我国地方政府性债务风险约束机制研究

发布时间：2018-04-24 10:14

本文选题：财政 + 债务　；参考：《财政部财政科学研究所》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：近几年地方政府债务规模快速扩张,债务风险日益凸显,引起各级政府、国内外理论界、实务界以及社会公众的高度关注,2013年中央经济工作会议也把化解地方政府债务风险作为2014年的重要工作。在城镇化加快发展、地方政府事权不断扩大和债务风险逐步暴露的背景下,能否建立有效的地方政府性债务风险约束机制,无论对防范风险本身还是对维持地方融资和区域经济增长的可持续性,都至关重要；对带动新一轮财税改革、跨越中等收入陷阱,保持国民经济健康发展和国家长治久安也具有重要的意义。在地方政府性债务风险研究领域存在三方面不足：一是现有研究多基于中央和地方财权事权不对等以及地方经济竞争等方面揭示地方债务的成因,从地方财政可持续性视角研究地方政府性债务风险,而从风险约束视角全面系统地研究地方政府性债务风险的文献不多。二是从风险约束角度研究地方债务风险的文献,也主要集中于对外部监督机制的研究,几乎未涉及地方政府性债务风险的内在约束机制。更没有将财政约束、市场约束和民意约束纳入到一个统一的分析框架中,探讨地方政府性债务风险约束问题。三是对于防范和化解地方政府性债务风险的措施方面,现有文献多移植成熟国家经验,强调采用市场约束机制解决中国地方政府性债务风险。但以中国为代表的转轨国家,在短期内,大政府小市场的现状难以改变、预算软约束问题难以根除、政府破产机制难以构建,所以基于市场约束机制设计的地方政府性债务风险解决方案对我国的适用性不强。当前我国正处于转方式、调结构、加速推进新型城镇化建设的关键时刻,面对规模庞大的地方政府性债务和日益凸显的地方债务风险,本文力图解决以下三个方面的问题：一是从更为宏观的机制设计层面上,从债务规模约束角度厘清地方政府事权边界；二是在兼顾融资可得性和债务风险约束的条件下,从增强融资主体自身的风险约束激励出发,构建融资可得性、外部监督和风险约束之间激励相容的地方政府融资机制；三是基于激励相容原则,构建市场、财政和民意三重约束相结合的地方政府性债务约束框架。本文运用归纳演绎、对比及数理分析方法,首先从对地方政府性债务管理的基本内涵和基础理论分析入手,剖析我国地方政府性债务风险的现状及成因,并对我国地方政府性债务风险状况做出总体评价。其次,从财政约束、市场约束和民意约束三个层面对我国地方政府性债务风险约束机制做了分析,并着重从制度层面剖析了我国地方政府性债务风险约束机制软化的原因。第三,基于我国地方政府性债务风险的生成逻辑、发展路径以及约束形式,提出了地方政府性债务风险约束有效性的三个标准。在此基础上,基于地方政府目标函数,构建了地方债务风险自我激励约束理论模型,并以此作为完善我国地方政府性债务风险约束机制的理论依据。第四,从财政体制、融资模式、破产机制视角,对比分析主要国家地方债务风险约束机制的特点及其有效性,以期为化解我国地方政府性债务风险问题提供借鉴。最后,基于本文的理论分析框架,借鉴国外经验,立足于我国经济体制、财政体制和社会发展目标,本着通过设计激励相容机制,增强融资主体自身风险约束动力的思路,在现行体制格局大体不变的前提下,提出完善我国地方政府性债务风险约束机制的政策建议。主要包括,通过设计政绩考核、土地出让金留存比例、自主发债、上级转移支付等与地方政府性债务风险挂钩的激励机制,增强地方政府偿债意愿和风险约束的自觉性。同时,通过完善地方债风险处置机制、强化地方资本预算管理等财政措施,以及资产证券化等风险防范和隔离措施,作为地方政府自我风险约束的补充。本文的创新之处在于：一是研究视角创新。1)本文不仅仅局限于探讨如何防范地方债务风险,而是着重从更为宏观的机制设计层面上,研究如何从债务约束角度厘清地方政府事权边界。2)在兼顾融资可得性和风险约束的基础上,从增强融资主体自身的风险约束激励出发,构建融资可得性、外部监督和风险约束之间激励相容的地方政府融资机制,避免单一的外部约束(上级财政和金融监管当局)的不足。3)以动力机制设计为基础,通过必要的外部约束和市场监管,解决地方政府性债务风险的外部性和信息不对称性问题,并设计了地方政府性债务约束的市场、财政和民意约束三重框架。二是研究观点创新。1)在现行体制基础上,基于激励约束相容原则,提出强化预算管理、限制地方政府性债务规模、增强地方政府偿债意愿、约束债务风险、完善风险处置的政策建议。2)基于理论模型的结果,本文认为要改变当前地方政府盲目追求经济增长目标的偏好,必须改革片面注重经济指标的地方政府官员考核机制；地方政府只有退出产出弹性较大的竞争性投资领域,才有动力增加产出弹性较小的经常性投资支出,增加公共产品供给；削弱地方政府对土地的控制权、降低土地抵押贷款的杠杆率、削弱地方政府对土地财政的依赖,能更好地抑制地方政府投资冲动,减少地方政府性债务风险。三是研究方法创新。本文采用优化分析法剖析地方政府行为。基于激励相容的机制设计思路,通过构建地方政府行为目标函数,将财政约束、市场约束作为外生变量嵌入地方政府行为目标函数,然后在此基础上求解基于地方政府利益最大化的风险约束机制。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the scale of local government debt has expanded rapidly, and the debt risk has become increasingly prominent. It has aroused the high attention of governments at all levels, the theoretical circles at home and abroad, the practice community and the public. In 2013, the central economic work conference also took the local government debt risk as an important work in 2014. In the context of expansion and gradual exposure of debt risk, it is essential to establish an effective local government debt risk constraint mechanism, whether to prevent risk itself or to maintain the sustainability of local financing and regional economic growth, to promote a new round of fiscal and tax reform, to cross the Middle Income Trap and maintain a healthy national economy. The exhibition and the long-term stability of the country are also of great significance.
There are three shortcomings in the research field of local government debt risk: first, the existing research is based on the causes of local debt in the areas of central and local financial rights and local economic competition, and local economic competition, and the study of local government debt risk from the perspective of local financial sustainability, and from the perspective of risk constraints. There are few literature on the risk of local government debt. Two is the literature of the study of local debt risk from the perspective of risk constraints, and it is mainly focused on the study of external supervision mechanism, and it does not involve the internal constraint mechanism of local government debt risk. It has not included financial constraints, market constraints and public opinion constraints into a unified division. In the framework of the framework, we discuss the problem of local government debt risk constraints. Three is to prevent and resolve local government debt risk measures, the existing literature transplants more mature country experience, emphasizes the use of market constraint mechanism to solve the risk of local government debt in China. However, the transitional country represented by China, in the short term, the big government The current situation of small market is difficult to change, the problem of soft budget constraint is difficult to be eradicated, and the government bankruptcy mechanism is difficult to build, so the local government debt risk solution based on the market constraint mechanism is not applicable to our country.
At present, our country is in the key moment of changing the way, adjusting the structure and accelerating the construction of the new urbanization. Facing the large scale of local government debt and the increasingly prominent local debt risk, this paper tries to solve the following three problems: first, from the perspective of the debt scale restriction from the perspective of the more macro mechanism design level. The boundary of the square government's power of affairs; two, under the condition that the financing availability and debt risk constraints are taken into consideration, the local government financing mechanism, which is compatible between the financing availability, the external supervision and the risk constraints, is built on the basis of enhancing the risk constraint of the financing body itself, and the three is based on the incentive compatibility principle, and the market, finance and public opinion are constructed. A local government debt constraint framework combined with three constraints.
Based on the basic connotation and basic theory of local government debt management, this paper begins with the basic connotation and basic theory of local government debt management, analyzes the current situation and causes of local government debt risk in our country, and makes a general evaluation on the state of local government debt risk in China. Secondly, from financial constraints, market constraints and people. This paper analyzes the local government debt risk constraint mechanism in our country and analyzes the reasons for the softening of local government debt risk constraint mechanism from the institutional level. Third, based on the generation logic of local government debt risk in China, the path of development and the form of restraint, the local government debt is put forward. On the basis of the three criteria of the effectiveness of risk constraints, based on the objective function of local government, a theoretical model of local debt risk self incentive constraint is constructed, which is the theoretical basis for improving the local government debt risk constraint mechanism in China. Fourth, from the financial system, financing model, bankruptcy mechanism perspective, the main comparative analysis is made. The characteristics and effectiveness of the national debt risk constraint mechanism are expected to provide a reference for solving the problem of local government debt risk in China. Finally, based on the theoretical analysis framework of this paper, using the experience of foreign countries for reference, based on our economic system, the financial system and social development goals, and in the light of the design of incentive compatibility mechanism, the financing will be enhanced. The idea of the motive force of the subject's own risk constraint is put forward on the premise that the current system pattern is largely unchanged, and puts forward the policy suggestions to improve the local government debt risk restraint mechanism in China, mainly including the design of the performance appraisal, the proportion of Jin Liucun, the independent debt Issuance and the upper level transfer payment, which are linked to the local government debt risk. Incentive mechanism will enhance local government's willingness to pay debts and risk constraints. At the same time, through improving local debt risk disposal mechanism, strengthening local capital budget management and other financial measures, as well as asset securitization risk prevention and isolation measures, as a supplement to local government self risk constraints.
The innovation of this article lies in:
One is research perspective innovation (.1). This paper is not only limited to discuss how to guard against local debt risk, but focus on how to clarify the.2 of the local government from the perspective of debt constraint from the perspective of a more macro mechanism design. On the basis of considering the availability and risk constraints of financing, the risk of the financing body is enhanced. A local government financing mechanism, which is incentive compatible between financing availability, external supervision and risk constraints, is constructed to avoid a single external constraint (the insufficient.3 of the superior financial and financial regulatory authorities), based on the design of the dynamic mechanism, and to solve the risk of local government debt through the necessary external contracts and market regulation. The problem of partial and asymmetric information is designed, and the three framework of local government debt constraint market, financial and public opinion constraint is designed.
The two is to study view innovation.1) on the basis of the current system, based on the principle of incentive and constraint compatibility, it is proposed to strengthen the budget management, restrict the local government debt scale, strengthen the local government's debt repayment will, restrict the debt risk, and improve the risk management policy recommendations.2) based on the results of the theory model, this paper believes that the current local government is to be changed. In order to pursue the goal of economic growth, it is necessary to reform the assessment mechanism of local government officials who pay more attention to economic indicators. Only when the local government withdraws from the competitive investment field with large output elasticity, the local government can increase the regular investment expenditure with less output elasticity, increase the supply of public goods, and weaken the control of the local government on the land. It can reduce the leverage ratio of land mortgage loans and weaken the dependence of local government on land finance. It can better suppress the investment impulse of local government and reduce the risk of local government debt.
The three is the research method innovation. This article uses the optimization analysis method to analyze the local government behavior. Based on the incentive compatibility mechanism design idea, the local government behavior target function is embedded by the financial constraint and market constraint as the exogenous variable by constructing the local government behavior objective function, and then on this basis, the solution is based on the local government's benefit most. The risk constraint mechanism of maximization.

【学位授予单位】：财政部财政科学研究所
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F812.5

【参考文献】