价格歧视的经济和法律分析
发布时间：2018-08-18 12:21
【摘要】：价格歧视作为一种常见的市场策略,由于可能成为具有优势地位的企业损害市场竞争的手段,而受到法律规制。本文通过将价格歧视与单一定价对竞争和社会福利的影响相比较发现,价格歧视在某些情况下有可能促进企业竞争,增加社会总福利,甚至是消费者福利。在完全垄断市场的静态均衡中,垄断厂商可以通过价格歧视获取消费者剩余,增加利润,影响社会分配的公平性,但是与单一定价相比有可能增加社会福利。价格歧视增加社会总福利的必要条件是它能够提高产量。尤其是,一级价格歧视虽然使垄断厂商攫取了所有消费者剩余,但是由于可以达到帕雷托最优的产出水平,社会资源的配置是有效率的,也因此减少了单一定价下产出限制带来的社会福利净损失。在垄断竞争市场上,静态和动态分析都表明价格歧视可以促进竞争,削弱垄断企业的市场力量,使市场价格降低,有利于消费者福利的改善。由于价格歧视在不同情况下对竞争和社会福利的影响是不确定的,单纯的禁止价格歧视的法律规范未必能够达到增进社会效率的目的,反而可能成为帮助企业实施统一价格的调节机制,损害消费者的利益。因此,反垄断法应遵循合理原则,以价格歧视对竞争和社会福利的具体影响为依据对价格歧视行为予以规范。
[Abstract]:As a common market strategy, price discrimination is regulated by law because it may become a means for enterprises with advantage status to harm the market competition. By comparing the effects of price discrimination and single pricing on competition and social welfare, this paper finds that price discrimination may promote enterprise competition and increase social welfare and even consumer welfare under certain circumstances. In the static equilibrium of completely monopolized market, monopoly firms can obtain consumer surplus through price discrimination, increase profits and affect the fairness of social distribution, but compared with single pricing, monopoly firms may increase social welfare. Price discrimination increases overall social welfare only if it increases production. In particular, although primary price discrimination allows monopolists to grab all consumer surplus, social resources are allocated efficiently because they can reach Pareto's optimal level of output. It also reduces the net loss of social welfare due to output restrictions under a single price. In monopolistic competition market, both static and dynamic analysis show that price discrimination can promote competition, weaken the market power of monopoly enterprises, reduce market price and improve consumer welfare. Since the impact of price discrimination on competition and social welfare is uncertain in different circumstances, a mere legal norm prohibiting price discrimination may not necessarily achieve the goal of enhancing social efficiency, On the contrary, it may become a regulating mechanism to help enterprises implement unified price, and harm the interests of consumers. Therefore, the antimonopoly law should follow the principle of rationality and standardize the behavior of price discrimination based on the concrete influence of price discrimination on competition and social welfare.
【学位授予单位】：对外经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2006
【分类号】：F062.9
本文编号：2189455
[Abstract]:As a common market strategy, price discrimination is regulated by law because it may become a means for enterprises with advantage status to harm the market competition. By comparing the effects of price discrimination and single pricing on competition and social welfare, this paper finds that price discrimination may promote enterprise competition and increase social welfare and even consumer welfare under certain circumstances. In the static equilibrium of completely monopolized market, monopoly firms can obtain consumer surplus through price discrimination, increase profits and affect the fairness of social distribution, but compared with single pricing, monopoly firms may increase social welfare. Price discrimination increases overall social welfare only if it increases production. In particular, although primary price discrimination allows monopolists to grab all consumer surplus, social resources are allocated efficiently because they can reach Pareto's optimal level of output. It also reduces the net loss of social welfare due to output restrictions under a single price. In monopolistic competition market, both static and dynamic analysis show that price discrimination can promote competition, weaken the market power of monopoly enterprises, reduce market price and improve consumer welfare. Since the impact of price discrimination on competition and social welfare is uncertain in different circumstances, a mere legal norm prohibiting price discrimination may not necessarily achieve the goal of enhancing social efficiency, On the contrary, it may become a regulating mechanism to help enterprises implement unified price, and harm the interests of consumers. Therefore, the antimonopoly law should follow the principle of rationality and standardize the behavior of price discrimination based on the concrete influence of price discrimination on competition and social welfare.
【学位授予单位】：对外经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2006
【分类号】：F062.9
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前1条
1 何娟,李映东;价格歧视对社会福利影响的探讨[J];价格理论与实践;2003年10期
，本文编号：2189455
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