内部控制及其影响下的审计博弈分析

发布时间：2018-06-14 11:31

本文选题：内部控制 + 内部控制与审计　；参考：《首都经济贸易大学》2004年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来，世界各国相继出现不少影响巨大的财务舞弊案和审计失败案。导致这些案件的原因是多方面的，其中企业内部控制设计及执行不完善导致管理层轻松逾越控制和注册会计师不重视对内部控制的分析和评价导致无法有效控制风险是两个重要原因。内部控制不仅对企业的生存、发展和实现组织目标起着至关重要的作用，而且还是影响注册会计师有效地、经济地完成审计工作的一个关键因素。本文首先研究了内部控制相关理论和实务，并从审计准则和企业实务两个方面分析我国内部控制的现状和局限性，提出自己对改进现状的建议和看法。其次，本文对内部控制和审计关系的相关理论和实务进行了对比研究，分析内部控制对于审计的重要性以及内部控制评价在我国审计实务应用中的一些问题。在分别从内控主体即企业的角度和从审计主体即注册会计师的角度研究内部控制问题后，本文引入了博弈论的方法，对内部控制影响下的审计博弈问题进行研究。本文的博弈分析分为两个部分，第一部分通过构建审计师—客户管理层之间静态审计博弈的三个模型，进行静态对比分析，讨论内部控制的强弱对博弈均衡和双方战略决策的影响；第二部分通过构建内部控制制定者(董事会)、管理层、审计师三方的动态审计博弈模型，，讨论董事会制定内部控制时的战略决策。
[Abstract]:In recent years, there have been many financial fraud cases and audit failures around the world. The causes of these cases are manifold. There are two important reasons for the imperfect design and execution of internal control in enterprises, that is, the management overstep the control easily and the CPA does not attach importance to the analysis and evaluation of the internal control, which leads to the failure to control the risk effectively. Internal control not only plays a vital role in the survival, development and realization of organizational goals, but also affects the CPA to complete the audit work effectively and economically. Firstly, this paper studies the theory and practice of internal control, analyzes the present situation and limitation of internal control in China from two aspects of audit standard and enterprise practice, and puts forward some suggestions and opinions on how to improve the present situation. Secondly, this paper makes a comparative study on the theory and practice of internal control and audit relationship, analyzes the importance of internal control to audit and some problems in the application of internal control evaluation in our country's audit practice. After studying the internal control problem from the angle of the internal control subject that is the enterprise and the audit subject that is the CPA, this paper introduces the method of game theory to study the audit game problem under the influence of the internal control. The game analysis of this paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, by constructing three models of static audit game between auditor and customer management, the static comparative analysis is carried out. This paper discusses the influence of internal control on game equilibrium and strategic decision of both sides. The second part constructs the dynamic audit game model of internal control maker (board of directors, management, auditor). Discuss the strategic decision of the board of directors when establishing internal control.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2004
【分类号】：F239.45

【引证文献】