管理防御对企业资本结构调整速度的影响研究
发布时间：2018-07-13 18:25
【摘要】：自从公司所有权与经营权相分离之后,股东与经理人之间的代理问题成为学术研究的重点课题,这一问题由詹森和麦克林在“代理成本理论”中首次提出。随着公司治理的深入,在传统代理问题上如经理人滥用现金流量、构建事实上的“经理人帝国”等,已有大量文献进行相关性研究并取得有效成果,能够有针对性地对企业实践活动中的治理问题进行有效借鉴,但在传统代理问题之上,关于经理人职位冲突下的经理人私利行为,称之为“经理人管理防御”问题,我国研究尚处于起步阶段,并没有形成一套系统性的理论能够对企业运行产生有效借鉴意义。本文基于经理人管理防御假说下对管理防御与企业资本结构调整速度之间的关系具体从以下五个方面进行分析,在文章第一部分对所研究问题的相关背景进行分析,具体阐述本文研究的主要内容、研究特色与创新点。第二部分为相关文献综述,对国内外围绕这一问题所得出的研究结论进行评述,并以此为基础探究本文所要研究问题的切入点。第三部分为理论分析部分,通过对经理人管理防御动机与影响因素分析对经理人管理防御对企业资本结构调整速度影响的作用机理进行理论探索。在第四部分,构建防御动机驱动下经理人资本结构调整决策的博弈模型,分析不同股权集中状况下公司股权结构对其资本结构调整动力的影响,探索出管理防御对企业资本结构调整速度影响的影响路径,为后文相关研究奠定理论基础。第五部分通过构建管理防御对企业资本结构调整速度影响的线性回归模型,以两大主板上市公司2012年12月31日至2016年12月31日财务数据为研究样本,将其分为高负债样本与低负债样本分别进行多元线性回归分析,验证本文所提出的相关假设。研究发现,经理人管理防御对企业资本结构调整速度具有显著影响,在高负债公司与低负债公司中,基于经理人管理防御程度的不同,这种影响作用呈现出不同的影响效用,这一研究结论的发现,为缓解股东与经理人之间委托代理问题与提升公司治理效率奠定基础,同时,也为完善我国国有企业内部监督机制与强化经理人市场竞争机制提供政策建议。
[Abstract]:Since the separation of corporate ownership and management right, the agency problem between shareholders and managers has become a key issue in academic research. This problem is first proposed by Jansen and Mclean in the "agency cost theory". With the deepening of corporate governance, the fact that managers abuse cash flow on the traditional agency problems is a fact. "Manager Empire" and so on, there have been a large number of literature related research and effective results, can be targeted to the effective reference to the governance problems in the enterprise practice, but on the traditional agency problem, the manager's private profit under the manager position conflict is called "manager management defense" problem. In this paper, the relationship between management defense and capital structure adjustment is analyzed from the following five aspects. In the first part of the article, the research on the relationship between management defense and enterprise capital structure adjustment is analyzed. The relevant background of the question is analyzed, the main content of the study, the research characteristics and the innovation point are elaborated. The second part is related literature review, commenting on the research conclusions surrounding this problem at home and abroad, and taking this as the basis to explore the breakthrough point of this paper. The third part is the theoretical analysis part, through which it is a theoretical analysis part. This paper makes a theoretical exploration of the mechanism of manager management defense motivation and influence factors on the effect mechanism of manager management defense on the adjustment speed of enterprise capital structure. In the fourth part, we construct the game model of manager capital structure adjustment decision driven by defensive motivation, and analyze the ownership structure of the company under the absence of ownership concentration. The influence of capital structure adjustment motivation, explore the influence path of management defense on the speed of enterprise capital structure adjustment, lay a theoretical foundation for the related research. The fifth part, by constructing the linear regression model of the influence of management defense on the adjustment speed of enterprise capital structure, the two major board listed companies from December 31, 2012 to 2016. In December 31st, the financial data were divided into high liability samples and low debt samples, which were divided into multiple linear regression analysis to verify the relevant hypotheses proposed in this paper. The difference in the degree of human management defences shows different effects. The discovery of this research conclusion lays the foundation for alleviating the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers and improving the efficiency of corporate governance. At the same time, it also provides a policy for improving the internal supervision mechanism of the state-owned enterprises and strengthening the market competition mechanism of the managers in China. Suggestions.
【学位授予单位】：西安理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51
本文编号：2120345
[Abstract]:Since the separation of corporate ownership and management right, the agency problem between shareholders and managers has become a key issue in academic research. This problem is first proposed by Jansen and Mclean in the "agency cost theory". With the deepening of corporate governance, the fact that managers abuse cash flow on the traditional agency problems is a fact. "Manager Empire" and so on, there have been a large number of literature related research and effective results, can be targeted to the effective reference to the governance problems in the enterprise practice, but on the traditional agency problem, the manager's private profit under the manager position conflict is called "manager management defense" problem. In this paper, the relationship between management defense and capital structure adjustment is analyzed from the following five aspects. In the first part of the article, the research on the relationship between management defense and enterprise capital structure adjustment is analyzed. The relevant background of the question is analyzed, the main content of the study, the research characteristics and the innovation point are elaborated. The second part is related literature review, commenting on the research conclusions surrounding this problem at home and abroad, and taking this as the basis to explore the breakthrough point of this paper. The third part is the theoretical analysis part, through which it is a theoretical analysis part. This paper makes a theoretical exploration of the mechanism of manager management defense motivation and influence factors on the effect mechanism of manager management defense on the adjustment speed of enterprise capital structure. In the fourth part, we construct the game model of manager capital structure adjustment decision driven by defensive motivation, and analyze the ownership structure of the company under the absence of ownership concentration. The influence of capital structure adjustment motivation, explore the influence path of management defense on the speed of enterprise capital structure adjustment, lay a theoretical foundation for the related research. The fifth part, by constructing the linear regression model of the influence of management defense on the adjustment speed of enterprise capital structure, the two major board listed companies from December 31, 2012 to 2016. In December 31st, the financial data were divided into high liability samples and low debt samples, which were divided into multiple linear regression analysis to verify the relevant hypotheses proposed in this paper. The difference in the degree of human management defences shows different effects. The discovery of this research conclusion lays the foundation for alleviating the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers and improving the efficiency of corporate governance. At the same time, it also provides a policy for improving the internal supervision mechanism of the state-owned enterprises and strengthening the market competition mechanism of the managers in China. Suggestions.
【学位授予单位】：西安理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 燕志雄;张敬卫;费方域;;代理问题、风险基金性质与中小高科技企业融资[J];经济研究;2016年09期
2 刘婵;;股权集中度与资本结构动态调整——来自我国上市公司的证据[J];财经界(学术版);2015年16期
3 李秉祥;吴建祥;;管理防御视角下经理人长短期项目选择的可分离均衡[J];系统工程理论与实践;2015年04期
4 张维迎;;经济转型需让企业家精神自由[J];中国投资;2015年04期
5 张海龙;姚冰n\;;经理管理防御对公司资本结构调整速度的非对称性影响研究——来自我国制造业上市公司的经验证据[J];管理评论;2014年09期
6 张春景;马文超;;基于企业经营预期下的资本结构调整——来自我国制造业上市公司的经验证据[J];会计研究;2014年08期
7 李秉祥;惠祥;;我国上市公司高管股权激励影响因素的实证研究[J];财会月刊;2013年08期
8 郝艳;李秉祥;;基于信号传递模型的企业投资短视与敲竹杠长期投资行为分析[J];管理工程学报;2011年03期
9 权小锋;吴世农;;CEO权力强度、信息披露质量与公司业绩的波动性——基于深交所上市公司的实证研究[J];南开管理评论;2010年04期
10 李秉祥;薛思珊;;基于经理人管理防御的企业投资短视行为分析[J];系统工程理论与实践;2008年11期
，本文编号：2120345
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/huobiyinxinglunwen/2120345.html
