管理层舞弊的诱因、互动机制与监管研究

发布时间：2018-03-10 17:33

本文选题：管理层舞弊　切入点：诱因结构　出处：《南京大学》2005年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】： 财务报告舞弊问题是学术界和实务界长期必须面对的问题。本文以中国上市公司管理层舞弊为主要研究对象,主要采用规范研究方法对管理层舞弊的诱因及其结构、行为人互动机制以及政府有效监管三个问题进行了深入的研究: 1、管理层舞弊多因论。借鉴激励期望理论建立起管理层舞弊诱因模型,同时运用社会控制论、文化传递论等理论构建起管理层舞弊的诱因体系;并在此基础上,运用理性经济人效用函数构建起管理层舞弊效用函数,从而在管理层舞弊诱因系统理论化基础上深入地剖析了管理层舞弊的成本收益的影响因素结构。在诱因结构研究上突破有:提出并分析了舞弊行为人内部控制系统内涵;提出并分析了舞弊行为人心理成本内涵;提出了判断主次诱因的标准;指出了我国管理层舞弊的主要诱因。 2、管理层舞弊过程论。在管理层舞弊诱因结构研究基础上,通过论证内部人控制问题导致的会计监管“三位一体”体系失衡以及失衡体系中的行为人效用变动因素,构建起管理层舞弊互动行为模型;并以此为基础,指出了我国管理层舞弊的主要类型,建立起管理层舞弊的博弈模型,深入剖析了管理层舞弊过程的利益分割及其制约因素、因素的影响强度和方向;并用案例进行了模型检验。 3、舞弊有效监管论。在论证了监控管理层舞弊的公司内部治理有限性、政府有效监管的效率理论基础上,文章构建了政府有效监管的博弈模型,深入剖析了一定时点的社会可承受的管理层舞弊量及其影响因素,以及以此为前提的政府监管力度、惩罚强度和惩罚方式选择的理论问题。在论证这三个问题基础上,文章提出了相应的治理管理层舞弊的政策原则和建议。
[Abstract]:The problem of financial reporting fraud is a problem that the academic and practical circles must face for a long time. This paper takes the management fraud of listed companies in China as the main research object, mainly adopts the normative research method to the inducement and structure of management fraud. The interaction mechanism of the actors and the effective supervision of the government are studied deeply. 1. The multi-cause theory of management fraud. The incentive model of management fraud is established by using incentive expectation theory, and the inducement system of management fraud is constructed by using social cybernetics and cultural transfer theory. Using rational economic man utility function to construct management fraud utility function, On the basis of the theory of management fraud inducement system, the paper deeply analyzes the structure of influencing factors of cost and income of management fraud. The breakthrough in the research of inducement structure includes: putting forward and analyzing the connotation of internal control system of fraud perpetrator; This paper puts forward and analyzes the connotation of psychological cost of fraud perpetrator, puts forward the standard of judging primary and secondary inducement, and points out the main inducement of fraud by management in our country. 2. The theory of management fraud. On the basis of the research on the inducement structure of management fraud, this paper demonstrates the imbalance of accounting supervision "trinity" system caused by the problem of insider control and the changing factors of actor's utility in the unbalanced system. Based on this model, this paper points out the main types of management fraud in China, establishes a game model of management fraud, and analyzes the benefit segmentation and its restricting factors of management fraud process. The influence of factors on intensity and direction of the model was tested with a case study. 3. The theory of fraud effective supervision. On the basis of demonstrating the limitation of internal governance and the efficiency theory of effective government supervision, this paper constructs a game model of effective government supervision. This paper deeply analyzes the amount of management fraud and its influencing factors at a certain time, and the theoretical problems of government supervision, punishment intensity and the choice of punishment mode based on this. On the basis of demonstrating these three problems, the paper puts forward the corresponding policy principles and suggestions of management fraud.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2005
【分类号】：F239.4

【相似文献】