地方政府行为对收入初次分配的影响研究

发布时间：2018-02-13 21:57

本文关键词： 地方政府行为技术选择指数政府收入份额劳动收入份额　出处：《浙江大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：伴随我国以经济增长为主的锦标赛式政绩考核体系,地方政府官员为了个人晋升的政治利益及经济利益纷纷选择大力发展辖区经济,尤其是致力于提升地区生产总值,并且尽可能获取更多资源以发展经济。1994年分税制改革后,地方政府成为了相对独立的利益主体。然而,既定辖区内的资源是有限的,地方政府为了扩大自身利益就要争取更多生产要素。以国企改制、非公有制经济为代表的市场化改革提升了生产要素的流动性,从而地方政府的生产要素之争具备了操作层面的可行性。由于地方政府拥有对土地的控制权,因此为了招商引资,地方政府通常采取增加土地供给、低价提供土地的手段来吸引投资者;此外,地方政府还会通过提供各种形式的补贴来吸引投资者。通过上述方式,地方政府吸引更多资本进入本辖区,实现经济增长和扩大财政收入的目标,从而助力职位晋升。但是,这种经济增长方式本身却存在问题,尤其是给收入分配造成了不可忽视的负面影响。首先,地方政府以较低价格来吸引资本,降低了企业的成本,资本收益率提高。在劳动价格不变的情况下,劳动收入份额降低,资本收入份额增加。同时由于资本密集型产业通常具有较长的产业链,对区域经济的拉动作用更加明显,地方政府也更加倾向于对资本密集型产业给予优惠,因而资本密集型企业成长更快,导致资本收入份额提高。另外,劳资的议价能力存在差异,更加不利于收入分配。本文通过Acemoglu渠道检验方法对该传导机制进行了检验,结果表明地方政府通过控制土地来影响技术选择,最终对劳动收入份额产生影响。然而,大力招商引资发展经济的时代背景已经改变,而且收入分配不均问题已不容忽视。我国的这种基于地方政府竞争行为的特殊的经济增长方式严重扭曲了收入分配状况。因此,由发展型政府转型为服务型政府非常迫切,政府改革现有的官员激励机制,并且因地制宜发展经济,实现经济健康发展。
[Abstract]:Along with our country's tournament-type performance appraisal system, which is mainly based on economic growth, local government officials have chosen to develop the economy of the jurisdiction one after another for the political and economic interests of personal promotion, especially in promoting the regional gross domestic product. And get as much resources as possible to develop the economy. After the tax distribution reform in 1994, local governments became relatively independent stakeholders. However, resources in established jurisdictions were limited. In order to expand their own interests, local governments must strive for more factors of production. The market-oriented reform, represented by the reform of state-owned enterprises and the non-public sector of the economy, has enhanced the mobility of production factors. As a result, the argument over factors of production by local governments is feasible at an operational level. Because local governments have control over land, in order to attract investment, local governments usually increase the supply of land. In addition, local governments attract investors by offering various forms of subsidies. In this way, local governments attract more capital into their jurisdictions. Achieving the goal of economic growth and expanding fiscal revenue, thereby contributing to the promotion of posts... however, this pattern of economic growth itself has problems, especially with regard to the negative impact on income distribution that cannot be ignored... first of all, Local governments attract capital at lower prices, reducing the cost of enterprises and raising the rate of return on capital. The share of labor income decreases when the price of labor remains unchanged. At the same time, because capital-intensive industries usually have a longer industrial chain, the pull effect on regional economy is more obvious, and local governments are more inclined to give preferential treatment to capital-intensive industries. As a result, capital-intensive enterprises grow faster, leading to the increase of capital income share. In addition, there are differences in bargaining power between labor and capital, which is even more detrimental to income distribution. This paper tests the transmission mechanism through Acemoglu channel test method. The results show that local governments influence the choice of technology by controlling land, and ultimately affect the share of labor income. However, the background of vigorously attracting investment to develop the economy has changed. Moreover, the problem of uneven income distribution can not be ignored. The special economic growth mode based on the competitive behavior of local governments in China has seriously distorted the income distribution situation. Therefore, it is very urgent to transform from a developmental government to a service-oriented government. The government reforms the existing official incentive mechanism, and develops the economy according to the local conditions, realizes the economic healthy development.
【学位授予单位】：浙江大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D630;F812.41

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