政策性补贴竞争、体制性产能过剩与福利效应

发布时间：2018-04-17 03:13

本文选题：地方政府目标函数 + 政策性补贴　；参考：《世界经济文汇》2015年03期

【摘要】：本文通过构建地方政府在分权经济下进行政策性补贴竞争的博弈模型,分析了地方政府目标的"市场效率导向"和"辖区GDP导向"对地方政府的政策性补贴、体制性产能过剩和社会福利的影响。结果表明,在"辖区GDP导向"下,地方政府的政策性补贴和体制性产能过剩程度都会随着其对"辖区GDP"看重程度的增加而增加。整个社会的福利变化受市场潜在规模的限制,呈现倒U型变化。因此,中央政府要协调地区经济竞争行为,引导地方政府进行适度的政策性补贴,防止出现由补贴过度而引起全国福利水平下降的情形。
[Abstract]:By constructing a game model of policy subsidy competition between local governments in decentralized economy, this paper analyzes the policy subsidies to local governments based on "market efficiency orientation" and "GDP orientation" of local governments.Institutional overcapacity and the impact of social welfare.The results show that the degree of policy subsidies and institutional overcapacity of local governments will increase with the increase of the importance of "GDP" in the jurisdiction under the guidance of "district GDP".The welfare changes of the whole society are restricted by the potential scale of the market and present inverted U-shaped changes.Therefore, the central government should coordinate regional economic competition, guide local governments to carry out appropriate policy subsidies, and prevent the decline of national welfare level caused by excessive subsidies.
【作者单位】：南京大学经济学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“中国转型时期地方官员治理研究”(项目批准号:12YJCZH165) 2012年度教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”项目的资助
【分类号】：F812.7

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