银行贷款渠道、风险传导渠道与风险竞争关系研究
发布时间:2018-05-17 10:36
本文选题:银行贷款渠道 + 风险承担渠道 ; 参考:《中国科学技术大学》2017年博士论文
【摘要】:本文探讨了金融中介的三大领域,即银行贷款渠道、risk-taking渠道和风险-竞争关系。前两个领域(银行贷款渠道和risk-taking渠道)探讨货币政策在中国银行业的作用。而风险-竞争关系则是考察银行风险与竞争之间的联系。此外,本文还探讨了影响银行贷款渠道的各种因素和货币政策传导的risk-taking渠道的作用。本论文所使用的数据由2000年至2013的年度不平衡面板组成。应用动态面板模型系统和差分GMM。本文的研究结果表明,银行贷款渠道既不通过资产负债表的特点,也不通过银行风险进行操作。然而,本文提供了大量的证据证明贷款渠道通过市场结构运作。市场结构削弱了货币政策对银行放贷的影响。研究结果对我国银行业的制度建设具有重要的政策意义。结果表明,更高的市场力量削弱了货币政策的传导,从而降低了银行放贷渠道。在考虑到市场结构之前,个人的货币政策可能不起作用。虽然更高的竞争引发了人们对金融稳定的担忧,但在这种情况下,更高的市场力量对银行放贷渠道和货币政策的传导产生了不利影响。这样的结果可能会竞争中国银行业市场的政策,从而达到预期的货币政策目标。本文的实证结果也表明,低货币政策利率会增加银行风险。与以往的研究不同,本文的结果表明,银行特定因素(规模、流动性和资本化)在risk-taking渠道中没有起到重要作用。然而,市场结构具有稳定效应的银行risk-taking渠道。更高的市场力量削弱了货币政策传导的risk-taking渠道。从政策的角度来看,较低的货币政策诱使银行承担过度的风险。不过,在银行市场上鼓励适当的市场力量,可以减轻这种影响。此外,本文的研究结果表明,采用不同的市场结构测度方法对银行风险(不同代理量)的反应是不同的。研究支持竞争稳定性、竞争脆弱性假说和U型关系,以银行风险和市场结构的各种测度为条件。通常认为,更高的市场力量会增加信贷风险,但是,如果银行使用更多的资本和风险缓解技术来降低总体银行风险,银行整体风险可能不会增加。我通过探讨银行资本化比率与市场结构之间的关系来检验这种论点。实证发现本文不支持这种论点。风险竞争是一个复杂的问题。在银行风险和市场结构单一测度的基础上得出结论是过于草率的。本研究强烈认为,银行风险与市场结构应采取多种措施,以稳健的方式探索风险竞争
[Abstract]:This paper discusses three fields of financial intermediation, namely, bank lending channel and risk-taking channel and risk- competition relationship. The first two areas (bank lending channel and risk-taking channel) discuss the role of monetary policy in Chinese banking. The relationship between risk and competition is to examine the relationship between bank risk and competition. In addition, this paper also discusses the influence of various factors on bank lending channels and the role of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission. The data used in this paper consist of an annual unbalanced panel from 2000 to 2013. Application of dynamic panel model system and differential GMM. The results show that the bank loan channel is not operated by the characteristics of balance sheet or bank risk. However, this paper provides a great deal of evidence to prove that the loan channels operate through the market structure. Market structure weakened the impact of monetary policy on bank lending. The research results have important policy significance to the institution construction of China's banking industry. The results show that higher market forces weaken the transmission of monetary policy, thus reducing bank lending channels. Individual monetary policy may not work until market structure is considered. While higher competition has raised concerns about financial stability, higher market forces have had a negative impact on banks' lending channels and the transmission of monetary policy. Such an outcome could rival policy in China's banking market, thus achieving the desired monetary policy objectives. The empirical results of this paper also show that low monetary policy interest rate will increase bank risk. In contrast to previous studies, the results show that the specific factors (scale, liquidity and capitalization) do not play an important role in the risk-taking channel. However, the market structure has the stable effect bank risk-taking channel. Higher market forces weaken the risk-taking channel for monetary policy transmission. From a policy point of view, lower monetary policy induces banks to take excessive risks. However, encouraging appropriate market forces in the banking market can mitigate this impact. In addition, the results show that different market structure measurement methods have different responses to bank risk (different agency volumes). The research supports competition stability, competition vulnerability hypothesis and U-type relationship, which is conditioned by various measures of bank risk and market structure. Higher market forces are thought to increase credit risk, but if banks use more capital and risk mitigation technology to reduce overall bank risk, the overall risk may not increase. I test this argument by exploring the relationship between the capitalization ratio of banks and the structure of the market. It is found that this thesis does not support this argument. Risk competition is a complex problem. It is too hasty to draw a conclusion on the basis of a single measure of bank risk and market structure. This study strongly believes that bank risk and market structure should take a variety of measures to explore risk competition in a robust manner.
【学位授予单位】:中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F832
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本文编号:1901044
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