制度变迁与美国国际经济政策
发布时间：2018-08-25 07:57
【摘要】： 本文的核心研究问题是:为什么美国国内制度结构的特点及其变迁,会在美国国际经济政策选择中发挥重大的作用,它具体又是如何发挥作用?本文将集中考察美国国际经济政策的制度逻辑,强调国家政权和国内社会的区分,以及这两者的制度关系和互动模式所给美国国际经济政策带来的影响。 具体而言,本文主要研究美国国内三个层次的制度变迁如何影响美国国际经济政策的制定。这三个层次的制度变迁分别是国家与社会关系的宏观制度结构,行政-立法-中间三大部门的中观政府体系,以及部门内部微观的决策系统。其中框定其他层次制度关系的宏观制度结构——国家与社会关系——是决定美国国际经济政策的最核心、最本质的制度关系。 本文认为,美国的国内制度结构(国家与社会关系)的变迁,具体体现为行政-立法两大部门关系以及各部门内部微观决策系统的调整,塑造了体系、国家和社会三个层次的变量对美国国际经济决策发挥作用的次序和方式,决定了国内社会的利益与偏好和国际体系的压力与刺激,如何作用于处于两者中间位置的国家政权,进而对联邦政府通过政策工具的选择来改变美国与世界的经济关系施加了影响。国家既处在国家之间进行政治经济互动的体系之中,又在国内社会的范畴之内运行。 国家是全体国民公共利益的代表者,而社会是由无数的私人行为体构成,社会利益体现为私人利益的总和,而由于社会结构天然就是失衡的,因此,社会利益往往体现为特殊利益,国家与社会围绕国际经济决策的权力竞争,体现为公共利益与特殊利益的竞争。由于美国的国家利益越来越多地通过政府在国际体系中的政策行为来实现,国家与社会的关系决定了政府在国际体系中通过国际经济政策保卫公共利益的能力。 本文认为,在一个“强国家、弱社会”的制度结构下,即“强总统、弱国会”的政府体系下,美国联邦政府将根据美国在国际体系中的总体利益理性地进行国际经济决策,努力实现经济利益与安全利益、国际利益与国内利益的平衡;在一个“弱国家、强社会”的制度结构下,即“弱总统、强国会”的政府体系下,美国联邦政府的国际经济决策更容易迎合国内社会的特殊利益,沦为国内政治过程的产物。 本文致力于复兴国际关系研究中的比较政治学(国内政治)传统,通过考察制约或刺激国家对外政策选择的国内制度因素,以挑战新现实主义所坚持的一些基本研究方法和研究假定,将国内政治找回来;同时,本文试图超越单纯的国内导向的研究路径,关注国际体系的压力和刺激如何通过变迁中的国内制度作用于政府决策。本文的研究路径,体现了作者试图为打破传统的国际关系与国内政治的界限而进行的努力。笔者通过构建一种解释美国国际经济政策的制度变迁理论,驱动当今风头正劲的国际政治经济学与比较政治经济学之间的对话和联姻。它将传统分离的国际关系与国内政治两大领域进行学理上的整合,以加强对国家对外经济政策和国际经济互动的解释力。
[Abstract]:The core research questions of this paper are: why and how will the characteristics and changes of American domestic institutional structure play an important role in the choice of American international economic policies? This paper will focus on the institutional logic of American international economic policies, emphasizing the distinction between national political power and domestic society, and the two. The impact of institutional relationship and interaction mode on us international economic policy.
Specifically, this paper mainly studies how the institutional changes at three levels in the United States affect the formulation of American international economic policies. The institutional changes at these three levels are the macro-institutional structure of the relationship between the state and society, the meso-governmental system of the administrative-legislative-intermediate departments, and the micro-decision-making system within the departments. The macro-institutional structure that defines institutional relations at other levels, the relationship between state and society, is the core and essential institutional relationship that determines American international economic policy.
This paper holds that the change of the domestic institutional structure (the relationship between the state and society) in the United States is embodied in the adjustment of the relationship between the two branches of administration and legislation and the micro-decision-making system within each department, which shapes the order and manner in which the variables of the system, state and society play their roles in the international economic decision-making of the United States and determines the domestic society. Interests and preferences, and the pressures and incentives of the international system, how they act on the state power in the middle of the two, and then influence the choice of policy instruments by the federal government to change the economic relations between the United States and the world. Run within categories.
The state is the representative of the public interest of the whole nation, and the society is made up of numerous private actors, and the social interests are embodied in the sum of the private interests. Because the social structure is naturally unbalanced, the social interests are often embodied in the special interests, and the power competition between the state and society around the international economic decision-making is embodied in the public interests. The competition between interests and special interests. As the national interests of the United States are more and more realized through the policies and actions of the government in the international system, the relationship between the state and society determines the ability of the government to defend the public interests through international economic policies in the international system.
This paper holds that under the institutional structure of "a strong country, a weak society", i.e. the government system of "a strong president, a weak congress", the federal government of the United States will rationally make international economic decisions in accordance with the overall interests of the United States in the international system, and strive to achieve the balance of economic and security interests, international interests and domestic interests. Under the system structure of "weak country, strong society", that is, under the government system of "weak president, strong congress", the international economic decision-making of the United States federal government is easier to cater to the special interests of the domestic society and become the product of the domestic political process.
This paper is devoted to reviving the tradition of comparative politics (domestic politics) in the study of international relations. By examining the domestic institutional factors that restrict or stimulate the choice of foreign policies, it tries to challenge some basic research methods and assumptions adhered to by neo-realism so as to retrieve domestic politics. The research path of this paper reflects the author's efforts to break the boundaries between traditional international relations and domestic politics. The author constructs an institutional change to explain American international economic policy. Theory, which drives the dialogue and marriage between international political economics and comparative political economics, integrates the traditional separation of international relations with domestic politics in order to enhance the explanatory power of the country's foreign economic policies and international economic interactions.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：F091.349;F171.2
本文编号：2202261
[Abstract]:The core research questions of this paper are: why and how will the characteristics and changes of American domestic institutional structure play an important role in the choice of American international economic policies? This paper will focus on the institutional logic of American international economic policies, emphasizing the distinction between national political power and domestic society, and the two. The impact of institutional relationship and interaction mode on us international economic policy.
Specifically, this paper mainly studies how the institutional changes at three levels in the United States affect the formulation of American international economic policies. The institutional changes at these three levels are the macro-institutional structure of the relationship between the state and society, the meso-governmental system of the administrative-legislative-intermediate departments, and the micro-decision-making system within the departments. The macro-institutional structure that defines institutional relations at other levels, the relationship between state and society, is the core and essential institutional relationship that determines American international economic policy.
This paper holds that the change of the domestic institutional structure (the relationship between the state and society) in the United States is embodied in the adjustment of the relationship between the two branches of administration and legislation and the micro-decision-making system within each department, which shapes the order and manner in which the variables of the system, state and society play their roles in the international economic decision-making of the United States and determines the domestic society. Interests and preferences, and the pressures and incentives of the international system, how they act on the state power in the middle of the two, and then influence the choice of policy instruments by the federal government to change the economic relations between the United States and the world. Run within categories.
The state is the representative of the public interest of the whole nation, and the society is made up of numerous private actors, and the social interests are embodied in the sum of the private interests. Because the social structure is naturally unbalanced, the social interests are often embodied in the special interests, and the power competition between the state and society around the international economic decision-making is embodied in the public interests. The competition between interests and special interests. As the national interests of the United States are more and more realized through the policies and actions of the government in the international system, the relationship between the state and society determines the ability of the government to defend the public interests through international economic policies in the international system.
This paper holds that under the institutional structure of "a strong country, a weak society", i.e. the government system of "a strong president, a weak congress", the federal government of the United States will rationally make international economic decisions in accordance with the overall interests of the United States in the international system, and strive to achieve the balance of economic and security interests, international interests and domestic interests. Under the system structure of "weak country, strong society", that is, under the government system of "weak president, strong congress", the international economic decision-making of the United States federal government is easier to cater to the special interests of the domestic society and become the product of the domestic political process.
This paper is devoted to reviving the tradition of comparative politics (domestic politics) in the study of international relations. By examining the domestic institutional factors that restrict or stimulate the choice of foreign policies, it tries to challenge some basic research methods and assumptions adhered to by neo-realism so as to retrieve domestic politics. The research path of this paper reflects the author's efforts to break the boundaries between traditional international relations and domestic politics. The author constructs an institutional change to explain American international economic policy. Theory, which drives the dialogue and marriage between international political economics and comparative political economics, integrates the traditional separation of international relations with domestic politics in order to enhance the explanatory power of the country's foreign economic policies and international economic interactions.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：F091.349;F171.2
【引证文献】
相关博士学位论文 前5条
1 张庆伟;美国政府对跨国公司的监管研究[D];山东大学;2011年
2 刘振环;美国贸易政策取向的历史演变[D];吉林大学;2010年
3 辛玫;美元霸权的国际政治经济学探析[D];吉林大学;2010年
4 姜伟;美国对日本贸易政策演变的政治经济学研究[D];辽宁大学;2010年
5 王志;美国多边贸易政策研究（1934-2009）[D];复旦大学;2010年
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