多代理人情况下的代言制度

发布时间：2018-08-18 11:11

【摘要】：通过尝试引入组织内部的具有非党性的信息调查者，来做为组织外的信息调查者的一种制衡，并由于这种多代理人的结构的出现，设计出一种更具竞争性的酬劳支付机制，本文扩展了Dewatripont—Tirole(1997)对信息经济学中关于决策理论一个重要议题：信息收集机制的讨论。一个组织中的决策者经常被要求对组织内部两部门的争端，或是一个工程是否应被通过而做出最后裁决，这要求决策人必须从组织利益最大化出发，尽力搜集有关争议两方或是一个项目正反两方的信息。观察表明，为改善决策质量，决策者常通过代理人进行信息收集工作，也就是所谓的信息收集者或代言人。而根据代言人是代言争端的一方或是两方，一般称代言人为具有党性和非党性。已有的工作如Dewatripont—Tirole(1997)文章中对上述信息收集机制背后的机理给出了一个简单而有利的模型加以说明。得出的主要结论是非党性的代言人机制占优于党性的代言人，因为在前种机制下信息被充分收集的可能性更大，并且组织需要支付的信息租金更少。本文引入组织内部的非党性的代理人，与组织外的代理人形成了多代理人结构，又设计出一种多代理人下的根据相对表现给予激励的酬劳支付机制，讨论了组织外代理人的党性与非党性的选择问题。得出的主要结论是所设计的竞争性的支付机制占优于非竞争性的一般支付机制，并且组织外的代理人具有党性与非党性的无差异特性，即他们的特征不会影响到最后信息被发现的可能性，也不会影响组织所支付的信息租金。在设计的代言制度下，所有代理人都把完全努力作为自己的占优策略，并且在一定条件下是严格占优策略。最有，当考虑代理人可能会对信息进行操控(隐瞒或编造信息)时，发现外部代理人的党性将使得隐藏信息对他们没有任何好处；同时，如果组织或决策人对于编造信息处以及其严格的处罚，将会使得所有代理人都不敢进行信息造假，因为另一方代理人作为他们的制约因素可能会发现造假行为，进而使得造假的成本变为无穷大，从而阻遏了造假行为的发生。
[Abstract]:By attempting to introduce non-party information investigators within the organization as a check and balance for information investigators outside the organization, and because of the emergence of this multi-agent structure, a more competitive compensation mechanism is designed. This paper extends Dewatripont-Tirole (1997) to the discussion of information gathering mechanism, which is an important topic of decision theory in information economics. Decision makers in an organization are often required to make final decisions over disputes between the two parts of the organization, or whether a project should be approved, which requires decision makers to maximize the benefits of the organization. Try to collect information about both sides of the dispute or both sides of a project. Observations show that in order to improve the quality of decision making, decision makers often collect information through agents, that is, so-called information gatherers or spokesmen. According to the spokesman is a party or two parties to the dispute, the spokesman is generally called a party and non-party spirit. The previous work, such as Dewatripont-Tirole (1997), gives a simple and advantageous model to explain the mechanism behind the information collection mechanism mentioned above. The main conclusion is that the non-party spokesman mechanism is superior to the party spokesman because under the former mechanism the information is more likely to be fully collected and the organization has to pay less information rent. This paper introduces the non-Party agents in the organization, forms the multi-agent structure with the agents outside the organization, and designs a kind of reward payment mechanism under the multi-agent to give the incentive according to the relative performance. This paper discusses the choice of the party spirit and non-party spirit of the agent outside the organization. The main conclusion is that the designed competitive payment mechanism is superior to the non-competitive general payment mechanism, and the agents outside the organization have the same characteristics of party and non-party. That is, their characteristics will not affect the possibility of the final information being discovered, nor will it affect the information rent paid by the organization. Under the designed endorsement system, all agents take full effort as their dominant strategy and are strictly dominant under certain conditions. Most of all, when considering that agents may manipulate information (concealing or fabricating information), it is found that external agents' party character will make hiding information unhelpful to them; at the same time, If the organization or decision makers impose strict penalties for the fabrication of information, it will deter all agents from falsifying information, since the other side of the agency, as their constraint, may discover fraud. In turn, the cost of counterfeiting becomes infinity, thus deterring the occurrence of counterfeiting.
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2004
【分类号】：F062.5

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