董事责任保险与企业投资效率的相关性研究

发布时间：2018-03-23 06:24

本文选题：董事责任保险　切入点：过度投资　出处：《海南大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近年来,大量财务丑闻的频频曝光,使公司董事及高管人员面临前所未有的详尽审查和责任风险。随着投资者利益保护意识的不断提升,针对上市公司的集体诉讼逐渐增加,董事和高管人员的执业风险不断加大,董事责任保险的潜在需求愈发凸显。关于董事责任保险理论的研究,国外学者从股东利益保护、外部监督、管理层风险厌恶、信号传递以及财务效应等方面对其进行了详尽的探讨,并形成了比较完整的董事责任保险购买需求动因理论体系。国内学者也从法理、功效和需求等方面对董事责任保险进行了全方位的分析,并达成了较为一致的观点。然而,对于董事责任保险与公司治理方面的研究则显得相对匮乏,而且在有限的相关文献中,关于董事责任保险与企业投资效率的研究更是屈指可数。投资效率关系到企业价值的提升和股东财富的增加,但现实资本市场中存在信息不对称和委托代理问题,这些因素会导致企业投资决策出现偏差,引发过度投资或投资不足。国外研究表明董事责任保险可充当外部监督机制,对上市公司董事及高管人员进行监督,以减少其机会主义行为,降低公司委托代理成本,进而缓解企业过度投资或投资不足。但与此同时,董事责任保险也有可能引发逆向选择或加剧道德风险,进一步降低企业投资效率。因此,结合我国特定的制度背景和法律环境,探索董事责任保险对我国企业的投资效率究竟是否存在治理作用就显得尤为重要,也具有开拓性的理论和实践意义。本文基于我国深沪A股上市公司2006-2012年的财务数据和手工搜集的有关董事责任保险的数据,在区分过度投资和投资不足的企业非效率投资基础上,采用规范分析、描述性统计、相关性分析和回归分析等多种研究方法,对董事责任保险与企业投资效率的相关性进行了深入的探讨。实证研究结果表明,董事责任保险能够改善企业过度投资,但是不能缓解企业投资不足,董事责任保险在对企业投资效率的治理作用方面表现出一定的选择性。我国上市公司应全面审视并相机利用董事责任保险作为改善企业投资效率的工具。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the frequent exposure of a large number of financial scandals, company directors and executives are facing unprecedented scrutiny and liability risks. With the increasing awareness of the protection of investors' interests, class-action litigation against listed companies has gradually increased. The risk of directors and executives is increasing, and the potential demand of directors liability insurance becomes more and more obvious. On the theory of directors liability insurance, foreign scholars from shareholders' interests protection, external supervision, management risk aversion, The signal transmission and financial effect are discussed in detail, and a relatively complete theoretical system of directors' liability insurance purchase demand motivation is formed. In the aspects of efficiency and demand, the director's liability insurance has been comprehensively analyzed and reached a more consistent point of view. However, the research on directors' liability insurance and corporate governance is relatively scarce. In the limited literature, the research on directors liability insurance and enterprise investment efficiency is even more rare. Investment efficiency is related to the promotion of enterprise value and the increase of shareholder wealth, but there are information asymmetry and principal-agent problems in the real capital market, which will lead to the deviation of enterprise investment decision. Foreign studies show that directors liability insurance can act as an external supervision mechanism to supervise the directors and executives of listed companies in order to reduce their opportunistic behavior and reduce the cost of agency. But at the same time, directors' liability insurance may lead to adverse selection or aggravate moral hazard, and further reduce the efficiency of enterprise investment. Combined with the specific institutional background and legal environment of our country, it is particularly important to explore whether directors' liability insurance has a governance effect on the investment efficiency of Chinese enterprises, and it is also of pioneering theoretical and practical significance. Based on the financial data of Shenzhen and Shanghai A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2012 and the data on directors' liability insurance collected by hand, this paper adopts normative analysis and descriptive statistics on the basis of distinguishing overinvestment from inefficient investment of underinvested enterprises. The correlation between directors' liability insurance and enterprise investment efficiency is discussed in depth by correlation analysis and regression analysis. The empirical results show that directors' liability insurance can improve the overinvestment of enterprises. However, it cannot alleviate the lack of investment by enterprises. The director's liability insurance has a certain selectivity in the governance of the enterprise's investment efficiency. The listed companies in our country should examine the director's liability insurance comprehensively and use it as a tool to improve the enterprise's investment efficiency.
【学位授予单位】：海南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F842.69;F275

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