退市监管与股价崩盘风险

发布时间：2018-06-29 04:59

  本文选题：退市监管 + 股价崩盘风险　； 参考：《中国工业经济》2016年12期

【摘要】：本文从公司股价崩盘风险这一视角来探讨退市监管的治理作用,以2012年深圳证券交易所和上海证券交易所推出的较之前更为严格的"退市新规"作为准自然实验,选取2010—2013年A股上市公司为样本,采用双重差分方法控制内生性问题,研究发现:与退市新规实施之前相比,受退市新规影响的上市公司在退市新规之后其股价崩盘风险更低,表明退市监管能够降低股价崩盘风险。本文还发现,退市监管降低上市公司股价崩盘风险,主要是通过业绩提升而非信息披露操纵和盈余管理发挥作用。进一步研究发现,更低的企业代理成本、更好的信息透明度,以及更好的外部治理监督有助于更好地发挥退市监管降低股价崩盘风险的作用,最终有利于提高市场定价效率和企业价值。以上研究结果表明,更加严格的退市监管对提高上市公司的信息透明度、维持资本市场的良好运作有着重要的积极作用。
[Abstract]:This paper discusses the governance role of delisting supervision from the perspective of the risk of stock price collapse, taking the more stringent delisting rules introduced by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2012 as quasi-natural experiments. In this paper, A share listed companies from 2010 to 2013 are selected as samples to control endogenetic problems by using double difference method. The results show that: compared with the new rules before delisting, Listed companies affected by the new delisting rules have a lower risk of a stock crash after delisting, suggesting delisting regulation can reduce the risk of a stock crash. This paper also finds that delisting regulation reduces the risk of stock price collapse of listed companies mainly through performance improvement rather than disclosure manipulation and earnings management. Further studies have found that lower corporate agency costs, better information transparency, and better external governance oversight help to better play the role of delisting regulation in reducing the risk of stock price crashes. Finally, it will help to improve the market pricing efficiency and enterprise value. The results show that more strict delisting regulation plays an important and positive role in improving the information transparency of listed companies and maintaining the good operation of capital market.
【作者单位】： 首都经济贸易大学会计学院;清华大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目“基于文本分析的管理层语调研究:信息含量及其经济后果”(批准号71502116)
【分类号】：F832.51
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本文编号：2080954