代理成本、控股权性质与跨部门补贴

发布时间：2018-02-28 11:38

本文关键词： 代理成本控股权性质跨部门补贴企业集团内部资本市场　出处：《管理科学》2014年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：企业集团通过内部资本市场可以将资源从低融资约束部门转移输送至高融资约束部门,以缓解后者的资金约束程度,同时导致跨部门补贴问题,集团总部对跨部门补贴双方的投资-现金流敏感性将产生不同的影响。基于2003年至2010年中国A股上市公司的7 181个年度样本数据,采用OLS多元回归和固定效应模型等实证研究方法,从投资-现金流敏感性角度检验中国企业集团的跨部门补贴及其影响因素问题。研究结果表明,中国企业集团存在明显的跨部门补贴现象,部门经理层代理成本的增大既能减轻集团对补贴方的资源转移程度,又能减弱集团对被补贴方融资约束的缓解作用,说明跨部门补贴主要在经理层代理成本较低的部门之间进行。大股东代理成本即控制权与现金流权的分离加重了补贴提供方的资源转移程度,却促进了被补贴方融资约束的缓解;控股权性质从非国有控股到国有中央政府控股,企业集团的跨部门补贴问题逐步减轻。
[Abstract]:Through the internal capital market, enterprise groups can transfer resources from low-financing constrained sectors to high-financing constrained sectors, so as to alleviate the degree of financial constraints of the latter, and at the same time lead to cross-sector subsidies. The group's headquarters will have different effects on the investment-cash flow sensitivity of cross-sector subsidies. Based on 7,181 annual sample data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2010, By using OLS multiple regression and fixed effect model, this paper examines the cross-sector subsidies of Chinese enterprise groups and their influencing factors from the perspective of investment-cash flow sensitivity. There is obvious cross-sector subsidy phenomenon in Chinese enterprise groups. The increase of agency cost of department managers can not only reduce the degree of resource transfer to subsidy parties, but also weaken the role of group to alleviate the financing constraints of subsidised parties. It shows that the inter-departmental subsidy is mainly carried out among the departments with lower agency cost at the manager level, and the separation of the agency cost of the large shareholder that is, the right of control and the right of cash flow increases the degree of resource transfer of the subsidy provider. However, it promotes the easing of the financing constraints of the subsidised parties; the nature of controlling shares from non-state holding to state-owned central government holding, the cross-sector subsidy problem of enterprise groups is gradually alleviated.
【作者单位】：电子科技大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71102054) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(ZYGX2010J124)~~
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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