我国地方财政投资软预算约束问题成因研究

发布时间：2018-07-30 08:47

【摘要】：改革开放以来,地方政府一直充当着推动经济增长的引擎作用,其“公司化”倾向不断增强。地方政府利用财政信用的扩张,添补了市场主体纷纷去杠杆化导致的市场信用萎缩,从而避免了大量的企业倒闭、工人失业、农民返乡等不利后果,使得中国经济在国际经济危机中率先摆脱了危机阴影。但与此同时,大扩张也带来了政府投融资平台过度借贷、产能过剩、政府间恶性竞争和银行不良贷款等“后遗症”。这说明我国地方财政投资中仍存在着突破预算约束的冲动,反映出我国政府财政投资决策、监督、问责等体制尚不健全。现阶段亟须对我国地方政府财政投资软预算约束的动因做进一步分析,以实现逐步硬化预算约束、规范地方政府财政投资行为的目标。本文从软预算约束的视角来研究地方财政投资行为,首先对建国以来我国地方财政投资行为特征及软预算约束情况进行梳理,总结出投资软预算约束的表现与特点；然后从政绩考核机制、财政投资体制、预算管理体制、金融信贷审批机制、监管机制等方面深入剖析了我国地方财政投资存在软预算约束的制度成因,并运用动态博弈论对地方政府与项目代理人、中央政府、同级其他地方政府之间的博弈过程进行分析,最后对比国外相关经验,提出硬化预算约束、规范地方财政投资行为的政策建议。制度带有根本性、全局性,研究我国地方财政投资行为中预算软约束形成的原因必须从制度入手。作者认为现有财政体制下地方财权与事权不对等以及不科学的政绩考核制度促使地方官员产生了突破财政投资预算约束的动机,而不科学的投资决策体制、不健全的预算管理机制、不严格的金融信贷审批制度和缺失的外部监管机制均给地方政府突破投资预算约束留下了制度操作空间。地方政府与财政投资项目代理人进行救助博弈时往往因为考虑到项目破产所带来的负面影响而被迫给予项目救助；中央与地方政府间的信息不对称以及委托代理关系使得两者博弈时地方政府存在一定的优势；地方政府相互间的博弈因为官员追求晋升而陷入不断扩大投资规模的囚徒困境。这些连续博弈的最终结果均是财政投资预算约束的软化。硬化我国地方财政投资预算约束,首先要转变政府职能定位,建立有限与有效的政府,为市场经济有效运行提供良好的基础；其次,构建科学合理的政绩考核体系,理顺政府间支出责任和收入分配,完善财政投资决策机制、问责机制,构建投资规模适度判定指标体系；最后,要加快《预算法》的修订,引入社会监管,建立地方预算绩效评价制度,从制度上约束和规范地方财政投资行为,提高财政投资效率。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the local government has been the engine of promoting economic growth, and its "corporate" tendency has been strengthened constantly. The local government has made use of the expansion of financial credit to supplement the market credit shrinking caused by the leveraging of the main body of the market, thus avoiding the failure of a large number of enterprises, the unemployment of the workers, and the return of the peasants to the countryside. As a result, the Chinese economy has taken the lead in getting rid of the shadow of the crisis in the international economic crisis. But at the same time, the expansion also brings the "sequelae" of the government investment and financing platform over borrowing, overcapacity, vicious competition between the government and the bank's bad loans. This shows that there is still an impulse to break through the budget constraints in the local financial investment. The government's financial investment decision-making, supervision, accountability and other systems are still not sound. At this stage, it is urgent to further analyze the reasons for the soft budget constraints of local government financial investment in order to achieve the gradual hardening of budget constraints and standardize the target of local government financial investment behavior.
This paper studies the behavior of local financial investment from the perspective of soft budget constraints. First, the characteristics of local financial investment behavior and soft budget constraints have been combed, and the performance and characteristics of the soft budget constraints are summed up. Then, the performance assessment mechanism, financial investment system, budget management system, and financial credit examination and approval machine are made. The institutional causes of local financial investment in China are deeply analyzed, and the game theory is used to analyze the game process between local government and project agents, central government and other local governments at the same level by dynamic game theory. Policy recommendations for fiscal investment behavior.
The system is fundamental and overall. The reasons for the formation of the soft budget constraints in our local financial investment must start with the system. The author thinks that the local financial power and power and the unscientific performance appraisal system under the existing financial system and the unscientific performance appraisal system have caused the local officials to break through the budget constraints of the financial investment, but not the motive. The investment decision-making system, the imperfect budgetary management mechanism, the unstrict financial credit examination and approval system and the missing external regulatory mechanism all leave the local government to break through the investment budget constraints. The local government and the financial investment project agents often take into account the project bankruptcy. The negative influence is forced to give the project assistance; the information asymmetry between the central and local governments and the principal-agent relationship make the local government have certain advantages when the two games are game; the game between the local government is trapped in the constant expansion of the investment scale because of the officials' pursuit of promotion. The result is the softening of fiscal budget constraints.
In order to harden our local financial investment budget constraints, we should first change the position of government functions, establish a limited and effective government, provide a good foundation for the effective operation of the market economy. Secondly, build a scientific and reasonable performance appraisal system, rationalize the Intergovernmental expenditure responsibility and income distribution, perfect the financial investment decision-making mechanism, accountability mechanism, and build the system. In the end, we should accelerate the revision of the "budget law", introduce the social supervision, establish the local budget performance evaluation system, restrict and standardize the local financial investment behavior, and improve the efficiency of financial investment.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F812.45

【参考文献】