基于独立董事经理人身份的审计委员会机制研究

发布时间：2018-06-29 02:52

本文选题：独立董事经理人 + 审计委员会　；参考：《湖南大学》2005年硕士论文

【摘要】：作为一篇规范性的论文,本文意在从美国审计委员会失效出发,探究审计委员会失效的原因并提出改进的方案。通过分析,本文得出审计委员会的失效在于公众对其组成成员即独立董事的理解上出现了问题。基于委托代理理论、经济人假设和管理学的基本理论,本文得出独立董事的身份应该是经理人。本文认为,将独立董事视为经理人身份为我们理解审计委员会提供了一个新的视野,这具体体现在它突破了以往对独立董事形式化的认识,彻底将独立董事视为社会经济人,要求独立董事实实在在对公司价值做出贡献,而不仅仅充当董事会“正名”的工具,成为花瓶或者装饰品。独立董事本身就是委托代理问题的一部分,要像其他经理人一样接受股东为主的利益相关者的选择、激励和监督。同时本文认为独立董事的经理人身份,不会导致独立董事独立性的削弱,反而会加强它。以往我们对独立性的要求仅仅停留在准入的门槛阶段,现在将独立董事像其他经理人那样加以激励和监督,可以将独立性的维护推入一个过程,从而切实落实对独立性的维护。本文进一步以独立董事经理人身份为基础,并结合审计委员会的工作特点,对审计委员会的选择、激励和约束机制进行设计。在选择机制中,本文探讨了审计委员会成员应具备的素质和选择形式;在激励机制中,本文认为单纯的声誉激励不能生效,需要与经济激励相配合,并运用组合激励模型做出了分析;在约束机制中,本文在自我约束、他方约束、机制约束上对审计委员会的约束进行了探讨。文章最后,根据中国现阶段的特征,分析了审计委员会在中国的发展,认为要使审计委员会在中国生效,要渐进的方式协调好审计委员会与监事会的关系,并且在规则的制定过程中要以规则为导向。
[Abstract]:As a normative paper, this paper aims to explore the causes of the audit committee's invalidation from the failure of the American audit committee and put forward the improvement scheme. Through analysis, this paper concludes that the failure of audit committee lies in the public understanding of its constituent members, that is, independent directors. Based on the principal-agent theory, the hypothesis of economic man and the basic theory of management, this paper concludes that the identity of independent director should be manager. This paper holds that treating independent directors as managers provides us with a new vision to understand the audit committee, which is embodied in the fact that it breaks through the previous understanding of the formalization of independent directors and completely regards independent directors as social economic persons. Require independent directors to actually contribute to the value of the company, not just as a board's "name" tool, as a vase or ornament. Independent director itself is a part of the principal-agent problem, like other managers, they should accept the choice, incentive and supervision of stakeholders. At the same time, this paper argues that the independent director's executive identity will not lead to the weakening of the independent director's independence, but will strengthen it. In the past, our demand for independence was only at the threshold of entry. Now we can encourage and supervise independent directors as other managers do, which can push the maintenance of independence into a process, so as to effectively implement the maintenance of independence. Based on the identity of independent director manager and the working characteristics of audit committee, this paper designs the selection, incentive and restraint mechanism of audit committee. In the selection mechanism, this paper discusses the quality and selection form of the members of the audit committee. In the incentive mechanism, the author thinks that the pure reputation incentive is not effective, and needs to be coordinated with the economic incentive. In the constraint mechanism, this paper discusses the constraints of the audit committee in terms of self-constraint, other constraints and mechanism constraints. Finally, according to the characteristics of China at the present stage, this paper analyzes the development of audit committee in China, and thinks that in order to make the audit committee effective in China, it is necessary to coordinate the relationship between audit committee and supervisory committee in a gradual manner. And in the process of making the rules, we should be guided by the rules.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2005
【分类号】：F239.4

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