城市基层治理对行政协商机制的“排斥效应”

发布时间：2018-06-29 23:41

本文选题：基层治理 + 行政协商　；参考：《公共管理学报》2017年01期

【摘要】：作为协商民主的一种次形态,行政协商机制是兼具中央推动与基层适应的政策,但依然受到了基层行政组织的排斥。理解这种"排斥效应"的关键是对城市内各级政府(行政组织)在治理过程中的互动进行探究。本文对F市M社区与S市T社区进行双案例研究,以"双尾设计"为原则,选取两个差异特征较为明显的案例进行差别复制的检验。研究发现,城市纵向政府间的"权责倒置"机制是造成行政协商机制被城市基层治理所排斥的关键原因。对"权责倒置"机制的分析将有助于调整城市内的纵向政府间关系,为突破城市基层治理中"政府-社会"关系的内在张力提供方向,为城市基层行政协商机制与协商民主制度的建设提供理论层面的支持。
[Abstract]:As a sub-form of deliberative democracy, the administrative consultation mechanism is a policy promoted by the central government and adapted to the grass-roots level, but it is still excluded by the grass-roots administrative organizations. The key to understanding this "exclusion effect" is to explore the interaction of all levels of government (administrative organizations) in the process of governance. This paper makes a double case study of M community in F city and T community in S city. Based on the principle of "double tail design", two cases with obvious difference characteristics are selected to test the difference replication. It is found that the "power and responsibility inversion" mechanism between the vertical governments is the key reason for the exclusion of the administrative consultation mechanism from the urban grass-roots governance. The analysis of the mechanism of "power and responsibility inversion" will help to adjust the vertical intergovernmental relations in cities and provide a direction for breaking through the inherent tension of the "government-society" relationship in urban grass-roots governance. It provides theoretical support for the construction of urban grass-roots administrative consultation mechanism and consultative democracy.
【作者单位】：福建师范大学公共管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金青年项目(15CZZ021) 福建省青年高校杰出青年科研人才培育计划
【分类号】：D630

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