巨灾保险下政府防灾减灾激励作用研究——基于被保险人的道德风险

发布时间：2018-06-13 06:00

本文选题：巨灾保险 + 防灾减灾　；参考：《武汉金融》2013年03期

【摘要】：文章首先分析了巨灾保险中被保险人防灾减灾积极性缺乏的原因,然后运用博弈理论,阐明了不同的政策如何影响巨灾保险中被保险人防灾减灾的积极性,得出结论:一方面,灾前政府只针对采取积极防灾措施的被保险人拨款的政策比对所有被保险人统一拨款的政策更能提高被保险人防灾减灾的积极性,并且这种有针对性的拨款政策通常并不会增加政府自身的财政负担;另一方面,政府灾后的奖励政策比灾后统一的补贴更能激励被保险人积极采取防灾减灾措施,并且只需比补贴政策更少的成本就能实现更高的收益。最后,文章就如何调动被保险人防灾减灾积极性,以减小巨灾保险存在的道德风险提出了政策建议。
[Abstract]:This paper first analyzes the reasons for the lack of enthusiasm for disaster prevention and mitigation of the insured in catastrophe insurance, and then, using the game theory, expounds how different policies affect the enthusiasm of the insured in catastrophe insurance against disaster prevention and mitigation, and draws the following conclusions: on the one hand, Prior to the disaster, the government's policy of allocating funds only to the insured who had taken active measures to prevent disasters could increase the enthusiasm of the insured for disaster prevention and mitigation more than the policy of unified allocation of funds to all the insured. Moreover, this targeted allocation policy usually does not increase the financial burden of the government itself; on the other hand, the government's post-disaster incentive policy can encourage the insured to take active measures to prevent and mitigate disasters more than the unified subsidy after the disaster. And higher returns can be achieved with less cost than subsidies. Finally, the paper puts forward some policy suggestions on how to arouse the enthusiasm of the insured in disaster prevention and mitigation in order to reduce the moral hazard existing in catastrophe insurance.
【作者单位】：武汉理工大学经济学院;
【分类号】：F842.6

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