国企高管激励方式协同配置:薪酬、股权与政治晋升

发布时间：2018-05-08 17:25

本文选题：国企高管激励 + 政治晋升　；参考：《山东社会科学》2017年08期

【摘要】：高管激励一般包括显性激励与隐性激励两大类,通常由缔结契约来完成。基于倾向得分匹配法(PSM)的配对样本,结合我国的制度环境,对政治晋升、薪酬、股权等激励方式的激励效应进行分析。研究发现,政治晋升激励对于国企高管存在双重效应,既能有效地调动高管工作积极性并提升公司短期绩效,同时也可能导致高管为了职位晋升和政绩需求产生短期行为,不利于企业长远发展。国企高管的政治晋升激励与薪酬激励对公司绩效发挥交互作用,二者之间存在替代关系。另外,同为显性激励的薪酬与股权激励之间存在互补关系,而且这种绩效提升的协同效应在民营企业中更为明显。
[Abstract]:Executive incentive generally consists of explicit incentive and implicit incentive, which is usually completed by concluding contracts. Based on the matched sample of PSM, the incentive effect of political promotion, salary, equity and so on is analyzed according to the institutional environment of our country. It is found that the political promotion incentive has dual effects on the senior executives of state-owned enterprises, which not only can effectively motivate the executives to work and improve the short-term performance of the company, but also may lead to short-term behavior for the promotion and performance needs of senior executives. Is not conducive to the long-term development of enterprises. There is an alternative relationship between the political promotion incentive and the salary incentive of the senior executives of state-owned enterprises. In addition, there is a complementary relationship between compensation and equity incentive, and the synergetic effect of this kind of performance promotion is more obvious in private enterprises.
【作者单位】：山东大学管理学院;山东电力经济技术研究院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“企业集团内部网络特征与子公司技术创新关系研究”(项目编号:71672102) 山东省自然科学基金面上项目“集团框架内子公司动态竞争能力培育机制研究”(项目编号:ZR2014GM011)的部分成果
【分类号】：F272.92;F276.1

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