政府投资审计引入中介机构的博弈分析
发布时间：2018-08-13 10:58
【摘要】：大量的社会中介机构进入政府投资审计领域,有效地缓解了审计任务繁重与审计力量不足之间的矛盾但由于国家审计机关与社会中介机构有着本质的区别,他们之间存在着一种既紧密联系又相互制约和相互斗争的博弈关系审计机关委托社会中介进行投资项目审计,是典型的"委托—代理"关系通过构建审计机关和社会中介的"委托-代理"模型来分析双方的决策和行为,寻找双方利益的契合点和平衡点,既防止中介机构消极怠工和徇私舞弊,又能保证审计质量和提高审计效率,防范和降低审计风险,维护审计工作的公平和正义.
[Abstract]:A large number of social intermediary institutions have entered the field of government investment audit, which has effectively alleviated the contradiction between the heavy audit task and insufficient audit power. However, because of the essential difference between the state audit institution and the social intermediary organization, There is a game relationship between them, which is closely linked with each other and restricts and struggles with each other. The auditing institution entrusts the social intermediary to carry out the investment project audit. It is a typical "principal-agent" relationship to analyze the decision-making and behavior of both sides by constructing the "principal-agent" model of auditing institutions and social intermediaries, and to find out the common point and balance point of the interests of both sides. It can not only prevent the intermediary organizations from doing nothing and practicing favoritism, but also guarantee the audit quality and improve the audit efficiency, prevent and reduce the audit risk, and safeguard the fairness and justice of the audit work.
【作者单位】： 三峡大学水利与环境学院;宜昌市s亭区审计局;
【分类号】：F812.45;F239.4;F224.32
本文编号：2180770
[Abstract]:A large number of social intermediary institutions have entered the field of government investment audit, which has effectively alleviated the contradiction between the heavy audit task and insufficient audit power. However, because of the essential difference between the state audit institution and the social intermediary organization, There is a game relationship between them, which is closely linked with each other and restricts and struggles with each other. The auditing institution entrusts the social intermediary to carry out the investment project audit. It is a typical "principal-agent" relationship to analyze the decision-making and behavior of both sides by constructing the "principal-agent" model of auditing institutions and social intermediaries, and to find out the common point and balance point of the interests of both sides. It can not only prevent the intermediary organizations from doing nothing and practicing favoritism, but also guarantee the audit quality and improve the audit efficiency, prevent and reduce the audit risk, and safeguard the fairness and justice of the audit work.
【作者单位】： 三峡大学水利与环境学院;宜昌市s亭区审计局;
【分类号】：F812.45;F239.4;F224.32
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