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产业集群企业合作竞争博弈机理研究

发布时间:2018-01-04 04:46

  本文关键词:产业集群企业合作竞争博弈机理研究 出处:《广西大学》2014年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


  更多相关文章: 产业集群 合作竞争 古诺博弈 知识创新“囚徒困境”博弈斯塔博格博弈


【摘要】:产业集群为区域经济的繁荣做出极大贡献,发展成熟的产业集群成为地方政府乃至整个国家重要的经济手段之一,而能否形成有序的的合作竞争机制,则是促进整个产业集群效益提升关键。为此,本文基于博弈论理论与方法,通过构建并创新相关经典博弈模型,试图寻求企业间能实现有序高效合作竞争博弈的过程和平衡点,以探寻能促进产业集群内企业有序合作竞争的有效措施。一方面,公平合理的利益分配机制,是实现产业集群内企业保持长期稳定合作竞争的关键因素;另一方面,产业集群内企业合作竞争博弈主体,主要存在于同质企业与异质企业之间。基于此,本文研究的主要内容包括:(1)构建同质企业间基于产量的古诺博弈模型并求解均衡解;(2)构建同质企业间基于知识创新的“囚徒困境”博弈模型并求解均衡解;(3)构建异质企业间(产业链上)的斯塔博格博弈模型并求解均衡解。 通过对产业集群内同质企业间“基于产量的古诺合作竞争博弈”均衡解形成机理的研究,本文认为:完全合作的效益大于完全竞争,但单方背叛合作能实现短期背叛收益,要保持长期稳定合作,必须提升博弈方对于合作收益的预期。 通过对产业集群内同质企业间“基于知识创新的囚徒困境合作竞争博弈”均衡解形成机理的研究,本文认为:创新合作能够提升创新力度与效果,但不完全信息下,某些企业可能会选择模仿他人创新成果而不是进行联合创新,导致选择合作企业利益受损,必须降低这些模仿企业个数,以及知识外溢的程度。 通过对产业集群内异质企业间(产业链上)“斯塔博格合作竞争博弈”均衡解形成机理的研究,本文认为:生产商作为产业链上的核心企业,如果暂时牺牲自己的利益来成全集体的利益,可以使整个产业链效益最大,但这种情况不能长期保持,除非选择竞争的经销商能为生产商提供一定的补偿,这个补偿必须大于生产商选择竞争时获得的收益。 本文研究的最后,通过产业集群内同质企业间基于产量的古诺合作竞争博弈机理、同质企业间基于知识创新的囚徒困境合作竞争博弈机理,以及异质企业间 (产业链上)的斯塔博格合作竞争博弈机理,对温州打火机、温州柳市低压电器以及上海汽车三个产业集群如何实现企业间的有序合作竞争,提出具体措施,以求达到理论指导实践的研究目的。
[Abstract]:Industrial clusters have made great contributions to the prosperity of regional economy. The development of mature industrial clusters has become one of the important economic means of local governments and even the whole country, and whether or not an orderly cooperative and competitive mechanism can be formed. Therefore, based on the theory and method of game theory, this paper constructs and innovates the relevant classical game model. This paper attempts to seek the process and balance of the orderly and efficient cooperative competition game among enterprises in order to explore the effective measures to promote the orderly cooperative competition in the industrial cluster. On the one hand, it is a fair and reasonable benefit distribution mechanism. It is the key factor to realize the long-term stable cooperation and competition of the enterprises in the industrial cluster. On the other hand, the main players of cooperative competition in industrial clusters mainly exist between homogeneous enterprises and heterogeneous enterprises. The main contents of this paper include: (1) constructing the yield-based Cournot game model among homogeneous enterprises and solving the equilibrium solution; 2) constructing the "prisoner's dilemma" game model based on knowledge innovation among homogeneous enterprises and solving the equilibrium solution; Thirdly, the Stabag game model of heterogeneous enterprises (industrial chain) is constructed and the equilibrium solution is solved. Through the study of the formation mechanism of the equilibrium solution of "Cournot cooperative competition game based on output" among homogeneous enterprises in the industrial cluster, this paper holds that the benefit of complete cooperation is greater than that of complete competition. But the cooperation of unilateral betrayal can realize the short-term benefit of betrayal, and in order to maintain long-term stable cooperation, it is necessary to improve the expectation of the game side for the benefit of cooperation. Through the study of the formation mechanism of equilibrium solution of "Prisoner's Dilemma Competition Game based on knowledge Innovation" among homogeneous enterprises in industrial cluster, this paper holds that innovation cooperation can enhance innovation dynamics and effect. However, under incomplete information, some enterprises may choose to imitate others' innovation results instead of joint innovation, which results in the loss of the interests of cooperative enterprises, so the number of these imitation enterprises must be reduced. And the extent of knowledge spillover. Based on the study of the formation mechanism of the equilibrium solution of "Stabag Cooperative Competition Game" among heterogeneous enterprises in the industrial cluster, this paper holds that the producer is the core enterprise in the industrial chain. If you sacrifice your own interests temporarily to achieve the collective interests, you can make the maximum benefit of the entire industrial chain, but this situation can not be maintained for a long time, unless the choice of competitive dealers can provide a certain amount of compensation to the manufacturer. This compensation must be greater than the profit the producer receives when he chooses to compete. At the end of this paper, through the mechanism of Cournot cooperation and competition based on output among homogeneous enterprises in industrial cluster, the mechanism of prisoners' dilemma competition based on knowledge innovation among homogeneous enterprises, and the mechanism of heterogeneous enterprises' cooperation and competition. The game mechanism of Stabag cooperation and competition in the industrial chain is put forward, and some concrete measures are put forward on how to realize the orderly cooperative competition among enterprises in Wenzhou lighter, Wenzhou Liuzhou low-voltage electric appliance and Shanghai automobile industry cluster. In order to achieve the theoretical guidance of the practice of research.
【学位授予单位】:广西大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F273.7;F271;F426.8;F426.8;F426.471

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