarantee incentive risk behavior.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.33;F224
【引证文献】
相关硕士学位论文 前1条
1 南星星;城市商业银行股权结构对信贷资产配置行为的影响研究[D];兰州大学;2014年
本文编号：2187542
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