非对称双边市场下的在位厂商均衡

发布时间：2018-09-12 12:22

【摘要】：我们将要讨论两个中介人(Matchmakers)之间的价格竞争问题,竞争的环境是一个具有不对称结构的双边市场。称市场不对称是因为处在市场两边的客户具有不同性质。这里我们假设有两个中介人,一个在位中介人和一个潜在中介人,前者想要阻止后者对市场的入侵,他们的竞争行为基于两种价格工具:注册费和交易费,并且市场具有网络外部性,这使得潜在中介人可以采用”分而治之(Divide-and-Conquer)”策略来抢占市场份额。我们将要分析的是在这种竞争下均衡的存在性以及两个厂商的价格策略。我们通过考察三种市场结构中的在位厂商均衡的存在性来来分析中介人的竞争行为。其中前两种市场中,消费者只能在同一时间注册于一个中介者,即两个中介人提供的服务是相互排它的。并且第一种市场结构下,中介人只能收取注册费,一开始拥有全部市场份额的在位中介人可以通过一套价格机制来防范潜在中介人对市场的抢夺;第二种市场结构下,中介人被允许征收交易费,这样一来,在位中介人无法通过价格机制来守住自己的市场份额。在最后一种情况当中,我们假定消费者可以同时接受两家中介人的服务,在这种情况下,在位中介人想要防范潜在中介人抢夺市场的代价是获得零利润。
[Abstract]:We will discuss the price competition between two intermediaries, (Matchmakers). The competitive environment is a bilateral market with asymmetric structure. Market asymmetry is said to be due to the different nature of customers on both sides of the market. Let's assume here that there are two intermediaries, one serving intermediary, one potential intermediary who wants to prevent the latter from invading the market, and that their competitive behavior is based on two price instruments: registration fee and transaction fee. Moreover, the market has network externality, which enables potential intermediaries to use "divide and conquer (Divide-and-Conquer)" strategy to preempt market share. We are going to analyze the existence of equilibrium in this competition and the price strategy of two firms. We analyze the competitive behavior of the intermediaries by investigating the existence of the equilibrium of the incumbent firms in the three market structures. In the first two markets, consumers can only register with one intermediary at the same time, that is, the services provided by the two intermediaries are exclusive to each other. Moreover, under the first market structure, intermediaries can only charge registration fees. At first, incumbent intermediaries with full market share can prevent potential intermediaries from seizing the market through a set of price mechanisms; under the second market structure, Intermediaries are allowed to levy transaction fees so that incumbent intermediaries are unable to secure their market share through price mechanisms. In the last case, we assume that consumers can accept the services of two intermediaries at the same time, in which case the incumbent wants to prevent potential intermediaries from seizing the market at the cost of zero profit.
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2005
【分类号】：F016

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